
At a cabinet meeting John F. Kennedy made several attempts to spell decisions. The Kennedy Library does not have sufficient information to determine the date of the meeting, although it is suspected it was either during meetings on the Bay of Pigs or the Cuban Missile Crisis.

1961



IMMEDIATE RELEASE OCTOBER 27, 1962

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

Several inconsistent and conflicting proposals have been made by the USSR within the last twenty-four hours, including the one just made public in Moscow. The proposal broadcast this morning involves the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere. But it is the Western Hemisphere countries and they alone that are subject to the threat that has produced the current crisis -- the action of the Soviet Government in secretly introducing offensive weapons into Cuba. Work on these offensive weapons is still proceeding at a rapid pace. The first imperative must be to deal with this immediate threat, under which no sensible negotiation can proceed.

It is therefore the position of the United States that as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban bases must stop; offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease -- all under effective international verification.

As to proposals concerning the security of nations outside this Hemisphere, the United States and its allies have long taken the lead in seeking properly inspected arms limitation, on both sides. These efforts can continue as soon as the present Soviet-created threat is ended.

# # # #

FBIS 49

TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE TO KENNEDY

MOSCOW DOMESTIC SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1400 27 OCT 62 L

(TEXT) ESTEEMED MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE ACQUAINTED MYSELF WITH MUCH SATISFACTION WITH YOUR REPLY TO U THANT TO THE EFFECT THAT STEPS WILL BE TAKEN TO EXCLUDE CONTACT BETWEEN OUR SHIPS AND THUS AVOID IRREMEDABLE FATEFUL CONSEQUENCES. THIS REASONABLE STEP ON YOUR PART STRENGTHENS MY (BELIEF) THAT YOU ARE SHOWING CONCERN TO SAFEGUARD PEACE, AND I NOTE THIS WITH SATISFACTION.

I HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT OUR PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT AND I PERSONALLY, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, ARE CONCERNED SOLELY THAT OUR COUNTRIES SHOULD DEVELOP AND OCCUPY A WORTHY PLACE AMONG PEOPLE OF THE WORLD IN ECONOMIC COMPETITION, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURE AND ARTS, AND THE RAISING OF THE WELL-BEING OF PEOPLE. THIS IS THE MOST NOBLE AND NECESSARY FIELD FOR COMPETITION, AND VICTORS AND VANQUISHED WILL ONLY (WORD INDISTINCT) FROM IT, BECAUSE THIS MEANS PEACE AND INCREASED COMMODITIES FOR THE LIFE AND ENJOYMENT OF MAN.

IN YOUR STATEMENT, YOU SUPPORTED THE OPINION THAT THE MAIN AIM WAS NOT ONLY TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT AND TAKE MEASURES TO PREVENT CONTACT BETWEEN OUR SHIPS--AND THEREFORE THE DEEPENING OF THE CRISIS WHICH MAY AS A RESULT OF SUCH A CONTACT STRIKE THE F RE OF A MILITARY CONFLICT AFTER WHICH ALL TALKS WOULD BE SUPERFL OU , BECAUSE OTHER FORCES AND LAWS WOULD COME INTO FORCE--THE LAWS OF WAR. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT THIS IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP. THE MAIN THING THAT MUST BE DONE IS TO NORMALIZE AND STABILIZE THE STATE OF PEACE AMONG STATES AND PEOPLE.

I UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATE , MR. PRESIDENT, BECAUSE THIS IS THE FIRST DUTY OF A PRESIDENT. HOWEVER, WE ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE SAME QUESTIONS, AND I BEAR THE SAME OBLIGATIONS AS CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

YOU HAVE BEEN WORRIED CONCERNING THE FACT THAT WE HAVE HELPED CUBA WITH WEAPONS WITH THE AIM OF STRENGTHENING ITS DEFENSIVE CAPACITY--YES, PRECISELY ITS "DEFENSIVE CAPACITY"--BECAUSE NO MATTER WHAT WEAPONS IT POSSESSES, CUBA CANNOT EQUAL YOU. THESE ARE DIFFERENT QUANTITIES, ALL THE MORE SO IF ONE TAKES INTO CONSIDERATION THE MODERN MEANS OF EXTERMINATION.

OUR AIM HAS BEEN AND STILL IS TO HELP CUBA. AND NO ONE CAN DENY THE HUMANENESS OF OUR MOTIVES, WHICH ARE TO ENABLE CUBA TO LIVE IN PEACE AND DEVELOP IN THE WAY ITS PEOPLE DESIRE.

(MORE)

27 OCT 1103A MLH/HM

FBIS 51

FIRST ADD 49 (TEXT KHRUSHCHEV MESSAGE TO KENNEDY)

X X X ITS PEOPLE DESIRE

(CONTINUING TEXT) YOU WANT TO MAKE YOUR COUNTRY SAFE. THIS S UNDERSTANDABLE, BUT CUBA, TOO, WANTS THE SAME THING. ALL COUNTR ES WANT TO MAKE THEMSELVES SAFE.

BUT HOW ARE WE, THE SOVIET UNION AND OUR GOVERNMENT, TO ASSES YOUR ACTIONS WHICH ARE EXPRESSED IN THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE SURRO NDED THE SOVIET UNION WITH MILITARY BASES, SURROUNDED OUR ALLIES WITH MILITARY BASES, LITERALLY DISPOSED MILITARY BASES AROUND OUR COUNTRY, AND STATIONED YOUR ROCKET ARMAMENTS THERE? THIS IS NOT A SECRET. AMERICAN OFFICIALS ARE DEMONSTRATIVELY SAYING THIS. YOUR ROCKETS ARE SITUATED IN BRITAIN AND ITALY AND AIMED AGAINST US. YOUR ROCKETS ARE SITUATED IN TURKEY.

YOU ARE WORRIED BY CUBA. YOU SAY THAT IT WORRIES YOU BECAUSE T IS A DISTANCE OF 90 MILES BY SEA FROM THE AMERICAN COAST. HOWEVER, TURKEY IS NEXT TO US. YOUR SENTRIES WALK UP AND DOWN AND LOOK AT EACH OTHER. WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER THEN--THAT YOU HAVE THE R GHT TO DEMAND SECURITY FOR YOUR OWN COUNTRY AND THE REMOVAL OF THOSE WEAPONS WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE AND DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE SAME RIGHT FOR US?

YOU HAVE PLACED DESTRUCTIVE ROCKET WEAPONS, WHICH YOU CALL OFFENSIVE, IN TURKEY, LITERALLY AT OUR ELBOW. HOW THEN DOES ADMISSION OF OUR EQUAL MILITARY CAPACITIES TALLY WITH SUCH UNEQUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR GREAT STATES? THIS CANNOT BE MADE TO AGREE IN ANY WAY.

IT IS WELL, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU HAVE AGREED TO OUR REPRESENTATIVES MEETING AND BEGINNING TALKS, APPARENTLY THRO GH THE INTERMEDIARY OF U.N. ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT. HENCE HE, TO SOME DEGREE, ASSUMES THE ROLE OF A MEDIATOR, AND WE CONS DER THAT HE IS ABLE TO COPE WITH THIS RESPONSIBLE MISSION IF, OF COURSE, EACH SIDE WHICH IS DRAWN INTO THIS CONFLICT SHOWS GOOD WILL. I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO END THE CONFLICT QUICKLY AND NORMALIZE THE SITUATION, AND THEN PEOPLE WOULD BREATHE MORE EASILY, CONSIDERING THAT THE STATESMEN WHO ARE VESTED WITH RESPONSIBILITY, HAVE GOOD SENSE, AN AWARENESS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE ABILITY TO SOLVE COMPLEX QUESTIONS AND NOT BRING THINGS TO THE CATASTROPHE OF WAR.

I THEREFORE MAKE THIS PROPOSAL. WE AGREE TO REMOVE FROM CUBA THOSE MEANS WHICH YOU REGARD AS OFFENSIVE MEANS. WE AGREE TO CARRY THIS OUT AND DECLARE THIS PLEDGE IN THE UNITED NATIONS. YOUR REPRESENTATIVES WILL MAKE A DECLARATION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE UNITED STATES ON ITS PART, CONSIDERING THE UNEASINESS AND ANX ETY OF THE SOVIET STATE, WILL REMOVE ITS ANALOGOUS MEANS FROM TURKEY.

LET US REACH AGREEMENT AS TO THE SPAN OF TIME NEEDED FOR YOUR AND US TO ACHIEVE THIS. AFTER THIS, PERSONS ENJOYING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT CHECK ON-THE-SPOT FULFILLMENT OF THE PLEDGES ASSUMED. OF COURSE, THE AUTHORIZAT ON OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF CUBA AND TURKEY ARE NECESSARY FOR ENTRY INTO THOSE COUNTRIES OF THESE PLENIPOTENTIARIES AND FOR INSPECT ON OF FULFILLMENT OF THE PLEDGE ASSUMED BY EITHER SIDE.

IT WOULD EVIDENTLY BE BETTER IF THESE PLENIPOTENTIARIES WOULD HAVE THE TRUST OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND YOUR TRUST AND MINE--OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION--AS WELL AS OF TURKEY AND CUBA. I THINK IT WILL NOT BE DIFFICULT TO PICK SUCH PEOPLE WHO WOULD ENJOY THE TRUST AND RESPECT OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

(MORE)

SECOND AND LAST ADD (TEXT OF KHRUSHCHEV MESSA TO KENNEDY)

X X X ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

(CONCLUDING TEXT) HAVING TAKEN UPON OURSELVES A PLEDGE TO GIVE SATISFACTION TO THE HOPES OF THE PEOPLES OF CUBA AND TURKEY AND STRENGTHEN THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THEIR SECURITY, WE WILL MAKE A STATEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MAKES A SOLEMN PROMISE TO RESPECT THE INVIOLABILITY OF THE FRONTIERS AND SOVEREIGNTY OF TURKEY, NOT TO INTERFERE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, NOT TO INVADE TURKEY, NOT TO MAKE ITS TERRITORY AVAILABLE AS A BRIDGEHEAD FOR SUCH AN INVA ON, AND WILL ALSO RESTRAIN THOSE WHO CONTEMPLATE PERPETRATING AGGRES ON AGAINST TURKEY BOTH FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER NEIGHBOR STATES OF TURKEY.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE A SIMILAR STATEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN RESPECT TO CUBA. IT WILL DECLARE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL RESPECT THE INVIOLABILITY OF THE FRONTIERS OF CUBA AND ITS SOVEREIGNTY, UNDERTAKES NOT TO INTERFERE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS, NOT TO INVADE, AND NOT TO MAKE ITS TERRITORY AVAILABLE AS A BRIDGEHEAD FOR SUCH AN INVASION OF CUBA, AND WILL ALSO RESTRAIN THOSE WHO MIGHT CONTEMPLATE PERPETRAT NG AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA, BOTH FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND FROM THE TERRITORY OF OTHER NEIGHBORING STATES OF CUBA.

OF COURSE, FOR THIS WE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO SOME KIND OF TIME LIMIT. LET US AGREE TO SOME PERIOD OF TIME, BUT NOT TO DELAY--TWO OR THREE WEEKS; NOT MORE THAN A MONTH.

THE MEANS SITUATED IN CUBA WHICH YOU HAVE STATED ARE PERTURB NG YOU ARE IN THE HANDS OF SOVIET OFFICERS. THEREFORE, ANY ACCIDENTAL USE OF THEM TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS EXCLUDED. THESE MEANS ARE SITUATED IN CUBA AT THE REQUEST OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND ARE ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. THEREFORE IF THERE IS NO INVASION OF CUBA OR ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION OR ANY OTHER OF OUR ALLIES, THEN OF COURSE THESE MEANS ARE NOT AND WILL NOT BE A THREAT TO ANYONE, FOR THEY ARE NOT THERE FOR THE PURPOSES OF ATTACK.

IF YOU ARE AGREEABLE, MR. PRESIDENT, TO MY PROPOSAL, THEN WE WOULD SEND OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO NEW YORK, TO THE UNITED NAT ONS, AND WOULD GIVE THEM EXHAUSTIVE INSTRUCTIONS IN ORDER TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT QUICKLY. IF YOU ALSO CHOOSE YOUR MEN AND GIVE THEM THE CORRESPONDING INSTRUCTIONS, THEN THIS QUESTION CAN BE SOLVED QUICKLY.

WHY SHOULD I WANT THIS? BECAUSE THE WHOLE WORLD IS NOW PERTURBED AND EXPECTS SENSIBLE ACTION FROM US.

THE GREATEST JOY FOR ALL PEOPLES WOULD BE ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR AGREEMENT ON THE RADICAL LIQUIDATION OF THE CONFLICT THAT HAS ARISEN. I ASCRIBE GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS AGREEMENT INSOFAR AS T COULD SERVE AS A GOOD BEGINNING AND WOULD, IN PARTICULAR, MAKE T EASIER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON BANNING OF TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE QUESTION OF TESTS COULD BE SOLVED IN PARALLEL, WITHOUT CONNECT ON ONE WITH THE OTHER, BECAUSE THEY ARE DIFFERENT ISSUES.

HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT AGREEMENT BE REACHED ON BOTH THESE ISSUES TO PRESENT THE PEOPLE A GOOD GIFT, TO PLEASE THEM ALSO WITH THE NEWS THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE DISCONTINUATION OF NUCLEAR TESTS AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE ATMO PHERE WILL NO LONGER BE POLLUTED. OUR AND YOUR POSITIONS ON THIS ISSUE ARE VERY CLOSE.

ALL THIS COULD POSSIBLY SERVE AS A GOOD IMPETUS TOWARD SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS ALSO ON OTHER CONTROVERSIAL SSUES ON WHICH WE ARE EXCHANGING VIEWS. THESE ISSUES HAVE NOT SO FAR BEEN SOLVED, BUT THEY ARE AWAITING URGENT SOLUTION WHICH WOULD CLEAR THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE. WE ARE READY FOR THIS.

THESE, THEN, ARE MY PROPOSALS, MR. PRESIDENT.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS. KHRUSHCHEV.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State 13603

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT ☐ CHARGE TO

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

41

TOPOL 578

Oct 28 12 12 AM '62

Origin SS

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS ~~for USRO~~ 1128 listed page 3
USUN FOR INFO
REPEAT ALL NATO CAPITALS EYES ONLY INFO AMBASSADORS.

USRO PASS EMBASSY 002

1. The President desires that your briefing of NATO be essentially factual and reflect clear determination of US Government to press on its present course as reflected in (1) White House statement issued noon Saturday on continuing buildup (2) President's message to Khrushchev released White House Saturday evening, (3) announcement by DOD of continued surveillance, and (4) DOD announcement call up of Air reserves (all contained wireless file).

2. You can report that message from Khrushchev to President received night October 26 (being repeated Finletter, Paris and London only), while full of polemics, seemed to offer real hope solution could be found within framework supervised withdrawal offensive weapons from Cuba in exchange for commitment by United States not invade Cuba. U Thant's conversations in New York and broad hints in Cuban speeches at UN also seemed offer hope settlement along these lines could promptly be reached. Khrushchev's message to U Thant agreeing keep Soviet vessels temporarily outside quarantine area also seemed favorable sign.

These hopes have been diminished by subsequent public letter from Khrushchev to the President linking Cuban settlement ~~xx~~ to withdrawal of NATO ~~xxx~~ Jupiters from Turkey, but we continue to press for solution in Cuban framework alone.

3. The situation as we see it is increasingly serious and time is

Drafted by: W.H.: McGeorge Bundy
EUR G:UAJohnson:ges 10/26/62

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: G - U. Alexis Johnson

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Bundy
EUR - Mr. Tyler
NEA - Mr. Talbot

FORM DS-322 5-61

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
State Ltr. 8/10/73
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By [illegible] NARS, Date 8/29/74

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EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

SECRET

growing shorter. The United States remained determined to insure removal of offensive installations in Cuba. We are combining reasonable diplomatic offers and military pressure in even balance to this end.

4. But construction on the missile sites continues and there is every indication that more of the missiles are becoming operationally ready. Moreover, unarmed U.S. military aircraft which today were conducting publicly announced surveillance over Cuba were exposed to intensive ground fire and one of these aircraft is missing.

5. At the same time, Soviet vessels are also continuing to proceed toward the quarantine area in direct violation of Khrushchev's assurances to U Thant, although the Soviet Government was officially informed of the limits of the quarantine area by both U Thant and the United States Government. At the present rate of speed the first vessel will reach the quarantine area during daylight Sunday and an incident may occur.

6. In these circumstances the United States Government may find it necessary within a very short time in its own interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary to remove this growing threat to the Hemisphere.

7. In the light of the developing possibility of the necessity for action in Cuba, the President has instructed you to bring this matter fully to the attention of the NAC. You should say that while the US holds to the position that this matter should be settled within framework of the Western Hemisphere, we have taken note of the Soviet public message to President of October 27th in which a connection is made between NATO defenses and Soviet action in

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

Cuba. This Soviet position increases the possibility that US military action in Cuba may result in some Soviet moves against NATO. In these circumstances the US feels it essential to inform its allies and to consult with them on the general situation.

8. FYI. It is of the utmost importance that nothing in your discussion should hint of any readiness to meet Soviet Jupiter exchange proposal, but it is equally important that you should allow free expression of European views, whatever they may be. In stimulating free response, you should strongly press the point that U.S. action in Cuba -- if it becomes essential -- will be directed at a potential threat to the total strategic balance endangering other NATO countries at least as much as the United States. End FYI.

~~END.~~ RUSK

REPEATED INFO NATO CAPITALS:

LONDON 2344
BONN 1081
ROME 878
OTTAWA 529
ANKARA 457
ATHENS 479
LISBON 219
LUXEMBOURG 100
BRUSSELS 693
THE HAGUE 297
OSLO 151
COPENHAGEN 259
REYKJAVIK 137

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

OFF THE RECORD MEETING ON CUBA
October 16, 1962
11:50 A.M. - 12:57 P.M.

DEED CLOSED

JFK: Okay.

Lundahl: This is a result of photography taken Sunday, sir.

JFK: Yeah.

Lundahl: There's a medium range ballistic launch site and two new military encampments on the southern edge of the Sierra del Rosaario in west central Cuba.

JFK: Where would that be?

Lundahl: Un, west central, sir. That...

Speaker[?]: South of [unintelligible], south...

Speaker[?]: I think this [other gray/grade] represents your three dots we're talking about. Industrial.

JFK: Yeah.

Lundahl: Have you got the big picture?

Speaker[?]: Yes, sir.

Lundahl: The President would like to see those now. Well, on site on one Of the encampments contains a total of at least fourteen canvas-covered missile trailers measuring 67 feet in length, 9 feet in width. The overall length of the trailers plus the tow-bars is approximately 80 feet. The other encampment contains vehicles a tents but with no missile trailers.

Speaker[?]: These are the launchers here. These are missile bases up the [unintelligible].

Lundahl: In this instance, the missile trailer is backing up to the launc point. The launching of this particular [unintelligible] is her The missile canvas [unintelligible] hasn't been done.

Speaker[?]: Okay.

Lundahl: The site that you have there contains at least 8 canvas-covered missile trailers. Four deployed probable missile-erector launches. These are unrevetted. The probable launch positions as indicated are approximately 850 feet, 700 feet, 450 feet, for a total distance of about 2,000 feet. In Areas II, there are at least 6 missile covered, missile, un, canvas-covered missile trailers, about 75 vehicles, about 18 tents. And in area number III, we have 35 vehicles, 15 large tents, 8 small tents, 7 buildings, and one building under construction. The critical one-have seen this, Dean?--is this one.

JFK: How far advanced is this?

Lundahl: Uh, sir, we've never seen this kind of installation before.

JFK: Not even in the Soviet Union?

Lundahl: No, sir. [NATIONAL SECURITY WITHDRAWAL: 9s.] But from May of '60 on, we have never had any U-2 coverage of the Soviet Union, so we do not know what kind of a practice they would use in connection with...

JFK: How do you know this is a medium-range ballistic missile?

Lundahl: The length, sir.

JFK: The what? The length?

Lundahl: The length of it. Yes.

JFK: The length of the missile? Which part? I mean which...

Lundahl: ...the missile, here indicates...

JFK: ...Which one is...

Lundahl: This one shows here...

JFK: [Unintelligible] That?

Lundahl: Yes. Uh, Mr. Graybeal, our missile, uh, man, has some pictures of the equivalent Soviet equipment that has been dragged through the streets of Moscow, that can give you some ...

Graybeal: There are two missiles involved. One of them is our SS-3, which is 630 miles and on up to 700. It's about 68 feet long. These missiles measure 67 foot long. The other missile, the 1,100 one, uh, is 73 foot long. The question we have in the photography is the nose itself. If the nose cone is not on that missile and it measures 67 feet--the nose cone would be 4 to 5 feet longer, sir; and with this extra length we could have a missile that'd have a range of 1,100 miles, sir. The missile that was drawn through th Moscow parade was [unintelligible] but...

JFK: Is this ready to be fired?

Graybeal: No, sir.

JFK: ...how long if we can't tell [unintelligible]

Graybeal: That depends on how ready the GSE how...

JFK: But, what does it have to be fired from?

Graybeal: It would have to be fired from a stable hard surface. This coul be packed dirt; it could be concrete or, or asphalt. The surfac has to be hard, then you put a flame defect-, a deflector plate c there to direct the missile.

McNamara: Would you care to comment on the position of nuclear warheads-- this is in relation to the question from the president--explain when these can be fired?

Graybeal[?]: Sir, we've looked very hard. We can find nothing that would spe nuclear warhead in term of any isolated area or unique security this particular area. The mating of the nuclear warhead to the missile from some of the other short range missiles there would take about, uh, a couple of hours to do this.

McNamara: This is not defensed, I believe, at the moment?

Lundahl: Not yet, sir.

McNamara: This is important as it relates to whether these, today, are rea to fire, Mr. President. It seems almost impossible to me that th

would be ready to fire with nuclear warheads on the site without even a fence around it. It may not take long to k--, to place them there, to erect a fence, but at least at the moment there is some reason to believe the warheads aren't present and hence they are not ready to fire.

Graybeal: Yes, sir, we do not believe they are ready to fire...

Taylor[?]: However, there is no feeling that they can't fire from this kind of field position very quickly, isn't that true? It's not a question of waiting for extensive concrete, uh, pads and that sort of thing?

Graybeal: The unknown factor here, sir, is the degree to which the equipment has been checked out after it's been shipped from the Soviet Union here. It's the readiness of the equipment. If the equipment is checked out, the site has to be accurately surveyed, the position as is known. Once this is known, then you're talking a matter of hours.

Taylor[?]: Well, could this be an operational site except perhaps for the fact that at this point there are no fence? Could this be operational now?

Graybeal: There is only one missile there, sir, and it's, uh, at the actual apparently, launching area. It would take them.... If everything were checked out, it would still take them in the order of two to three hours before they could get that one missile up and ready t go, sir.

Lundahl or: Carter[?] Collateral reports indicated from ground observers that convoys o 50 to 60 of these kinds of Soviet, uh, vehicles were moving down into the San Cristobal area in the first, uh, couple of weeks of August, but this is the first time we have been able to catch the on photography at a location.

Taylor[?]: You say there's only one missile there?

Lundahl: There, uhm, are 8 missiles there. One of them is in what appears to be the position from which they're launched--in the horizontal Apparently near an erector to be erected in vertical position.

Rusk: You have erected one? You mean something has to be built, or is that something that can be done in a couple of hours?

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible]

Lundahl: Mobile piece of equipment, sir. We haven't any specifics yet on This but here is the way we believe that it could actually be lifted. Something of this nature. Now that, this would be the erectors, helping to raise the missile from this transporter up into a vertical position but the [unintelligible] structure [unintelligible] is on the ground.

McNamara: Am I correct in saying that we have not located any nuclear storage sites with certainty as yet? This is one of the most important thoughts we face in properly interpreting the readiness of, of these missiles. It's inconceivable tot me that the Soviets would deploy nuclear warheads on an unfenced peice of ground. There's, there must be some storage site there. It should be one of our important objectives to find that storage site.

Lundahl: May I report, sir, that two additional SAC [Strategic Air Command] missions were excuted yesterday? They were taken to Washington area last night. They're currently bing chemically processed at the Naval Center at Suitland, and they're due to reach us at the National PI [Photographic Interpretation] Center around 8 o'clock tonight. Both of these missions go from one end of Cuba to the other--one along the north coast and one along the south--so additional data on activities or these storage sites which we consider critical may be in our grasp if we can find them.

McNamara: And, is it correct that there is outside of Havana, uh, an installation that appears to be hardened that might be the type of installation they would use for nuclear warheads, uh, and therefore, is a, a, prospective source of such warheads?

Lundahl: Sir, I couldn't put my finger on that. Uh, the Joint Atomic Energy people may be looking at that and forming a judgement, but from photos alone I cannot attest to that.

Carter: There would appear to be little need for putting this type of missile in there, however, unless it were associated with nuclear warheads.

Rusk: [Unintelligible] don't you have to assume these are nuclear?

McNamara: Oh, I think...

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible]

McNamara: There's no question about that. The question is one of readiness of the, to fire and--and this is highly critical in formaing our plans--that the time between today and time when thre readiness to fire capability develops is a very important thing. To estimate that we need to know where these warheads are, and we have not yet found any probable storage of warheads and hence it seems extremely unlikely that they are now ready to fire or may be ready to fire within a matter of hours of even a day or two.

Lundahl: [NATIONAL SECURITY WITHDRAWAL: 24s.]

[WITHDRAWN: NATIONAL SECURITY. (CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5.)]

Taylor[?]: When will it be ready? Some time today?

Lundahl: They're supposed to be in, sir; I think that's right, isn't it, General Carter?

Carter: Yes, it is.

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible]

Carter: Read out from Sunday's should be available now. We have done some...

Taylor: Weren't there flights yesterday as well, too?

Carter: Two flights yesterday.

Taylor: You don't have the results of those film...

Carter: Yeah.

JFK: Thank you.

Lundahl: Yes, sir.

JFK: Well, weren't there any further flights scheduled?

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible]

Lundahl: There are no more scheduled, sir.

JFK: These flights yesterday, I presume, cover the...

Carter[?]: [Unintelligible]

Bundy: We hope so, sir, because the weather won't have been clear all along the island, so we can't claim that we will have been.... Certainly won't surely do not have up-to-date photographic coverage on the whole island. Actually one of our first questio is to...

Speaker[?]: Auth...[Unintelligible]

Bundy: ...consider whether we should not authorize more flights on the basis of COMOR [Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance] priorities There's a specific question of whether we want a closer and sharper look at this, this area. That, however, I think should b looked at in the context of the question whether we wish to give tactical warning, any other possible activities.

McNamara: I would recommend, Mr. President, that you authorize such flights as are considered necessary to obtain complete coverage of the island. Now, this seems to be ill-defined, but I purposely define it that way because we're running into cloud cover on some of these flights, and I would suggest that we simply repeat the flight if we have cloud cover and repeat it sufficiently often to, to obtain the coverage we require.

JFK: [Are your thoughts good?] on that?

Carter[?]: Yes, sir.

Rusk[?]: Interestingly...

McNamara: Now, this is X, this is a U-2 flying...

Carter: U-2, sir.

McNamara: ... specifically excludes the question that Mac raised of low-level flying which I think that we ought to take up later...

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible]

McNamara: ...after our further discussions on...

Speaker[?]: I agree.

McNamara: ...these possibilities here.

Lundahl: I have one additional note, sir, if I may offer it. Of the collateral information from ground observers as to where these kinds of trailers have gone, we don't have any indications elsewhere on the island of Cuba except for this San Cristobal area where we do have coverage; but we have no ground collateral which indicates there might be an equivalent thing going on somewhere else.

JFK: In other words, the only missile base...

Speaker[?]: Inter--,intermediate-range missile...

JFK: ... missile base that we now know about is this one?

Lundahl or Carter[?]: Correct.

Taylor: Is this one or two? This is one...

Carter: There's three of them.

Lundahl: Three, sir.

Bundy: Three that are associated.

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible]

Bundy: Do I understand this is a battalion, as you estimate it, Mr. Graybeal?

Graybeal: Yes, sir. We estimate that four missiles make up a battalion, uh, so that in this one that you're looking at, Mr. President, has eight missiles. That'd be two battalions and a regiment size. This one in front of the table is a second separate installation from which we can see six missiles. So there are probably two more battalions there. The other missiles may be under the tree. The third installation has the tents, but there are no missiles identified anywhere in that area.

Speaker[?]: Okay.

JFK: These are the only ones we now know about?

Graybeal: Yes, sir.

Taylor: Other than those cruise missiles...

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible] [thanks?]

Taylor: ...that you're familiar with, those coastal pens and the surface to air missiles.

Speaker[?]: Any intelligence on that thing?

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible]

JFK: Secretary Rusk?

Rusk: Yes. [Well?], Mr. President, this is a, of course, a widely serious development. It's one that we, all of us, had not really believed the Soviets could, uh, carry this far. Uh, they, uh, seemed to be denying that they were going to establish bases of their own. But it's plain [unintelligible] is a Soviet base, thu making it essentially Cuban point of view. The Cubans couldn't deal with it anyhow, so.... Now, hmm, I do think we have to set motion a chain of events that will eliminate this base. I don't think we can sit still. The questioning becomes whether we do i by sudden, unannounced strike of some sort, or we, uh, build up the crisis to the point where the other side has to think very seriously about giving in, or, or even the Cubans themselves, uh take some action on this. The thing that I'm, of course, very conscious of is that there is no such thing, I think, as unilateral action by the United States. It's so intimately involved with 42 allies and confrontation in many places, that a action that we take, uh, will greatly increase the risks of dire action involving, uh, our other alliances and our other forces i other parts of the world. Hmm, so I think we, we have to think very hard about two major, uh, courses of action as alternatives One is the quick strike. At the point where we make the, that i

the, uh, overwhelming, overriding necessity to take all the risks that are involved doing that. I don't think this in itself would require an invasion of Cuba. I think that with or without such an invasion, in other words if we make it clear that, uh, what we're doing is eliminating this particular base or any other such base that is established. We ourselves are not moved to general war, we're simply doing what we said we would do if they took certain action. Uh, or we're going to decide that this is the time to eliminate the Cuban problem by action on the island.

The other would be, if we have a few days--from the military point of view, if we have the whole time--uh, then I would think that, uh, there would be another course of action, a combination of things that, uh, we might wish to consider. Hmm, first, uh, that we, uh, stimulate the OAS (Organization of American States) procedure immediately for prompt action to make it quite clear that the entire hemisphere considers that the Rio Pact has been violated, that acts, whatever actions we take in, under the terms of the Rio Pact. The OAS could constitute itself an organ of consultation promptly, although maybe, it may take two or three days to get, uh, instructions from governments and things of that sort. The OAS could, I suppose, at any moment, uh, take action to insist to the Cubans that an OAS inspection, uh, team be permitted to come and, itself, look directly at these sites, provide assurance to the hemisphere. That will undoubtedly be turned down, but it will be another step in building up the, uh, building a position.

I think also that we ought to consider getting some word to Castro, perhaps through the Canadian ambassador in Havana, or through, uh, his representative at the U.N. Uh, I think perhaps the Canadian ambassador would be the best the better channel to get to Castro priv-, privately and tell him that, uh, this is no longer support for Cuba, that Cuba is being victimized here, and that, uh, the Soviets are preparing Cuba for destruction or betrayal.

You saw the Times (New York Times) story yesterday morning that high Soviet officials were saying, "We'll trade Cuba for Berlin." This ought to be brought to Castro's attention. It ought to be said to Castro that, uh, uh, this kind of a base is intolerable and not acceptable. The time has now come when he must in the interests of the Cuban people, must now break clearly with the Soviet Union, prevent this missile base from becoming operational.

And I think there are certain military, hmm, uh, actions that we can, we might well want to take straight away. First, to, uh, to call up, uh, highly selected units no more than 150,000. Unless we feel that it's better, more desirable to go to a general national emergency so that we have complete freedom of action. we announce, at the time that we announce this development--and think we do have to announce this development some time this week

uh, we announce that, uh, we are conducting a surveillance of Cuba, over Cuba, and we will enforce our right to do so. We reject the mission of secrecy in this hemisphere in any matter of this sort. We reinforce our forces in Guantanamo. We reinforce our forces in the southeastern part of the United States --whatever is necessary from the military point of view to be able to give, to deliver an overwhelming strike at any of these installations, including the SAM sites. And, uh, also, to take care of any, uh, MIGs or bombers that might make a pass at Miami or at the United States. Uh, build up heavy forces, uh, if those are not already in position.

That, uh, we then would move more openly and vigorously into the, into the, uh, guerrilla field, and, uh, create maximum confusion on the island. Uh, won't be too squeamish at this point about the overtness, covert counter [unintelligible] of what is being done.

We review our attitude on, on alternative Cuban government. We get Miro Cardona and his group in, Manuel Rey and his group, and see if they won't get together on a progressive junta. Uh, that would pretty well combine all principal elements, other than the Batista group, as the leaders of Cuba. And, uh, have them, give them more of a status, whether we proceed to full recognition or not is something else, but get, get the Cuban elements highly organized on this matter.

I think also that we need a few day, hmm, to alert our other allies, for consultation in NATO. I'll assume that we can move on this line at the same time to interrupt all air traffic from free world countries going into Cuba, insist to the Mexicans, the Dutch, that they stop their planes from coming in. Tell the British, who, and anyone else who's involved at this point, that, uh, if they're interested in peace, they've got to stop their ships from Cuban trade at this point. Uh, in other words, isolate Cuba completely without at this particular moment a, uh, a forceful blockade.

I think it would be important for you to, uh, consider, uh, calling in General Eisenhower (Dwight D. Eisenhower), giving him a full briefing before a public announcement is made as to the situation and the aggressive action which you might determine upon.

But I think that, uh, by and large, there are, there are these two broad alternatives: one, the quick strike; the other, to alert our allies and Mr. [Nikita S.] Khrushchev that there is utterly serious crisis in the making here, and that, uh.... That Mr. Khrushchev may not himself really understand that or believe that this point. I think we'll be facing a situation that could well l to general war; that we have an obligation to do what has to be d but do it in a way that gives, uh, everybody a chance to, uh, pul away from it down before it gets too hard. Those are my, my reactions of this morning, Mr. President. I naturally need to

think about this very hard for the next several hours, uh, what I a my colleagues at the State Department can do about it.

McNamara: Mr. President, there are a number of unknowns in this situation I want to comment upon, and, in relation to them, I'd like to outline very briefly some possible military alternatives and ask General Taylor to expand upon them.

But before commenting on either the unknowns or outlining some military alternatives, there are two propositions I would suggest that we ought to accept as, uh, foundations for our further thinking. My first is that if we are to conduct an air strike against these installations, or against any part of Cuba, we must agree now that we will schedule that prior to the time these missile sites become operational. I'm not prepared to say when that will be, but I think it is extremely important that our talk and our discussion be founded on this premise: that any air strike will be planned to take place prior to the time they become operational. Because, if they become operational before the air strike, I do not believe we can state we can knock them out before they can be launched; and if they're launched there is almost certain to be, uh, chaos, in part of the east coast or the area, uh, in a radius of six hundred to a thousand miles from Cuba.

Uh, secondly, I, I would submit the proposition that any air strike must be directed not solely against the missile sites, but against the missile sites plus the airfields plus the aircraft which may not be on the airfields but hidden by that time plus al potential nuclear storage sites. Now, this is a very extensive air strike. It is not just a strike against the missile sites; and there would be associated with it potential casualties of Cubans, not of U.S. citizens, but potential casualties of Cubans in, at least in the hundreds, more likely in the low thousands, say two or three thousand. It seems to me these two propositions uh, should underlie our, our discussion.

Now what kinds of military action are we capable of carrying out and what may be some of the consequences? Uh, we could carry out an air strike within a matter of days. We would be ready for the start of such an air strike within, within a matter of days. If it were absolutely essential, it could be done almost literally within a matter of hours. I believe the chiefs would prefer that it be deferred for a matter of days, but we are prepared for that quickly. The air strike could continue for a matter of days following the initial day, if necessary. Uh, presumably there would be some political discussions taking place either just before the air strike or both before and during. In any event, w would be prepared, following the air strike, for an air, invasion both by air and by sea. Approximately seven days after the start of the air strike, that would be possible if the political environment made it desirable or necessary at that time. Fine. Associated with this air strike undoubtedly should be some degree of mobilization. Uh, I would think of the mobilization coming no before the air strike but either concurrently with or somewhat

following, say possibly five days afterwards, depending upon the possible invasion requirements. The character of the mobilization would be such that it could be carried out in its first phase at least within the limits of the authority granted by Congress. There might have to be a second phase, and then it would require a declaration of a national emergency.

Now, this is a very sketchily the military, uh, capabilities. I think you may wish to hear General Taylor, uh, outline his choice.

Speaker[?]: Almost too [unintelligible] to Cuba.

Speaker[?]: Yes.

Taylor: Uh, we're impressed, Mr. President, with the great importance of getting a, a strike with all the benefit of surprise, uh, which would mean ideally that we would have all the missiles that are in Cuba above ground where we can take them out. Uh, that, that desire runs counter to the strong point the secretary made if the other optimum would be to get every missile before it could, becomes operational. Uh, practically, I think the, our knowledge of the timing of the readiness is going to be so, so, uh, difficult that we'll never have the, the exact permanent, uh, uh, the, uh, perfect timing. What we'd like to do is to look at this new photography, and take any additional--and try to get the, the, layout of the targets in as near an optimum, uh, position as possible, and then take 'em out without any warning whatsoever. That does not preclude, I don't think, Mr. Secretary, some of the things that you've been talking about. It's a little hard to say in terms of time how much I'm discussing. But we must do a good job the first time we go in there, uh, uh, pushing a 100 percent just as far, as closely as we can with our, with our strike. I'm having all the responsible planners in this afternoon, Mr. President, at four o'clock, to talk this out with 'em and get their best judgment.

I would also mention among the, the military actions we should take once we have destroyed as many of these offensive weapons as possible, we should, should prevent any more coming in, which means a naval blockade. So that all.... And also a reinforcement of Guantanamo and evacuation of dependents. So, really, the, the point of time, I'm, I'm thinking in terms of three phases.

One, a, an initial pause of some sort while we get completely ready and get, get the right posture on the part of the target, so we can do the best job. Then, virtually concurrently, a air strike against, as the secretary said, missiles, airfields, uh, nuclear sites that we know of. At the same time, naval blockade. At the same time, reinforce Guantanamo and evacuate the dependents. I'd then start this continuous reconnaissance, the list that you had, continue over Cuba.

Then, then the decision can be made as we, as we're mobilizing, uh, with the air strike as to whether we invade or not. I think that's the hardest question militarily in the whole business--one which we should look at very closely before we get our feet in that deep mud in Cuba.

Rusk: Uh, there are st-, one or two other things, Mr. President, uh. [Andrei A.] Gromyko asked to see you Thursday. Hmm, it may be of some interest to know what he says about this, if he says anything. He may be bringing a message on this subject. Uh, but that .... I just want to remind you that you are seeing him and that may be relevant to this conflict. I'm not suggesting that necessarily, that you delay it or anything else you have to do at this point.

Secondly, I don't believe, myself, that the critical question is whether you get a particular missile before it goes off because if they shoot those missiles we are in general nuclear war. In other words, the Soviet Union has got quite a different decision to make. If they, if they shoot those missiles, want to shoot 'e off before they get knocked out by aircraft.... So, I'm not sure that this is, uh, necessarily the precise thing, element, Bob.

McNamara: Well, I would strongly emphasize that I think our time should be based on the assumption it is, Dean. We don't know what kinds of communications the Soviets have with those sites. We don't know what kinds of control they have over the warheads.

Rusk: Yes, [unintelligible]...

McNamara: If we saw a warhead on the site and we knew that launcher was capable of launching that warhead, I would.... Frankly, I would strongly urge against the air attack, to be quite frank about it, because, I think the danger to this country in relation to the ga: that would accrue would be excessive, uh.... This is why I sugge: that if we're talking about an air attack, I believe we should consider it only on the assumption that we can carry it off befo: these become operational.

JFK: What is the, uh, advant-.... Must be some major reason for the Russians to, uh, set this up as a .... Must be that they're not satisfied with their ICBMs. What'd be the reason that they woul uh....

Taylor: What it'd give 'em is primarily, it makes the launching base, uh for short range missiles against the United States to supplement their rather defective ICBM system, for example. There's one reason.

JFK: Of course, I don't see how we could prevent further ones from coming in by submarine.

Taylor: Well, I think that thing is all over...

JFK: I mean if we let`em blockade the thing, they come in by submarine.

McNamara: Well, I think the only way to prevent them coming in, quite frankly, is to say you'll take them out the moment they come in. You'll take them out and you'll carry on open surveillance and you'll have a policy to take them out if they come in. I, I, think It's really rather unrealistic to think that we could carry out an air attack of the kind we're talking about. We're talking about an air attack of several hundred sorties because we don't know where these airplanes are.

Bundy: Are you absolutely clear of your premise that an air strike must go to the whole air complex?

McNamara: Well, we are, Mac...

Bundy: ...air complex? [Appears to be a repeat of the words above.]

McNamara: ...because we are fearful of these MIG 21s. We don't know where they are. We don't know what they're capable of. If there are nuclear warheads associated with the launchers, you must assume there will be nuclear warheads associated with aircraft. Even if there are not nuclear warheads associated with aircraft, you must assume that those aircraft have high explosive potential. We have a serious air defense problem. We're not prepared to report to you exactly, un, what the Cuban air force is capable of; but I think we must assume that the Cuban air force is definitely capable of penetrating, in small numbers, our coastal air defense by coming in low over the water. And I would think that we would not dare go in against the missile sites, knock those out leaving intact Castro's air force, and run the risk that he would use par or all of that air force against our coastal areas--either with o: without nuclear weapons. It would be a, a very heavy price to pa in U.S. lives for the, the damage we did to Cuba.

Rusk: Still, about why the Soviets are doing this, hmm, Mr. [John A.] McCone suggested some weeks ago that the one thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind is that, uh, uh, he knows that we have a substantial nuclear superiority, but he also knows that we don't really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that, uh, he has to live under the fear of ours. Also we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that. Hmm....

JFK: How many weapons do we have in Turkey?

Taylor[?]: We have the Ju-, Jupiter missiles...

Bundy[?]: Yeah. We have how many?

McNamara[?]: About fifteen, I believe it is.

Bundy: I think that's right. That's right.

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible]

Rusk: But then there are also delivery vehicles that are, could easily...

McNamara: Aircraft.

Rusk: ... be moved through the air, aircraft and so forth.

Rusk: Route 'em through Turkey.

Rusk: Hmm, and that Mr. McCone expresses the view that Khrushchev may feel that it's important for us to learn about living under medium-range missiles, and he's doing that to sort of balance that, uh, that political, psychological plank. I think also that uh, Berlin is, uh, very much involved in this. Hmm, for the firs time, I'm beginning really to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is entirely rational about Berlin. We've kind of talked about hi obsession with it. And I think we have to, uh, keep our eye on that element. But, uh, they may be thinking that they can either bargain Berlin and Cuba against each other, or that they could provoke us into a kind of action in Cuba which would give an umbrella for them to take action with respect to Berlin. In othe words like the Suez-Hungary combination. If they could provoke u into taking the first overt action, then the world would be confused and they would have, uh, what they would consider to be justification for making a move somewhere else. But, uh, I must say I don't really see the rationality of, uh, the Soviets' pushing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba to this country.

Bundy: It's important, I think, to recognize that they did make this decision, as far as our estimates now go, in early summer, and this has been happening since August. Their Tass statement of September 12, which the experts, I think, attribute very strongl to Khrushchev himself, is all mixed up on this point. It has a rather explicit statement, "The harmless military equipment sent to Cuba designed exclusively for defense, defensive purposes. The president of the United States and the American military, th military of any country know what means of defense are. How can these means threaten the United States?"

Now there, it's very hard to reconcile that with what has happened. The rest, as the secretary says, has many comparisons between Cuba and Italy, Turkey and Japan. We have other evidenc that Khrushchev is, honestly believes, or, or at least affects t believe that we have nuclear weapons in, in Japan, that combination [unintelligible].

Rusk: Gromyko stated that in his press conference the other day, too..

Bundy: Yeah. They mean Okinawa.

Speaker[?]: Right.

McNamara: It's not likely, but it's conceivable the nuclear warheads for these launchers are not yet on Cuban soil.

Bundy: Now that seems to me that's.... It's perfectly possible that this, that they are in that sense a bluff. That doesn't make them any less offensive to us...

McNamara: No.

Bundy: ...because we can't have proof about it.

McNamara: No, but it does possibly indicate a different course of action...

Bundy: Yeah.

McNamara: ...and therefore, while I'm not suggesting how we should handle this, I think this is one of the most important actions we should take: to ascertain the location of the nuclear warheads for these missiles. Later in the discussion we can revert back to this. There are several alternative ways of approaching it.

JFK: Doug, do you have any....

Dillon: No. The only thing I'd, would say is that, uh, this alternative course of, of warning, and getting, uh, public opinion, uh, OAS action and telling people in NATO and everything like that, would appear to me to have the danger of, uh, getting us wide out in th open and forcing the Russians to, uh, Soviets to take a, a position that if anything was done, uh, they would, uh, have to retaliate. Whereas, uh, a, uh, a quick action, uh, with a statement at the same time saying this is all there is to it, might give them a chance to, uh, back off and not do anything. Meanwhile, I think that the chance of getting through this thing without a Russian reaction is greater under a quick, uh, strike than, uh, building the whole thing up to a, a climax then going through.... Therefore, it will be a lot of debate on it.

Rusk: That is, of course, a possibility, but, uh....

Bundy: The difficulties of--I, I share the Secretary of the Treasury's feeling a little bit--the difficulties of organizing the OAS and NATO; the amount of noise we would get from our allies saying that, uh, they can live with Soviet MRBMs, why can't we; uh, the uh, division in the alliance; the certainty that the Germans wou feel that we <u>were</u> jeopardizing Berlin because of our concern ove Cuba. The prospect of that pattern is not an appetizing one...

Rusk: Yes, but you see...

Bundy: ...(Unintelligible)

Rusk: ...un, uh, everything turns crucially on what <u>happens</u>.

Bundy: I agree, Mr. Secretary.

Rusk: And if we go with the quick strike, then, in fact, they <u>do</u> back it up, then you've exposed all of your allies and ourselves to all these great dangers without...

Bundy: You get all these noises again.

Rusk: ...without, uh, the slightest consultation or, or warning or preparation.

JFK: But, of course, warning them, uh, it seems to me, uh, if you warn everybody. Uh, uh, uh, obviously you can't sort of announce that in four days from now you're going to take them out. They may announce within three days they're going to have warheads on them; if we come and attack then they're going to fire them. Then what'll, what'll we do then? We don't take 'em out. Of course, we then announce, well, if they do that, then we're going to attack with nuclear weapons.

Dillon: Yes, sir, that's the question that nobody, I didn't understand, nobody had mentioned, is whether this s-, uh, "take-out," this mission, uh, was [unintelligible] to deal with...

Speaker[?]: I don't know.

Dillon: ... high explosives?

Speaker[?]: High explosives, yes.

JFK: How effective can the take-out be, do they think?

Taylor: It'll never be a 100 percent, Mr. President, we know. Uh, we hope to take out a vast majority in the first strike, but this is not just one thing, one strike, one day, but continuous air attack for whenever necessary, whenever we di-, discover a target.

Bundy: They're now talking about taking out the air force as well.... I [could tell you that in the staff?]

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible]

Bundy: I <u>do</u> raise again the question whether, uh, whether we [unintelligible] the problem, military problem, but there is, I would <u>think</u>, a substantial political advantage in limiting the strike in surgical terms to the thing that is in fact the cause of action.

McNamara: I suggest, Mr. President, that if you're involved in several hundred strikes, this is what you would--and against airfields

this is what you would do pre-invade. And, uh, it would be very difficult to convince anybody that this was not a pre-invasion strike. I think also once you get this volume of attack that public opinion reaction, uh, to this, as distinct from the reaction to an invasion, uh, there's very little difference. And, uh, from both standpoints, it would seem to me that if you're talking about a, a general air attack program, you might as well think about whether we can eradicate the whole problem by an invasion just as simply with as little chance of reaction.

Taylor: Well, I would think we would have, should be in a position to invade at any time if we so desired. Hence that, uh, in this preliminary, we should be, uh, it's all bonus if we are indeed taking out weapons [unintelligible]...

JFK: Well, let's say we just take out the missile bases, then, uh, they have some more there. Obviously they can get 'em in by submarine and so on, I don't know whether you, you just can't keep high strikes on.

Taylor: I suspect, Mr. President, we'd have to take out the surface-to-air missiles in order to get in, to get in, take some of them out. Maybe [unintelligible].

JFK: How long will, do we estimate this will remain secure, this, uh information, uh, people have it?

Bundy: In terms of the tightness of our intelligence control, Mr. President, I think we are in unusually and fortunately good position. We set up a new, uh, security classification governing precisely the field of offensive capability in Cuba just five day ago, four days ago, under General Carter. That, uh, limits this, uh, to people who have an immediate, operational necessity in intelligence terms to work on the data and the people who have...

JFK: How many would that be, about?

Bundy: Oh, that will be a very large number, but that's not generally where leaks come from. And, the more important limitation is that only officers with the policy responsibility for advice directly to you'll receive this.

JFK: How many would get it over in the Defense Department, General, with your meeting this afternoon?

Taylor: Well, I was going to mention that. We'd have to ask for relaxation of the ground rules, uh, that, that Mac has just enunciated, so that I can, uh, give it to the senior commanders who are involved in the plans.

JFK: Would that be about fifty?

Taylor: By then... No, sir. I would say that, uh, within, at this stage ten more.

McNamara: Well, Mr. President, I, I think, to be realistic, we should assume that this will become fairly widely known, if not in the newspapers, at least by political representatives of both parties within--I would, I'm just picking a figure--I'd say a week.

[Several speakers speak at once; the conversation is unintelligible.]

McNamara: And I say that because we have, we have taken action already that is raising questions in people's minds. Normally, when a U-2 comes back, we duplicate the films. The duplicated copies go to a series of commands. A copy goes to SAC. A copy goes to CINCLANT (Commander-In-Chief, U.S. Forces Atlantic). A copy goes to CIA. And normally, uh, the photo interpreters and the, and the operational officers in these commands are looking forward to these. We have stopped all that, and this, this type of information is going on throughout the department. And I, I doubt very much that we can keep this out of the hands of, uh, of members of Congress, for example, for more than a week.

Rusk: Well, Senator [Kenneth B.] Keating has already, in effect, announced it on the floor of the Senate.

Bundy: Senator Keating said this on the floor of the Senate on the tenth of October...

Rusk: That's correct.

Bundy: ... "Construction has begun on at least a half-dozen launching sites for intermediate range tactical missiles."

Rusk: Well, that's that's exactly the point. I think we can count on announcing this not later than Thursday or Friday of this week.

Carter: There is a refugee who's a major source of intelligence on this, of course, who has described one of these missiles in terms which we can recognize, who is now in this country.

JFK: Is he the one who's giving Keating his stuff?

Carter: We don't know.

Bundy: My question, Mr. President, is whether as a matter of, uh, tactic we ought not to interview Senator Keating and check out his data. Seem to me that that ought to be done in a routine sort of way by a covert officer of the intelligence agency.

Speaker[?]: I think that's right.

JFK: You have any thoughts, Mr. Vice-President?

LBJ: I agree with Mac that that ought to be done. I think that, uh, we're committed at any time that we feel that there's a build up that in any way endangers to take whatever action we must take to ensure our security. I would think that the secretary's evaluation of this thing being around all over the lot is a pretty accurate one, I wouldn't think it'd take a week to do it. I think they'll know it before then.

I would, uh, like to hear what the responsible commanders have to say this afternoon. I think the question with the base is whether we take it out or whether we talk about it, and, uh, both, either alternative is a very distressing one, but of the two, I would take it out.

JFK: Well, uh, the, uh...

Johnson: Assuming that the commanders felt that way. I'm fearful if we.... I spent the weekend with the ambassadors of the Organization of American States, I think this organization is fine, but I don't think, I don't rely on 'em much for any strength in anything like this. And, uh, I, the fact that we're talking about our other allies, uh, I take the position that Mr. Bundy says; we ought to be living all these years with [unintelligible] get your blood pressure up. But the fact is the country's blood pressure is up and they are fearful, and they're insecure, and we're getting divided, and, uh, I don't think that, uh, uh... I take this little State Department, uh, Bulletin that you sent out to all the congressmen. One of, one of the points you make--that any time the build up endangers or threatens our security in any way, we're going to do whatever must be done immediately to protect our own security. And when you say that, why the, give unanimous support. People are really concerned about this, in my opinion. Uh, I would, I think we have to be prudent and cautious, talk to the commanders and see what they say, what they're... I'm not much for circularizing it over the Hill or our allies, even though I realize it's a breach of faith. It's the one not to confer with them. We're not going to get much help out of them.

Bundy: There is an intermediate position. There are perhaps two or three of our principal allies or heads of government we could communicate, at least on a 24-hour notice basis. Certainly ease, ease the...

Johnson: Tell allies, we've got to try to stop the planes, stop the ships, stop the submarines and everything else from sending. Just not going to permit it. And then stop them from coming in here.

Speaker[?]: Yeah.

JFK: Uh, eh, well, this, which... What you're really talking about are two or three different, uh, potential operations. One is the strike just on this, these three bases. One, the second is the broader one that Secretary McNamara was talking about, which is on the airfields and on the SAM sites and on anything else connected

with, uh, missiles. Third is doing both of those things and also at the same time launching a blockade, which requires really the, uh, the, a, uh, third and which is larger step. And then, as I take it, the fourth question is the, uh, degree of consultation. I don't know how much use consulting with the British has been. They'll just object.

Speaker[?]: Hmm.

JFK: Just have to decide to do it. Probably ought to tell them, though, the night before.

RFK: Mr. President.

JFK: Yes.

RFK: We have the fifth one, really, which is the invasion. I would say that, uh, you're dropping bombs all over Cuba if you do the second, uh, air, and the airports, knocking out their planes, dropping it on all their missiles. You're covering most of Cuba. You're going to kill an awful lot of people, and, uh, we're going to take an awful lot of heat on it...

Speaker[?]: Yeah.

RFK: ... and, uh, and the, uh, you know, the heat, you're going to announce the reason that you're doing is because, uh, they're sending in these kind of missiles. Well, I would think it's almost incumbent upon the Russians, then to say: "Well, we're going to send them in again, and if you do it again, we're going to do, we're going to do the same thing to Turkey", or "We're going to do the same thing to Iran."

Speaker[?]: Do they have the...

JFK: I don't believe it takes us, at least, uh... How long did it take to get in a position where we can invade Cuba? Almost a month? Two months?

McNamara: No, sir.

Speaker[?]: Right on the beach...

McNamara: No, sir. It's a bare seven days after the air strike, assuming the air strike starts the first of next week. Now, if the air strike were to start today, it wouldn't necessarily be seven days after today, but if... I think you can basically consider seven days after the air strike.

JFK: You could get six divisions or seven divisions into Cuba in sever days [unintelligible].

Taylor: Uh, no, sir. They, there are two, two plans we have. One is to

go at maximum speed, which is the one referred to you by Secretary McNamara, about seven days after the strike. We put in 90,000 men in, in 11 days. Uh, if you have the time, if you give us more time, so we can get all the advance preparation and prepositioning, we'd put the same 90,000 in five days. We have the choice of those two plans.

JFK: How'd you get 'em in, by ship, or by a air...

Speaker[?]: By air...

Taylor: Air drop and ship.

McNamara: Simultaneous air and ship.

JFK: To you think 90,000 are enough?

Taylor: Uh, at least it's enough to start the thing going. And I would say it would be, who... It ought to be enough.

McNamara: Particularly if it isn't directed initially on Havana, the Havana area. Uh, this is a variant. General Taylor, and, and, uh...

JFK: We haven't any real report on what the state of the popular reaction would be to all this, do we? We don't know whether...

Taylor: They'd be greatly confused, don't you think?

JFK: What?

Taylor: Great, great confusion and panic, do you think...

Carter: Well, it's quite hard to evaluate the effect and the later consequences.

Speaker[?]: Quite right.

McNamara: Sometime today, I think, at the State Department, we will want to consider that. There's a real possibility you'd have to invade. If you carried out an air strike, this might lead to an uprising such that in order to prevent the slaughter of, of, uh, of the free Cubans, we would have to invade to, to, uh, reintroduce order into the country. And we would be prepared to do that.

Rusk: I would rather think if there were a, a complete air strike against all air forces, you might as well do it, do the whole job

JFK: Well, let's uh, decide what we ought to be doing...

RFK: Could I raise one more questions?

JFK: Yeah.

RFK: Is it, uh, absolutely essential that you wait seven days after you have an air strike? I would think that seven days, that's what you're going to have all...

Taylor: If you give less, you, you run the risk of, of giving up surprise. If you start moving your troops around in order to, to reduce that [unintelligible]...

RFK: Yeah. The only thing is, there, there's been so much attention on Berlin in the last... Would you have to move them so that everybody would know it was Cubans?

Taylor: Well, it's troops, but shipping even more so, you know. You're going to have to assemble the ships necessary, and that will be very, very overt, and we can think of no way to cover that up.

McNamara: Uh, may I suggest the fact that we, we mentioned this other plan we talked about. We should be prepared for a series of eventualities after the air strike starts. I think it's not probable, but it's conceivable that the air strike would trigger a nation-wide uprising. And if there was strong opposition among the, the dissident groups, and if the air strike were highly successful, it's conceivable that some U.S. troops could be put in in less than seven days.

Taylor: That's correct. Our first pri., our air, our air drops and our marines. Well, the air drop at least beginning in five days. That might do the trick if this is really a national upheaval.

McNamara: So, we, we should have a series of alternative plans is all I'm suggesting, other than the seven days.

Speaker[?]: Well...

RFK: I just think that, uh, that five day, even a five-day period, the uh, United States is going to be under such pressure by everybody not to do anything; and, and there's going to be also pressure, pressure on the Russians to do something against us. If you could get it in, get it started so that there wasn't any turning back, uh, they couldn't...

JFK: But, but I mean, the problem is, as I understand it... You've got two problems. One is how much time we've got on these particular missiles before they're ready to go.

McNamara: Right.

JFK: Do we have two weeks? If we had two weeks, we could lay on all this and have it all ready to go, but uh-, the question really is is whether we can wait two weeks.

Speaker[?]: Yeah.

Taylor: I don't think we'll ever know, Mr. President, these operational

questions because, uh, with this type of missile, uh, can be launched very quickly with a concealed expedience.

Bundy: Do we have any...

Taylor: So that...

Bundy: ...intelligence, uh...

Taylor: ...even today, this, this one, uh, area, might be operational. I can see that it's, it's highly possible...

Bundy: One very important question is whether there are other areas which conceivably might be even more operational that have not identified.

McNamara: This is why I think the moment we leave here, Mac, we just have to take this new authority we have and put it...

Bundy: May I ask General Carter [whether the intelligence, the collateral intelligence relates to this area, as I understood it this morning?]

Carter: That's right. That's why we specifically covered this area on the one Sunday because the [unintelligible], you see...

McNamara: May I go back for a second, however, to the point that was raised a moment ago? Mr. President, I don't believe that if we had two weeks and we knew that at the end of two weeks we were going in, I don't believe we could substantially lessen the five or seven-day period required after the air attack, prior to the invasion, for the size force we're talking about because we start with the assumption the air attack must take them by surprise. We would not be able to take the actions required to shorten the five-to-seven day period and still assure you of surprise in the air attack. And therefore, we haven't been able to figure out a way to shorten that five-to-seven day period while maintaining surprise in the air attack...

JFK: What are you doing for that five days? Moving ships or where [unintelligible]...

McNamara: Moving ships and moving.... We have to move transport aircraft b the scores around the country. We should move ships. Actually, the ship movement would not be as extensive in the seven-day invasion as it would be in a, a...eleven day, after the air strike.

Taylor: It would take place after the air strike.

McNamara: We, we, we have been moving already, on a very quiet basis, munitions and POL. We will have by the twentieth, which is Friday, I guess, we will have stocks of munitions, stocks of POL pre-positioned in the southeast part of this country. So that of movement is beginning...

kind

JFK: What's POL, uh?

McNamara: Petroleum, oil, lubricants. So that kind of movement has already been taking place and it's been possible to do it quietly.

JFK: What about armor and so on? What about all the...

McNamara: the, the armor movement would be noticeable if it were carried out in the volume we require. And hence, the point I would make is that knowing ahead of time, two weeks ahead of time, that we would carry out the invasion would not significantly reduce the five-to-seven day interval between the strike by air and the invasion time of...given the size force we're talking about.

Taylor: I think our point of view may change somewhat because of an adjustment here. The decision would take out only the known missile sites and not the airfields. There is a great danger of, of equipment dispersal of all the, the interesting aircraft. Uh, you'd be in suprise, there's [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible]

Talyor: Missiles can't run off quite, quite as readily.

JFK: The advant-, what is... The advantage of taking out these airplanes would be to protect us against a reprisal...

Taylor: Yes.

JFK: ...by them. I would think you'd have to pre-, assume they'd be using, uh, iron bombs and not nuclear weapons because obviously why would the Soviets permit nuclear war to begin under that sort of half-assed way?

McNamara: I think that's reasonable.

Speaker[?]: But they still...

Speaker[?]: But they have...

Speaker[?]: ...have ten IL-28s and twenty...

Speaker[?]: Yes. Yes. They may carry out [unintelligible]. Yes.

Speaker[?]: ...twenty-five big ones.

JFK: So you think that if we're going to take out the, uh, missile sites you'd want to take out these planes at the same time?

Carter: There are eight airfields that are capable of mounting this jets. Eight [unintelligible]...

Bundy: But politically, if you're trying to get him to understand the limit and the non-limit and make it as easy for him as possible, there's an enormous premium on having a small, as small and clear-cut an action as possible, against the hazard of, uh, going after all the operational airfields becomes a kind of...

JFK: General.

Taylor[?]: I wonder if we could get, uh...

Bundy: ...[unintelligible] nuclear war.

Taylor: ...the number of hours required for each type of air strike, if we were just going for...

Carter: Yeah, sure, sure.

JFK: Well, now, what is it, uh, we have what is it we want to, we need to do in the next 24 hours to prepare for any of these three? It seems to me that we want to do more or less the same things no matter what we finally decide [unintelligible]...

Bundy: We've authorized, Mr. President, we have a decision for additional intelligence reconnaissance, a minor decision that we'll talk to Keating. Seems [like?]...

JFK: I don't think Keating...

Bundy: No.

JFK: ... will be that helpful.

Bundy: Leave that out.

JFK: Yeah.

RFK: I think that'll, then he'll be saying afterwards that we tried to...

Bundy: All right, the next, uh...

RFK: ...dun him.

Bundy: I should think we need to know the, the earliest readiness for th various sizes of air strike and how long they would take to execute.

Speaker[?]: Yes.

JFK: The immediate probability...

Dillon: One other question is what, if anything, has to be done, uh, to b prepared for, un, eventuality of a Soviet reaction?

JFK: And then I think what we ought to do...

McNamara[?]: What sort of alert to do...

JFK: ...is to figure out what are the minimum number of people that we really <u>have</u> to tell. I suppose, well, there's (Charles A.) de Gaulle [unintelligible].

Bundy: Right. You want de Gaulle. It's hard to say about (Konrad) Adenauer. You've got to tell, it seems to me you're going to have to tell SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe).

JFK: Hmm.

Bundy: ...and, uh, and the commandant.

Dillon: I would think this business about the Soviet reaction, that there, that might be helpful, uh, if we could maybe take some, uh, general war preparation type of action that would show them that we're ready if they want to start anything, without what you might risk starting anything.

Bundy: One...

Dillon: You just don't know.

Bundy: On this track, one obvious element on the political side is do we say something simultaneously or, uh, to the Cubans, to the Soviets, or do we let the action speak for itself?

Rusk: This point whether we say something to the Cubans and the Soviets before any, before...

JFK: I think we ought to, what we ought to do is, is uh, after this meeting this afternoon, we ought to meet tonight again at six, consider these various, uh, proposals. In the meanwhile, we'll go ahead with this maximum, whatever is needed from the flights, and, in addition, we will... I don't think we go much time on these missiles. They may be... So it may be that we just have to, we can't wait two weeks while we're getting ready to, to roll. Maybe just have to just take <u>them out</u>, and continue our other preparations if we decide to do that. That may be where we end up. I think we ought to, beginning right now, be preparing to... Because that's what we're going to do <u>anyway</u>. We're certainly going to do number one; we're going to take out these, uh, missiles. Uh, the questions will be whether, which what I would describe as number two, which would be a general air strike. That we're not ready to say, but we should be in preparation for it. The third is the, is the, uh, the general invasion. At least we're going to do number one, so it seems to me that we don't have to wait very long. We, we ought to be making <u>those</u> preparations.

Bundy: You want to be clear, Mr. President, whether we have <u>definitely</u> decided <u>against</u> a political track. I, myself, think we ought...

Taylor: Well, we'll have...

Bundy: ...to work out a contingency on that.

Rusk: We, we'll develop both tracks.

JFK: I think we ought to do the OAS. I think that's a legal time. I don't think we ought to do NATO. We ought to just decide who we talk to and how long ahead and how many people, really, in the government. There's going to be a difference between those who know that...this will leak out in the next few days...there are these, uh, uh, bases, until we say or the Pentagon or State won't be hard. We've already said it on the [unintelligible]. So we, let's say, we've got two or three days.

Bundy: Well, let's play it, shall we play it still harder and, and, simply say that there's no evidence...I mean we have to...

JFK: We ought to stick the battle plan till we want to do something.

Bundy: ...[unintelligible] the alliance [unintelligible].

JFK: Otherwise we give ourselves away, so let's...

Bundy: May I make one other cover plan suggestion...

JFK: Yes.

Bundy: ...Mr. President? There will be meetings in the White House. I think the best we can do is to keep the people with a specific Latin American business black and describe the rest as "intensive budget review sessions," but I haven't been able to think of any other...

JFK: Nobody,' it seems to me, in the State Department. I discussed the matter with, uh, [Charles E.] Bohlen of the Soviet bloc and told him he could talk to [Llewellyn E.] Thompson. So that's two. It seems to me that there's no one else in the State Department that ought to be talked to about it...

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible] in the department.

JFK: ...in any level at all, and, uh, until we know a little more. And then, as I say, in Defense we've got to keep it as tight as possible...

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible]

JFK: ...particularly what we're going to do about it. Maybe a lot of people know about what's there, but what we're going to do about it really ought to be, you know, the tightest of all becau otherwise we bitch it up

McNamara: Mr. President, may I suggest that we come back this afternoon prepared to, to answer three questions. First, should we surface our surveillance? I think this is a very important...

Speaker[?]: Very important point.

McNamara: ...question at the moment. We ought to try to decide today either yes or no.

JFK: By "surface our"...

McNamara: I mean we should state publicly...

JFK: Oh.

McNamara: ...that, that you have stated we will, we'll act to take out any offensive weapons, we are scheduling U-2 flights or other surveillance...

Bundy: What's the skull number, commissar? [Laughs]

McNamara: ...or reconnaissance flights to, uh, to obtain this information. We'll make the information, uh, public.

JFK: There may not be one. All right, why not?

McNamara: This is one question. A second question is should we precede the military action with political action? If so, on what, uh, timing? I would think the answer's almost certainly yes. And I wouldn't, I would think particularly of the contacts with Khrushchev. And I would think that if these are to be done, they must be scheduled in terms of time very, very carefully in relation to a potential military action. There must be a very, very precise series of, of contacts with him, and indications of what we'll do at certain times following that. And thirdly, we should be prepared to answer your questions regarding the, the effect of these strikes and the time required to carry them off. I think...

JFK: How long it would take to get'em organized.

McNamara: E-, e-, exactly. We'll be prepared...

JFK: In other words, how many days from tomorrow morning would it.... How many mornings from tomorrow morning would it take to get the, to take out just these missile...

McNamara: Missile sites, right.

JFK: ...sites which we, [well?] we need to know now? How long before we get the information about the rest of the island, do you figure, General?

Carter: Could take weeks, Mr. President.

JFK: Weeks?

Speaker[?]: Uh...

Carter: For complete coverage of a cloud covered island.

Bundy or McNamara[?]: Depending on the weather.

Taylor: Well, we, we've got about 80 percent now, don't we [unintelligible]?

Lundahl: Yes, sir. It depends much on what we get out of yesterday's flight, sir. They won't be [unintelligible]...

Carter: There are clouded areas, Mr. President...

Speaker[?]: Right, but there are areas...

Carter: ...as I understand it and there are...

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible]

Carter: ...areas that are very substantial...

Speaker[?]: We'll have a report on those...

Carter: ...in permanent [helium?].

Speaker[?]: ...covered with clouds over it.

Lundahl: We'll have preliminaries by six o'clock tomorrow morning.

JFK: Well, the [top] there is the...

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible]

JFK: ...the part of the island isn't covered by, uh, this flight we're uh, by tomorrow morning. What about, uh, doing that, uh, tomorro plus the clouded part doing low level? Have we got a plane that goes...

Carter: We can certainly go low level...

Speaker[?]: Go low level, lower level [unintelligible]...

Carter: ...and we have been reluctant to do that. The, the one thing to worry about on low level is that that will create a sense of tactical alert in the island, and I'm not sure we want to do that Our guess is that the high level ones have not, in fact, been detected.

Taylor: I think that's correct.

Bundy[?]: No reactions.

JFK: I would think that if we are going to go in and take out this and any others we find that we would, uh, at the same time do a general low level...

Carter: You could at the same time do a low level of all that we have not seen.

JFK: ...photographic reconnaissance.

Speaker[?]: Associated with.

Carter: That would certainly be sensible.

JFK: Then we would be prepared...

Carter: As a matter of fact...

JFK: ...almost any day to take those out.

Carter: ...for evidentiary purposes, uh, someone has made the point this morning, that if we go in on a quick strike, we ought to have a photographic plane take shots of the [hits?].

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible]

Taylor[?]: I think that's right, that's [unintelligible].

JFK: All right, well, now, I think we've got to, uh, [unintelligible] for this for us got to be doing anything quickly and quietly and completely that's what we've got to be doing the next two or thre days. So we'll meet at six?

Speaker[?]: Do you think...

RFK: How long...Excuse me. I just wondered how long it would take if you took it out ahead an invasion?

Taylor: Got to mount an invasion?

RFK: No, how long would it take got to...

Speaker[?]: What is that...

RFK: ...uh, take over the island?

Taylor: Very hard got to estimate, Bobby...

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible]

[There are several conversations going on and only portions of each are intelligible.

Taylor: ...but I would say that we, in five or six days the main resistance ought to be overcome. We might then be in there for, for a month thereafter [cleaning up?].

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible] just [unintelligible].

McNamara: Five or seven days of air plus five days of invasion plus...

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible]

RFK: I wonder if CIA could give us what state, uh, the [unintelligible] CIA what the latest, uh, is [popular or populace?] [unintelligible]. Yeah, so we get some idea about our reception there. I just hate to even waste these six hours, so it may be that we will want to be, uh, doing some movements, uh, in the next six hours, uh...

Speaker[?]: About the execution of the [launching?] [unintelligible].

JFK: Yeah.

[Multiple speakers; the following is the only intelligible conversation]

JFK: I want to, uh, add [unintelligible] better also. [I don't know?] About you, are you coming to lunch?

Speaker[?]: Yeah. Both of us were.

JFK: Who else is supposed to come to lunch?

Rusk: I was supposed to, but, hmm, [unintelligible]...

JFK: George, are you supposed to come?

Speaker[?]: No, no. [He's?], see if they've got the [unintelligible].

JFK: Do you want to take [out that?]?

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible], are you supposed to go now?

JFK: Yeah, six o'clock tonight?

Speaker[?]: Six o'clock.

JFK: All right. Seven o'clock.

Bundy[?]: Seven, seven is better actually for you, Mr. President. Is six-thirty manageable? That would be still better because you're supposed to be out there at eight.

JFK: Well, that's all right. That's, that's [unintelligible] then, uh, seven. Between six-thirty and seven. As close to six-thirty as you can be here. How many would there be? I'd like to have, if you add the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff her...

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible]

JFK: Well, then you bring who you think ought got to be bought.

Bundy: May I urge everybody got to use the East Gates rather than the West Gates?

JFK: I think we ought got to get... What's Mr. [John A.] McCone doing up here, General?

Carter: He's uh, burying his stepson tomorrow morning back...

Speaker[?]: He just [threw me?], I just talked with him on the phone. I think he'd rather decide.

JFK: So why don't you, you discussed [unintelligible]? Is he familiar with this information?

Carter: Yes, sir, he's aware of what has happened.

RFK: I talked with him about an hour ago. [unintelligible] here tomorrow morning [unintelligible]. He said he was going got to talk after the meeting, maybe just tell him we had a meeting [unintelligible].

JFK: All right, now the other question is on, uh, the [unintelligible] General Eisenhower. Where is the General, now?

Speaker[?]: Eisenhower...

JFK: I'll take care of that. I'll have [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: I want got to get say a list of the [unintelligible] of the [unintelligible] the president [unintelligible].

Carter: It's too complicated got to...

Rusk: George.

Speaker[?]: George.

Rusk: The president wants you got to take my place at lunch.

Ball: All right, I've got this, you know that I've got a 1 o'clock pre speech, that's all.

Rusk: Well, well, but maybe they could reschedule that.

Speaker[?]: Oh, well, we'll see how he's [unintelligible] at the conference [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: Yes, yes.

Speaker[?]: They can reschedule that, that's fine.

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible] the military [unintelligible].

JFK: Well, as I say, [I say?] you're familiar with [unintelligible].

Taylor: Well, uh, [unintelligible] the SAC bombers.

JFK: No, no, no. We'd get [unintelligible] out of [unintelligible].

Taylor: [unintelligible] make a decision her got to use whatever facilities you have.

Speaker[?]: What about [unintelligible], I'll call him about this thing tomorrow.

Speaker[?]: That's not the right person [unintelligible] [two or got to?] low level reconnaissance.

Speaker[?]: Yeah.

[End of reel of 1.]

(Beginning of reel 2. Reel 2 repeats some of the conversation from the end of reel 1. Several conversations are going on at the same time and very little is intelligible]

Speaker[?]: Yeah.

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible] tomorrow [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible] right person now [got to do?] low level reconnaissance.

McNamara: Yeah. I was just talking got to [Heinz?]. He'll get there right now. [unintelligible] What I think [unintelligible]. Everybody else will sit down at the table [unintelligible] and consider wha gaps there are.

Speaker[?]: This is the point I want [unintelligible] on this [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: I'm trying got to find out [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: I know.

McNamara: Why don't you drive? Pick up your car and you drive over got to this, the Pentagon and have lunch with [unintelligible].

why don't call from here and...

McNamara: This one still [unintelligible]....come over This could be [unintelligible]. Anybody else you choose.

Bundy: One, two...[unintelligible] then you can sit down...

Speaker[?]: Are you [unintelligible]?

McNamara: [Unintelligible] in great detail.

Speaker[?]: See what we really need.

Johnson: I have, I have leased under my authority [unintelligible]. I have kept that relationship. Uh, the only objective reason we should [unintelligible] switch planes makes sense. If you had, uh, immediate assassination or if you had something else, I'm, I'm away from you 4 or 5 hours. I have a Grumman "Gulfstream" that I've leased and I want you to lease it for MATS after the election. Let me use it instead of the "Jetstar." It's a helluva lot better for these small airfields and I think [unintelligible] fit in more people. Well, anyway, I have a lease now and I'd, what I'd like to have is, uh, the best communication that you have here. If it can be done.

McNamara: Oh, sure.

Johnson: As it is, my [unintelligible] when I get 100,200 miles from Washington, my telephone [unintelligible] but the highest it will go [unintelligible].

McNamara: Sir, things like this [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: Let me just check [before?] I ask him?

Speaker[?]: What will it be around here about [unintelligible]?

Bundy: Well, he's going to telephone [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: Low, low level. If you think that [unintelligible].

McNamara: He ought to just over there [unintelligible].

Oh, thank you. Would you just then take the call into [unintelligible]? Have [unintelligible] just sit down and your': right, they're great at that.

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible], too.

Speaker[?]: Yes, sir.

Cuba Tape

(This is a transcription of tapes recorded in the Cabinet Room on Saturday, October 27, 1962.

The tape begins with an inconclusive discussion of current tactical questions, including plans to stop a ship (Grozny) and a proposal for two daylight surveillance missions, morning and afternoon. This discussion is interrupted a few minutes into the meeting as the President reads a ticker item:)

JFK: (Reading) Premier Khrushchev told President Kennedy yesterday he would withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba if the United States withdrew its rockets from Turkey.

(voices unclear.)

Voice: He didn't really say that, did he?

JFK: That may not be -- he may be putting out another letter.

(Mixed voices. Calls for Pierre [Salinger].)

JFK: That wasn't in the letter we received, was it?

Voice: No. (Voices unclear)

JFK: Is he supposed to be putting out a letter he's written me or putting out a statement?

Salinger: Putting out a letter he wrote to you.

JFK: Let's just -- uh -- keep on going (words unclear)

Voice: It's in a different statement.

Rusk: Well, I think we better get -- uh -- (words unclear) Will you check and be sure that the letter that's coming in on the ticker is the letter that we were seeing last night.

(mixed voices)

JFK: What's the advantage of the second mission?

McNamara: It creates a pattern of increasing intensity of surveillance, Mr. President. We believe that we should do this. Now, personally I would recommend, although we don't need...

Voice: Are there two eights?

McNamara: Yes, two eights. On the missile sites (words unclear). And I would also recommend, although we don't have to decide now, that we conduct a night surveillance mission tonight. There appears increasing evidence that they're working night and day on these sites. (words unclear) two in daylight and one at night.

Bundy: The night is laid on but not finally authorized?

(mixed voices)

Voice: We believe there ought to be an announcement of that

(mixed voices)

Rusk: I really think we ought to have a talk about the political part of this thing, because if we prolong it more than a few days on the basis of the withdrawal of these missiles from Turkey -- not from Turkey, from Cuba -- the Turkish thing hasn't been injected into this conversation in New York and it wasn't in the letter last night. It thus appears to be something quite new.

(words unclear)

McNamara: That's what worries me about the whole deal. Just go through that letter; to a layman it looks to be full of holes, and I think my proposal would be to be...

Bundy: (interrupting) keeping the heat on

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McNamara: Keep the heat on. This is why I would recommend the two daylight and the one night missions, and I fully agree we ought to put out an announcement that we are going to send the night mission over.
Pause
Bundy: Which way do you want it to stand, that we approved it, Mr. President, subject to appeal, or do you want to hold it...
McNamara: (interrupting) We can hold it, Mr. President, we
(Voices unclear)
JFK: I think we ought to go ahead if they want it, so it's all right with me. I think we might have one more conversation about it, however, at about six o'clock just in case during the day we get something.
McNamara: There's plenty of time -- we keep it on alert.
JFK: That's right. We plan to put it on unless there's something in the daytime.
Bundy: Well the announcement can -- that is a complication. We can't very well make the announcement and not do it.
(And the conclusion, after further exchange, is to have the announcement all ready to go at the Pentagon.)
JFK: I ought to have...In case this is an accurate statement, where are we with our conversations with the Turks about the withdrawal of these ...
Nitze: Hare says this is absolutely anathema, and as a matter of prestige and politics. George is ready with a report from Finletter.
Ball: Yeah, we have a report from Finletter, and we've also got a report from Rome on the Italians which indicates that that would be relatively easy. Turkey creates more of a problem. We would have to work it out with the Turks on the basis of putting a Polaris in the waters, and even that might not be enough according to the judgment that we've had on the spot. We've got a -- we've got one paper on it already, and we're having more work done right now. It is a complicated problem, because these were put in under a NATO decision, and (words unclear)
Nitze: The NATO requirement involves the whole question as to whether we are going to denuclearize NATO, and I would suggest that what you do is to say that we're prepared only to discuss Cuba at this time. After the Cuban thing is settled we can thereafter be prepared to discuss anything...
JFK: (interrupting) I don't think we can -- if this an accurate -- and this is the whole deal -- we just have to wait -- I don't think we can take the position...
Bundy: (interrupting) It's very odd, Mr. President, if he's changed his terms from a long letter to you and an urgent appeal from the Counselor [Fomin] only last night, set in a purely Cuban context, it seems to me we're well within our -- there's nothing wrong with our posture in sticking to that line.
JFK: But let's wait and let's assume that this is an accurate report of what he's now proposing this morning -- there may have been changes over there -- a change over there.
Bundy: He -- uh -- I still think he's in a difficult position to change it overnight having sent you a personal communication...
JFK: (interrupting) Well now let's say he has changed it. This is his latest position.
Bundy: I would answer back saying I would prefer to deal with your -- with your interesting proposals of last night.
JFK: Well now that's just what we ought to be thinking about. We're going to be in an insupportable position on this matter if this becomes his proposal. In the first place, we last year tried to get the missiles out of

there because they're not militarily useful, number 1. Number 2, it's going to -- to any man at the United Nations or any other rational man it will look like a very fair trade.
Nitze: I don't think so. I don't think -- I think you would get support from the United Nations on the proposition, "Deal with this Cuban thing." We'll talk about other things later, but I think everybody else is worried that they'll be included in this great big trade, and it goes beyond Cuba...
Rusk: (interrupting) That's true of the Allies; it would not be true of the neutrals.
Bundy: No.
Rusk: (words unclear) goes on at the moment, to think about this. One possibility would be to, if this is persistent
Voice: Why are you stopping, Mr. Secretary?
Rusk: (words unclear)
JFK: (reading) A special message appeared to call for negotiations and both nations, Cuba and Turkey, should give their consent to the United Nations to visit their territories. Khrushchev said the Security Council of the Soviet Union was solemnly pledged not to use its territory as a bridgehead for an attack on Turkey, called for a similar pledge from the United States not to let its territory be used as a bridgehead for an attack on Cuba. Broadcast (words unclear) it was out of the question for the U. S. to abandon its Turkish military bases. Now we've known this was coming for a week -- uh -- we can't -- it's going to be hung up here now (words unclear).
(mixed voices)
JFK: How much negotiation have we had with the Turks?
Rusk: We haven't talked with the Turks. The Turks have talked with us -- the Turks have talked with us in -- uh -- NATO.
JFK: Well, have we gone to the Turkish government before this came out this week? I've talked about it now for a week. Have we had any conversation in Turkey, with the Turks?
Rusk: We've asked Finletter and Hare to give us their judgments on it. We've not actually talked to the Turks.
Ball: We did it on a basis where if we talked to the Turks, I mean this would be an extremely unsettling business.
JFK: Well this is unsettling now George, because he's got us in a pretty good spot here, because most people will regard this as not an unreasonable proposal, I'll just tell you that. In fact, in many ways...
Bundy: But what most people, Mr. President?
JFK: I think you're going to find it very difficult to explain why we are going to take hostile military action in Cuba, against these sites -- what we've been thinking about -- the thing that he's saying is, "If you'll get yours out of Turkey, we'll get ours out of Cuba." I think we've got a very tough one here.
Bundy: I don't see why we pick that track when he's offered us the other track, within the last twenty-four hours. You think the public one is serious?
(words unclear)
JFK: Yeah. I think you have to assume that this is their new and latest position and it's a public one.
Rusk: What would you think of releasing the letter of yesterday?
Pause
Bundy: I think it has a good deal of virtue.

JFK: Yes, but I think we have to be now thinking about what our position's going to be on this one, because this is the one that's before us, and before the world.
(Short pause)
Sorensen: As between the two I think it clear that practically everyone here would favor the private proposal.
Rusk: We're not being offered the choice — we may not be offered the choice.
JFK: But seriously, there are disadvantages also in the private one, which is a guarantee of Cuba. But in any case this is now his official (sic), and we can release his other one, and it's different, but this is the one that the Soviet government obviously is going on.
Nitze: Isn't it possible that they're going on a dual track, one a public track and the other a private track; the private track is related to (words unclear), and the public track is one that's in order to confuse the public scene (words unclear) additional pressures.
JFK: Possible...
(Voices unclear)
Thompson: I think it's one that the Soviets take seriously.
Rusk: I think, yes, I think that the -- uh -- NATO-Warsaw Pact arms problem is a separate problem and ought to be discussed between NATO and Warsaw Pact. They've got hundreds of missiles looking down the throat of every NATO country. And I think this is -- we have to get it into that context. The Cuba thing is a Western Hemisphere problem, an intrusion in the Western Hemisphere.
(Short pause - mixed voices)
Nitze: I think we ought to stand as much as we can on the separate stages.
Voice: Absolutely. (mixed voices)
Nitze: Fight the Turkish one with the best arguments we can. I'd handle this thing so that we continue on the real track which is to try to get the missiles out of Cuba pursuant to the private negotiation.
Bundy: The other way, it seems to me -- if we accept the notion of a trade at this stage, our position will come apart very fast. It's a very difficult position. It isn't as if we'd got the missiles out, Mr. President. It'd be different. Or if we had any understanding with the Turks that they ought to come out, it would be different. Neither of these is the case.
JFK: I'd just like to know how much we've done about it and how much did we talk about it...
Bundy: We decided not to, Mr. President. We decided not to play it directly with the Turks.
Rusk: ... our own representatives
Ball: If we talked to the Turks, they would take it up in NATO. This thing would be all over Western Europe, and our position would have been undermined.
Bundy: That's right.
Ball: Because immediately the Soviet Union would know that this thing was being discussed. The Turks feel very strongly about this. They -- uh -- we persuaded them that this was an essential requirement, and they -- they feel that it's a matter of prestige and a matter of real...
(mixed voices)
Bundy: ...In their own terms it would already be clear that we were trying to sell our allies for our interests. That would be the view in all

of NATO. It's irrational, and it's crazy, but it's a terribly powerful fact.
Thompson: Particularly in the case that this is a message to the UN, to U Thant. It seems to me we ought to get word to Stevenson that if this is put up up there he should immediately say we will not discuss — discuss the Turkish bases.
Bundy: The problem is Cuba. The Turks are not a threat to the peace. Nobody can (words unclear).
JFK: I think it would be very desirable to tell (word unclear) that until we get time to think about it, this thing -- the fact of the matter is that we received a letter last night from Khrushchev with an entirely different proposal. Therefore we first ought to get clarification from the Soviet Union of what they're talking, at least give us -- as I say you're going to find a lot of people think this a rather reasonable condition.
JFK: (reading bits from something) Besides he must guarantee not to intervene in Turkey and we must do the same in Cuba. (a dozen words unclear) Well, we know what the problem is there.
Rusk: Well, I think that it's relevant here to be able to say that we support the declaration of Iran that they would not accept foreign missiles in Iran. The Turkish problem is a NATO-Warsaw Pact problem, and it's an arms problem between these two groups that is something for these two groups to talk about with each other as a problem of disarmament with respect to NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
(Pause)
Dillon: Well, there's also this thing of upsetting the status quo, and we did not upset it in Iran. (words unclear) not being upset there, and they do the...
(Pause)
JFK: He's put this out in a way that's caused maximum tension and embarrassment. It's not as if it was a private proposal, which would give us an opportunity to negotiate with the Turks. He's put it out in a way that the Turks are bound to say they don't agree to this. (words unclear)
Dillon: There's another (words unclear) there's another -- uh -- military thing to it. It may be preparations for counteraction against those particular bases that we -- uh -- (words unclear) Cuba (words unclear) could be that.
(Short pause, whispers and mixed voices)
JFK: Until we have gotten our position a little clearer we ought to go with this -- uh -- last night business so that that gives us about an hour or two, we don't have Khrushchev...
Rusk: (interrupting) There's nothing coming in yet on our tickers. I...
JFK: He says he'd like to consider the following statement be issued — this is Stevenson — (reading) the United States does not have any territorial designs against Cuba, but of course we cannot tolerate Soviet-Cuban aggression against us or our sister republics (words unclear) the Soviet offer to withdraw weapons in Cuba (words unclear) assurance of our peaceful intentions towards Cuba. In the meantime it is imperative that further developments of Soviet bases stop and discussions proceed with the Secretary General of the United Nations in New York. Governor Stevenson recommends that such a statement be made in order to prevent the Soviets from capturing the peace offensive. Governor Stevenson also recommends that we not consider the Turkish offer as reported in the attached Reuters dispatch as an alternative or an addition to the Khrushchev proposal in his

letter. I think that -- uh -- we ought to go at -- we ought to get a statement ready which will -- uh -- I'm not sure that -- which would -- uh -- these references to last night's -- back on that, number one. Number two something about the work on the bases stopping while we're going to have a chance to discuss these matters. I don't know what we're going to say on the Turkish matter.
Thompson: Khrushchev may have picked up the statement which Kreisky, the Austrian Foreign Minister, made day before yesterday -- has made and which he may think was inspired by us, in which he raised the question of Turkish...
Low Voice: Of course maybe the Russians got Kreisky to do it, too.
(Pause -- very low voices on drafting details of something for 75 seconds)
Rusk: And if we publish the letter of last night, Tommy, what other letters will get published (words unclear)
Thompson: I think probably this -- uh -- whole exchange, this refers -- uh -- starting with this crisis -- this refers to the previous letters. It starts out by saying, "I received your letter." I've got the feeling that if you have someone explaining the situation, you have to publish the exchange.
JFK: I don't know. You perhaps don't have to put out the letter as much as you do the three proposals or so.
(Long pause. Voices mixed, occasional, and low)
RFK: The first point being that this -- uh -- this question of Cuba and the (word unclear) must be resolved within the next few days; it can't wait. The negotiations and discussions must -- uh -- get on, and the work that is continuing despite our protests has been going on. So therefore it's got to be resolved quickly. Uh -- this action that has been taken is not an action just by the United States but is an action by all of the Latin American countries plus the United States. This has nothing to do with the security of the countries of Europe, which do have their own problems. Uh -- we would -- uh -- obviously consider negotiating the giving up of bases in -- uh -- Turkey if we can assure the -- uh -- Turks and the other European countries for whom these bases were emplaced that there can be some assurances given to them for their own security. This will entail inspection as we anticipate that there will be some inspection in Cuba and in the United States -- uh -- at the time that these bases are withdrawn from Cuba and we give assurances that we are not going to invade Cuba. Something along those lines.
(Pause. Low voices exchanging unclear views on US-UN relations. A new message reported arriving.)
RFK: I don't see how we can ask the Turks to give up their defense
Voice: What do you think they could...
RFK: No -- uh -- (word unclear) unless the Soviet Union is also going to give up their -- uh --
Voices: weapons.
McNamara: Not only the weapons, but agree not to invade Turkey.
(Voices overlapping)
McNamara: And allow inspection to ensure that they haven't.
RFK: We would be glad for it (voices overlapping). We think that's a very good point made by the Russians, and we would be glad to -- and we finally feel that this is a major breakthrough and we would be glad to discuss that. In the meantime this is a threat to the United States and not just that -- to all of Latin America and let's get that done.

Voice: I think that's tough on (word unclear) to say that this is what we want.
(Voices overlapping.)
McNamara: Well, Khrushchev's statement to U Thant is absolutely contradictory to his statement to the President. The question is which came first. I thought the reply to U Thant came first.
Rusk: What's the statement to the President?
McNamara: The long letter.
Voice: Oh.
(mixed voices)
(There follows an inconclusive discussion of times of the messages.
The reel of tape ends here,

[End Meeting Item 40.3, Reference Reel 1, continued on Reference Reel 2]

and the next reel begins with low voices and side conversations, not clear -- President not present. The gathering comes to order after about five minutes as Rusk begins to read from the Khrushchev public letter. He reads its highlights rapidly.)

McNamara: Dean, how do you interpret the addition of still another condition over and above the letter that came in last night? We had one deal in the letter, and now we've got a different deal. And -- uh -- in relation ...

(mixed voices; one: Shouldn't we point this out by letter?)

McNamara: How can we negotiate with somebody who changes his deal before we even get a chance to reply and announces publicly the deal before we receive it?

Bundy: I think there must have been an overruling in Moscow.

Voice: What does Tommy say?

Voice: (Words unclear) - Bob, we've got three positions.

Thompson: (Words unclear) a long letter last night he wrote himself.

Rusk: And was that sent out without clearances?

Thompson: Without clearances, yes.

(mixed voices)

McNamara: It completely changes the character of the deal we're likely to be able to make, and also therefore our action in the interim. So I (words unclear) really keep the pressure on (words unclear) the situation.

Bundy: This should be knocked down publicly. A private -- let me suggest this scenario -- we knock this down publicly in the way we've just described, separating the issues, keeping attention on Cuba, and the four-point reply that Bob has framed. Privately we say to Khrushchev, "Look -- uh -- your public statement is a very dangerous one because -- uh -- it makes impossible immediate discussion of your private proposals and requires us to proceed urgently with the things that we have in mind. You'd better get straightened out."

Voice: This is exactly what I'd say.

McCone: I think that's exactly right.

Voice: And we release the fact that there was the other letter?

Bundy: No, we don't. I guess we say we are reluctant to release this letter which would display the inconsistency in your position, but we don't have very much time.

McNamara: The point, Bobby, is he's changed the deal. (Words unclear) Before we even got the first letter translated, he added a completely new deal and he released it publicly, and under these circumstances (words unclear)

(voices)

RFK: What is the advantage? I don't know what -- where you are in twenty-four hours from now -- uh -- so we win that argument but what twenty-four hours...

voices
McNamara: We incorporate a new deal in our letter.
(Voices unclear and overlapping, and someone says: "remove the missiles, clear the production sites, and then inspection.")
RFK: Now the problem is going to be -- uh -- not just this fact that we have this exchange with him and (words unclear) but the fact that he's going to have a ploy publicly that's going to look rather satisfactory at present. How are we going to have him do anything but take the ball away from us publicly, if we don't -- if we just write him a letter.
(Voices)
Bundy: (words unclear) to surface his earlier message, Bobby...
RFK: All of that. I think that we're going to have to, in the next three or four hours, not just put the ball completely in -- uh -- in his hands and allow him to do whatever he wants. We have an exchange with him and say he's double-crossed us, and we don't know which deal to accept, and then he writes back, and in the meantime he's got all the play throughout the world, and the fact that he (word unclear)
McNamara: Just turn it down publicly.
RFK: Yeah, but I think that's awful tough...
(Voices overlap.)
McCone: I don't think you can turn that down publicly without -- uh -- referring publicly to his letter of yesterday.
RFK: I'd like to have the consideration of my thoughts (words unclear). He's offered this deal -- uh -- (words unclear) that he will withdraw the bases in Cuba for assurances that we don't intend to invade. We've always given those assurances. We will be glad to give them again. He said, in his letter to me, he said that we were to permit inspection. Obviously that entails inspection not only of Cuba but entails inspection of the United States to ensure that we're not -- by United Nations observers -- to ensure that we're not getting ready to -- uh -- invade. Now this is one of the things U Thant -- the bases in Cuba -- uh -- involve -- uh -- the security of the Western Hemisphere. This is not just a question of the United States. This is a question of all the Latin American countries, which have all joined together in this effort. Time is running out on us. This must be brought to fruition. -- uh -- The question of the Turkish bases, we think that's excellent, that you brought that up, and that -- uh -- that -- uh -- there should be disarmament of the Turkish bases, but that has nothing to do with the security of the Western Hemisphere. It does have to do with the security of Turkey, and we would be happy, and we're sure the Turks would be, of making a similar arrangement in Turkey. We will withdraw the bases from Turkey if -- uh -- and allow (word unclear) inspection of Turkey to make sure we've done that, and you withdraw your invasion bases of -- uh -- of the Soviet Union and permit inspection there.
Voice: I think it's too complicated, Bobby.
RFK: Well, I don't think it is.
JFK: Wait, just, it seems to me the first thing we ought to try to do is not let the Turks issue some statement that's wholly unacceptable. So that before we've even had a chance to get our own diplomacy the first thing it seems to me we ought to emphasize is that (noises) But they've given us several different proposals in twenty-four hours. And work's got to stop today, before we talk about anything. At least then we're in a defensible position. The other thing is to not have the Turks making statements, so that this thing -- Khrushchev puts it out and the next thing the Turks say they won't accept it. Then whatever we do in Turkey -- in Cuba -- it seems

to me he has set the groundwork to do something in Turkey. So I think we ought to have the Turks -- we ought to have a talk with the Turks because I think they've got to understand the peril that they're going to move in the next week. When we take some action in Cuba, the chances are that he'll take some action in Turkey, and they ought to understand that. And in fact he may even come out and say that once (words unclear) he's tried to be fair and if we do any more about Cuba then he's going to do it to Turkey. So I think the Turks ought to think a little (noise). We ought to try to get them not to respond to this till we've had a chance to consider what action we'll take. Now how long will it take to get in touch with the Turks? (Voices overlapping: "it's going to be awfully hard," "the NATO problem")

Rusk: I think this is the thing the Turks ought to say that -- uh -- the security of Turkey, and the military arrangement in Turkey are part of the NATO problem or NATO.

Bundy: Part of the Atlantic -- part of the Western Alliance -- and have no other and they have nothing to do with (word unclear, possibly "NATO"). They ought to -- they can certainly make a statement disassociating themselves.

Voices: Yes

Bundy: It seems to me it's important that they should. If anyone pulls them in, it'll be us, and they can't be expected to do that.

JFK: Well, but -- uh -- we want to give them some guidance. These are American missiles, not Turkish missiles; they're under American control, not Turkish control.

Rusk: The missiles -- don't they own the missiles?

McNamara: They belong to Turkey and are manned by Turks, but the warheads are in U. S. custody.

Voice: It seems to me that...

Rusk: And they're committed to NATO.

JFK: In other words we couldn't withdraw the missiles anyway. (words unclear)

McNamara: They belong to Turkey.

JFK: All we could withdraw is the warheads?

McNamara: Well, we can't even really withdraw the warheads. We simply are custodians of the warheads for the account of the Turks in the recognition that you must release them.

JFK: Well now we've got -- what we have to do first is get -- uh -- I would think is just -- uh -- act very quickly, till we've had a chance to think a little more about it -- that what we ought to say is that we have had several, publicly and privately, different proposals -- or differing proposals -- (words unclear by other voices). They all are complicated matters that involve some discussion to get their true meaning. We cannot permit ourselves to be impaled on a long negotiating hook while the work goes on at these bases. I therefore suggest that -- uh -- work -- that the United Nations immediately, with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, take steps with regard to the cessation of the work, and then we can talk about all these matters, which are very complicated.

Bundy: I think it would be very important to say at least that the current threat to peace is not restricted to Cuba. There's no pain in saying that if you think you're going to make a trade later on. I think also that we ought to -- uh -- say that we have an immediate threat -- what is going on in Cuba, and that is what has got to stop. Then I think we should say the public Soviet -- the broadcast message is at variance with other proposals which have been put forward --

JFK: In the last twelve hours...
Bundy: In the last twelve hours. And interpret those for background.
JFK: That being so -- uh -- until we find out what is really being suggested and what can really be discussed, we have to get something on work -- the main weakness here is the work's going on.
Bundy: That's right.
JFK: We may -- now let's not kid ourselves; they've got a God -- they've got a very good proposal, which is the reason they made it publicly not privately...
Bundy: The work's going on. While you were out of the room, Mr. President, we reached an informal consensus -- I don't know whether Tommy agrees -- that this -- last night's message was Khrushchev and this one is his own hard-nosed people overruling him -- this public one -- that they didn't like what he said to you last night. Nor would I, if I were a Soviet hard-nose.
Thompson: I think in view of the Kreisky speech they have to have thought this was our underground way of testing this and they thought they had to...
Bundy: Who said that?
JFK: The only thing is, Tommy, why wouldn't they say it privately if they were serious. The fact they give it to us publicly -- I think they know the kind of complexity that...
Voice: Soviet officials...
Bundy: And it's a way of pinning themselves down.
JFK: Now let's -- uh -- I would think the first thing we have to do is to -- as I say, rather than get into the details -- the fact that work is going on is the one defensible public position we've got. They've got a very good card. This one is going to be very tough, I think, for us. It's going to be tough in England, I'm sure -- as well as other places on the continent -- we're going to be forced to take action, that might seem, in my opinion, not a blank check but a pretty good check to take action in Berlin on the grounds that we were wholly unreasonable. Most think -- people think that if you're allowed an even trade you ought to take advantage of it. Therefore it makes it much more difficult for us to move with world support. These are all the things that -- uh -- why this is a pretty good play of his. That -- uh -- being so -- uh -- I think that we -- the only thing we've got him on is the fact that now they've put forward varying proposals in short periods of time, all of which are complicated, and under that shield this work goes on. Until we can get some un -- agreement on the cessation of work, how can we possibly negotiate with proposals coming as fast as the wires can carry them.
Bundy: And the ships are still moving. In spite of his assurances to U Thant his ships still...
JFK: I don't think we ought to emphasize the ships (words unclear)
Dillon: There's one other -- uh -- very -- might be a very dangerous sentence in this thing that no one has particularly mentioned, but it's a thing I've been afraid of all along on a Cuban trade, and it's where he says, "How are we to react when you have surrounded our country with bases about which your military speak demonstratively?" that opens up our whole base system...
JFK: I thought he pinned it to Turkey, though.
Dillon: Oh no. Then he goes on and says that, but he's left it open to (voices unclear) say it's -- uh --
JFK: It (words unclear) the direct phrase suggests it's Turkey.

Thompson: Mr. President, it's larger than the missiles, because he says 'the means which you consider aggressive' which -- this could include planes, the presence of technicians, and everything else. That means the real abandonment of our base in Turkey (words unclear).
Bundy: Yah, obviously that's subject to various shades. He could take missiles for missiles, which wouldn't be good enough from our point of view because its (word unclear) to Cuba. It would be tough anyway.
JFK: It would be tough for three weeks (words unclear) because the problem is if the work on their bases stops, that's in my opinion our defensible position.
McNamara: Stop the (words unclear) the operability of it -- uh --
(mixed voices)
McNamara: I would certainly put that in the same message. It isn't enough to stop work on a base that's already operable.
JFK: We've got to -- now let's see now -- let's see what Stevenson's suggesting. (Pause) What? Yeah (to voices not heard)
Voice: I don't think it's a strong line to suggest the peculiar ways of debating (words unclear). It's going to look to the public as though we're confused.
JFK: Well no, the only thing that I'm trying to suggest is all these proposals come; they're all complicated, and what they can do is hang us up in negotiations on different proposals while the work goes on.
Nitze:: That looks like a rationalization of our own confusion. I think you've got to take a firmer line than that.
Bundy: I myself would send back word, by Fomin, for example, that last night's stuff was pretty good; this is impossible, at this stage of the game, and that time is getting very short.
JFK: What's our public position?
Bundy: Our public position is as you outlined it, but I think that it's very important to get them to get the message that they -- if they want to stop something further in Cuba, they have to do better than this public statement.
(short pause)
JFK: See if you can get Stevenson on the phone.
(short pause)
Bundy: Mr. Secretary, have you got a draft -- typed?
(words unclear)
Rusk: I'm just scribbling off something here. I think we ought to say something pretty closely (word unclear)
(long pause -- low voices not clear)
JFK: You have any idea how many bases -- missiles may be facing Turkey? Intermediate?
McNamara: Not off hand, Mr. President.
Voice: I would guess it was on the order of at least a hundred, within range.
Voice: We have fifteen Jupiters.
JFK: Fifteen Jupiters in Turkey?
(voices unclear)
Voice: To get the bombers out of Cuba we'd have to get the nuclear weapons and planes out of Turkey.
Thompson: It seems that you can't tell which one went first. One went there and one went here, but he thinks that they were sent about the same time.
(voices unclear)
McNamara: Absolutely contradictory.

(mixed voices)
Low Voice: Are we sure that the Russians might not have -- that the Russian language view, might not have implied or might not be interpreted by the Russians, when we're talking about ships carrying proclaimed material?
(Pause)
Thompson: He certainly doesn't have the text but he knew when he heard the broadcast.
JFK: (Talking to Stevenson on phone) Well -- uh -- well, Governor we'd be -- I think your message -- uh -- you know the letter that I received last night was different than this. What's your judgment (listens 15 secs) Right (listens 15 secs) Yes (listens 7 secs) Yes (listens 25 secs) (word unclear) Yeah (listens 40 secs) and to act against Cuba ...in addition (listens 30 secs.) Sounds like a (words unclear) (listens 18 secs). Yeah, that's what it presented us (listens 18 secs.) I think we've been around and around too much of that. Fine, well I think the only -uh- what we've got to do is get them to agree to stop work while we talk about all these proposals; they're all possibilities. (listens 30 seconds) Ok, good. Fine, thank you.
JFK: What about our -- what about our putting something in about Berlin?
Dillon: Well that's (words unclear) if you start talking about Cuba and about Turkey, and then you talk...
JFK: Let's get it out of this problem, then we might as well I mean just decide on sand in his gears for a few minutes.
Voice: In what way?
JFK: Well, satisfactory guarantees for Berlin.
Pause
JFK: That's not any good, I'm just trying to cope with what the public problem is about -- because everybody's going to think that this is very reasonable.
Dillon: This Turkish thing has got to be thrown -- you're quite right, Mr. President -- into the overall European context, and you can bring in Berlin; I think it's fine. Because it's not only going to be Turks that are going to be answering here, but the Germans are going to be making statements in the next few hours, as well as other people about this when they're asked, and they're going to take a very strong position.
JFK: Yes...So we've got to call Hare...
Dillon: You're going to have statements out of Bonn too.
Voice: They're trying to find out where he is, Mr. President (words unclear)
JFK: Who has talked to the Turks? Has Finletter talked to them?
Voice: No (voice unclear)
Rusk: The Prime Minister talked to our delegation to -- uh -- to -- uh --
(word unclear)
(short pause)
Dillon: I would say that you say that the Turkish proposal opens the way to a major discussion of a lot of tensions in Europe, including Berlin.
(voices unclear)
Dillon: Oh no no no no no no
Voice: I don't think you -- if you mention that, you've lost the Germans.
Rusk: That's right, right then and there.
(mixed voices)

[End Meeting Item 40.3, Reference Reel 2]

Meeting Item 41.1, Reference Reel 1

McNamara: They turned away from their targets and returned to base.
(short pause)

Taylor: (words unclear) they run into resistance
Rusk: Mr President, it looks like we'll have to make a statement today as to what we do about that as far as surveillance is concerned.
JFK: Well we better wait till we hear more about why they aborted. (voices unclear)
McNamara: Mr. President I wonder if it wouldn't be wise to put the announcement about night surveillance whether we decide to carry it out tonight or not. This is the announcement we would propose.
(pause, low voices unclear)
Voice: They've (words unclear) commonly referred to is -- uh -- different than the resolution.
Rusk: Bob, before you put this out, the second sentence I would delete, unless you have a special need for it and go straight to the (words unclear). Now just before the Foreign Ministers (words unclear) which isn't really very strong as decisions go.
Voice: It's no help. I'm sorry to say this -- this communique (mixed voices, including discussion of which paper is under discussion and further discussion of surveillance announcement, word not clear, with conclusion by JFK: "we'd better wait.")
Voice: I'd better make sure that nobody does anything wrong on this.
(There follows a confused discussion of a draft response to Soviet position. Mixed voices are not clear except as noted below.)
JFK: On this last paragraph, Mr. Secretary, I think we ought to say "As I was preparing this letter, which was prepared in response to your private letter of last night, I learned of your -- this immediate crisis in Cuba, and so forth. When we get action there I shall certainly be ready to discuss the matters you mentioned in your public message. So that's more forthcoming than (words unclear). What we're saying -- we're rejecting his public message, but we might as well...
Dillon: Be prepared to discuss our actions, the detailed thinking (voices unclear)
JFK: Well, be prepared to discuss the -- uh -- your public message -- the matters in your public message, or the issues in your public message. (Short pause) Nothing is going to be successful; you might as well realize that. That's why I'm just wondering whether -- uh -- (words unclear) when he's rejected it (words unclear). Then where are we going to be? Tomorrow he'll come back and say the United States has rejected this proposal we've made. So I think that we ought to be thinking also of saying that we're going to discuss all these matters if he'll cease (words unclear). That's the only place we've got him. So I think we ought to be able to say that -- uh -- the matter of Turkey, and so on, in fact all these matters, ought to be -- can be discussed if he'll cease work. Otherwise he's going to announce that we've rejected his proposal. And then where are we? (Short pause) We're all right if he would cease work and dismantle the missiles. Then we can talk another two weeks. But until we get that -- so I think we ought to put that in -- just say, I read of your public message accepting (words unclear) bases in Cuba. -- uh -- (words unclear) contact as necessary. (Apparently reading from draft) You must realize that these other matters involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries will require time for discussion. Unless we all agree, unless we all mean to announce that we've rejected it, I don't think we ought to do it today. I think we ought to say if we're going to discuss this, we're going to have to have a cease of work. (words unclear) to get a cessation of work, (word unclear). And therefore the burden's on him. That's our only...it seems to me...defense

against the appeal of his -- uh -- trade. (Pause) I think we (words unclear) glad to discuss this and other matters, we've got to get a suspension of work.
RFK: And the bases being observed and dismantled
(low voices unclear for about a minute)
Voice: Mr. Zorin has been to U Thant, and one of the people who was there came out and said that the position that Zorin had taken was that the first letter was confidential and it was designed to reduce tension but that as far as he was concerned the second letter contained the substantive proposal.
Voice: the second letter the substantive proposal.
JFK: I think we ought to say to U Thant this afternoon that -- uh -- can he give us any assurances -- can he get any assurances from the Soviet Union that work has ceased. We ought to get that -- seems to me -- before the end of the afternoon. Just that simple message to U Thant. He ought to call Zorin in before we discuss these other matters.
Voice: All right; that's a good idea.
Voice: All right with me.
JFK: Yes, why don't we send that up to U Thant right now while we discuss these other matters which are complicated, involve other countries and which are bound to take time, and everybody will recognize that.
Voice: This is Stevenson's feeling too, and this ought to be a condition before we...
JFK: Well why don't we just make that -- send that message just to U Thant? If we can get assurance from -- which can be inspected that they will cease the work and then we'll discuss these matters. Then I think we're on a much better ground. (voices unclear) We ought to make it a formal request, I think, George.
Ball: All right
(Voices unclear, probably discussing draft answer to Russians)
JFK: Well just let this go for just a second while we send a message to U Thant. (lowers voice) I think we ought to say the Soviet Union message of this morning introduces -- I think we ought to release this (word unclear) what do you think? introduces matters not involved in the Cuba issue but involving -- uh -- the relationships of countries in the -- other than the Western Hemisphere, which are complicated and unfamiliar and will take some time. If we're going to discuss these we must have some assurances which can be verified that the Soviet Union will cease work on the missiles and that the missiles which are presently there have been made inoperable. Would the Secretary General get from the Soviet Union these assurances. In that case the United States would be prepared to discuss any proposals of the Soviet Union.
(Pause 5 seconds, voices)
Rusk: Is anybody a shorthand expert in here? (laughter)
(Long pause)
Sorensen: (reading) The proposal made by the Soviet Union this morning involves a number of countries and issues unrelated to the existing threat to peace posed by Soviet planes and missile bases in Cuba. The lengthy discussions required for any possible settlement of these matters cannot be undertaken by this country until it is assured that work on these bases is halted and the bases themselves are inoperable.
JFK: I wouldn't say "lengthy" because that sounds -- uh -- I have the Soviet Union, in its message of this morning has introduced issues which are directly -- which are not directly related to the Cuban crisis. The United

States would be glad to discuss these matters with the Secretary General and the Soviet Union but they do involve the interests of the fifteen countries of NATO and obviously would take, therefore, some time. I would like the Secretary General -- I ask, therefore, the Secretary General whether he can get assurances from the Soviet Union -- uh -- assurances from the Soviet Union which can be verified by the United Nations that the missiles and so on and so on and about the missile bases that they have been rendered inoperable. If this can be done then the conversations can take place in an atmosphere which would be more suitable.
Dillon: Couldn't they say that they're not interested in the fifteen other countries you say would require consultation. (words unclear)
JFK: Ted why don't you -- uh -- is that agreeable -- Mr. Secretary, that letter to -- uh -- U Thant to get assurances (words unclear) and verified?
Voice: George Ball is getting him on the phone right now.
JFK: U Thant
Voice: Yes
JFK: I'd like to get that out of the way. I'd like to have a written message which could be used in this -- uh. --
low voices unclear for 10-15 seconds.
RFK: I would think -- uh -- Jack it would be well (words unclear) complication
JFK: Yeah that's right, that's why we want to get it out tomorrow morning (words unclear)
Bundy: I talked to Bohlen in Paris. He said the knockdown of the trip to Cuba had been very well received there. He thought there was no problem in France.
(Mixed voices)
Rusk: Probably needed for a revolt in NATO that (words unclear)
Bundy: Well I've also talked to Finletter and asked him to check the Permreps and say that the United States stands for this position but if the NATO countries should feel that it places them in unusual hazard, he is authorized to elicit their points of view (laughter) (words unclear) stir them on that point.
(short pause)
Taylor: We have some more information on the afternoon flight, Mr. Secretary. These planes took off at 1541. There were four in the afternoon flight. The planes took off at 1541. (word unclear). One developed mechanical trouble so a pair turned back. (words unclear) approach the Cuban coast in three flight plans. One flight plan was fired on.

(The report continues, with little consecutive audible clarity but the net of it is that all the planes are on their way back and direct reports after their return will not be available before 6 o'clock. The President asks what kind of fire was received and the answer is not clear. The night-flight statement is presented and the President holds it up, "I want to have a talk with the Secretary," and know more also about this latest episode. "and we may want to do something else.")

There follows low and apparently less general conversation including a discussion, not very audible, by Rusk of possible public comment on the off-course U-2 over the Soviet Union. The President responds:
JFK: I think we're better off not to do it if we can get away with not having some leak. But I think -- I think our problem is to maintain our credibility with Khrushchev.

Bundy: We didn't do it even then until he commented to us, last time.
JFK: Well, very close — didn't we?
Bundy: No, sir.
JFK: Well I don't think there's any advantage now. It just makes -- it gives him a story tomorrow. It makes it look like we're maybe (word unclear). I don't see the advantage.
(voices unclear)
McNamara: Mr. President, may I say in relation to that, I think if we haven't announced already, and I know we haven't we shouldn't now. One of our afternoon aircraft was hit by a 37 millimeter shell. It's coming back, it's all right, but it simply indicates that there's been quite a change in the character of the orders given to the Cuban (word unclear). I don't think we ought to confuse the issue by issuing a White House...
JFK: I agree; let's let it go.
(Pause and low conversation and comments not clear on drafts to Khrushchev and U Thant)
JFK: I think we've got two questions. One is, do we want to have these conversations go on, on Turkey and these other matters while there's a sort of standstill in Cuba, or do we want to say that we won't talk about Turkey and these other matters until they've settled the Cuban crisis. I think these are (words unclear) questions. And I don't think we're going to get there -- they're not going to -- now that they've taken the public position obviously they're not going to settle the Cuban question until they get some compensation in Cuba [sic]. That being true, I think the best position now, with him and publicly, is to say we're glad to discuss this matter and this whole question of verification and all the rest once we get a positive indication that they've ceased their work in Cuba. Otherwise -- uh -- what we're really saying is "We won't discuss Turkey till they settle Cuba," and I think that he will then come back and say the United States has refused his offer, and I don't think that's as good a position as saying we're glad to discuss his offer if we can get a standstill in Cuba. That puts us in a much stronger world position because most people will think his offer is rather reasonable. I think we ought to put our emphasis right now on the fact that we want an indication from him in the next twenty-four hours that he's going to stand still and disarm these weapons. Then we'll say that under <u>those</u> conditions we'll be <u>glad</u> to discuss these matters. But I think that if we don't say that he's going to say we rejected his offer, and therefore he's going to have public opinion with him. So I think our only hope to escape from that is to say that we insist that he stand still. Now we don't think he'll do that, and therefore we're in much better shape to put our case on that than rather that Turkey's irrelevant.
(Pause, 15 seconds, then low voices, 20 seconds)
JFK: Ya, I think we ought to say "if" his proposal. (reading) The proposal made by the Soviet Union broadcast — this would be to the Secretary General -- this morning involved a number of countries and complicated issues not directly related to the existing threat to peace posed by Soviet offensive missile bases in Cuba. The United States would be glad to discuss this matter with you and others after consultation with the members of NATO, whose interests are also involved. The discussions required for any peaceful settlement of these other matters, however, will require time for consultation with the countries whose interests -- uh -- with these countries and cannot be undertaken by this country until it is assured that work on these bases in Cuba has halted and the bases themselves are inoperable. I therefore request with the utmost urgency that you seek

such assurances from the Soviet Union in order that negotiations can go forward. Anybody object to that?
Voice: No it's fine.
JFK: OK, we'll send that, now. You want to ask Adlai to deliver it right away and ask for an answer, don't you think?
Voices: ("I'll get that off" among them)
Voice: The only question I'd like to raise about that is that while really it sets Turkey as a quid pro quo...
Voice: That's my worry about it.
JFK: Well, the negotiations. The point is -- the point is that we're not in a position today to make the trade. That's number one. And we won't be -- maybe -- may in three or four days, I don't know, we have to wait and see what the Turks say. We don't want to be -- we don't want the Soviet Union or the United Nations to be able to say that the United States rejected it. So I think we're better off to stick on the question; freeze, and then we'll discuss it....
Bundy: Well there are two (words unclear) different audiences here, Mr. President, there really are, and I think that if we sound as if we wanted to make this trade, to our NATO people and to all the people who are tied to us by alliance, we are in real trouble. I think that -- we'll all join in doing this if it's the decision, but I think we should tell you that that's the universal assessment of everyone in the government that's connected with these alliance problems.
RFK: Well now what reports did you get from Chip Bohlen, saying that?
Bundy: That the knockdown in this White House statement this morning was well received. Finletter's report is in. Hare's long telegram is in. They all make the same proposition, that if we appear to be trading our -- the defense of Turkey for the threat to Cuba we -- we will -- we just have to face a radical decline in the...
JFK: Yes, but I should say that also, as the situation is moving, Mac, if we don't for the next twenty-four or forty-eight hours, this trade has appeal. Now if we reject it out of hand and then have to take military action against Cuba, then we also face a decline. Now the only thing we've got for which I would think we'd be able to hold general support would be -- well let's try to word it so that we don't harm NATO -- but the thing that I think everybody would agree to -- while these matters, which are complicated, are discussed, there should be a cessation of work. Then I think we can hold general support for that. If they don't agree to that, the Soviet Union, then we retain the initiative, that's my...
Sorensen: I would suggest, Mr. President, when we come to the sentence where we say we'll be glad to discuss this matter, we put in the phrase "Inasmuch as they (that is, these initiatives) relate to disarmament proposals this nation has previously put forward the United States will be glad to discuss this matter."
JFK: I don't think that's much -- that's the whole disarmament
McCone: When you separate out...
(mixed voices)
McNamara: Couldn't we just add in there, "Inasmuch as they relate to -uh- you want to make it the entire issue of NATO, not just Turkey. (voices) That's clear. (voices) Inasmuch as they relate to the defense of NATO, bases in Italy, Turkey, the UK and elsewhere -- then you go on. So you link it all together and you -- and you take away the attention from Turkey. In that case I don't see anything wrong with it.
(Low mixed voices for 2 1/2 minutes.)

Sorensen: Why don't we -- how about if we insert this morning's statement.
Voice: This morning's statement...
Sorensen: After we talk about the con -- the required consultation with NATO and so on, simply say "I repeat, however, the position of the United States that preliminary to consideration of any proposals..."
RFK: Yeah, but he wants to find out -- take the initiative away by saying to the Soviet Union tonight, "President Kennedy -- the United States Government -- wants to know, prior to initiating discussions on any matters, that you will give us assurances that work on the bases has stopped."
Voice: That's right
RFK: No I don't think that that does.
Voices unclear
RFK: The point that has to be made in the statement. Will you give the United States Government assurances that before we try to negotiate...
(There follows 30 minutes of mixed voices and discussion proceeding evidently without the President. McNamara repeats his point, to get away from specific reference to Turkey. Sorensen notes that most of what's needed is in the morning statement. Sometimes many voices at once but also further audible discussion not transcribed here because the President was not present.
The President returns and the revised letter to U Thant is quickly approved, to be given to U Thant and then released at six.)
JFK: I just talked to General Norstad. He thinks that we ought to have a meeting of the NATO Council tomorrow morning to present this to them so that they all have a piece of it. Otherwise no matter what we do -- if we don't take it, we're blamed, if we do take it, we're just as blamed. Very right.
Bundy: I talked to Finletter and asked him to present it individually. Would you prefer to have a meeting?
JFK: Ya, I think we ought to have one. And I think the United States position ought to be that here it is, and we ought to have the -- uh -- if we don't take it what the prospects will be, as well as what we do. Otherwise its too easy to say well let's not take it. We ought to get up a message to Finletter, instructions, and he ought to call for a meeting at 9 or 10 in the morning.
RFK: You don't think it blows the possibility of this other one (words unclear)
JFK: What
RFK: It blows the possibility in your first letter.
JFK: Why?
RFK: Of getting an acceptance of the proposal that goes up in your letter now, which is (words unclear) has nothing to do with that I think that if they understand you have a meeting in NATO...
Voice: That's the disadvantage of a Council meeting.
Voice: That's just a report.
Rusk: It doesn't have to be known that -- uh -- that that is the only purpose of the discussion...
RFK: They're going to know that.
Dillon: It's probably obvious that they made a suggestion about Turkey which the NATO Council would be interested in meeting about.
Bundy: I don't think there's any pain in the meeting. Why don't we get the meeting called...

JFK: The advantage of the meeting is that if we reject it, they participate in it, if we accept it, they participate in it. I think we ought to...

RFK: The possibility is if you wait twenty-four hours and see if they accept this other thing (words unclear) accept it yet.

The letter that he offered which we accepted today. We wrote him this letter that you've approved where we say that we won't invade Cuba in return.

[End Meeting Item 41.1, Reference Reel 1, continued on Reference Reel 2]

Ball: You see the way the record will stand, Mr. President, is this, that we got out a blast this morning in which we said look we don't think this is really relevant. Then you send a query this afternoon as to whether they're willing to stop work. Then if we send a letter this afternoon along the line of the letter that we were proposing, which ties it back to his message of last night -- if this was simply a kind of fishing expedition in Moscow to see if they could get beyond that he'd put in his last night's letter, they may get the impression that they can't do it, in which case we...
Bundy: That's what I think
Ball: We might get something. Otherwise we can then go forward along the other track.
Thompson: If you have a NATO meeting, I gather from some word we've had from Italy, the Italians are likely to come up with a proposal to withdraw the bases there, the missiles there. I don't know if we ever got that message, did we?
Voice: We have a letter from Freddy Reinhardt saying that the Italians really don't care at all about...
Thompson: There was supposed to be a message coming through from...
Voice: Well I don't know.
Rusk: Well now in view of that message just gone up to U Thant we wind up this letter. (reading) As I was preparing this letter let me (words unclear) many countries and complicated issues not related to Cuba and the Western Hemisphere. The United States would be glad to discuss these matters with you and other governments concerned. The immediate crisis is in Cuba, and it is there that (words unclear) is necessary. With that behind us we can make progress on other vital issues.
(low voices)
JFK: In this language are you rejecting their proposal of this morning?
Bundy: I don't think so. It's rejecting...
Rusk: I wouldn't think so.
Dillon: It's rejecting the immediate tie-in (words unclear)
JFK: Now don't we just have to ask -- we don't have to reject the tie-in. If we're going to reject it we ought to have all of NATO reject it. What we want to insist on now is a cessation of work, et cetera, while we discuss it. Then we may reject it, but NATO ought to reject it, because I think the reprisal is going to be on all NATO. And I don't want them around saying -- that's the essence of it -- it's just a question of timing, isn't it?
Ball: I would suggest this, Mr. President, if you have a NATO Council meeting in the morning, I think you're going to get a flat rejection of this, which then ties our hands. I mean, then you can't go forward very easily in the face of this, because the NATO Ambassadors met this afternoon in New York and they took a very strong line against any discussion of this.
(mixed voices)

JFK: I don't think the alternative's been explained to them. You see they just think it's a continuation of the quarantine. They don't have any notion that we're about to do something. That's got to be on them. You see that hasn't been explained to NATO. I'm not going to get into that before they do something.
Dillon: If you have a Council meeting you'll probably get a strong reaction from a great many of the members of NATO against our taking any action in Cuba. They say "Don't trade," but they also say, "Don't do anything in Cuba."
Voice: Exactly.
(low voices)
McNamara: Mr. President, I wonder if we should not take certain actions with respect to the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy before we act in Cuba. If we decided to take that action with respect to the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy before we acted in Cuba, then we could tell NATO that at the time we talked to them about this proposal from Khrushchev and our response to it. If we act in Cuba, the only way we can act now is with a full attack. I don't think we can make any limited attacks when they're shooting at our reconnaissance aircraft because we would -- we would not dare to go in with the kind of limited attack that we've been thinking about the last twenty-four hours without taking out their SAM-sites. The moment we take out the SAM-sites and the MIG airfields we're up to the * 500 * sortie program. If we send * 500 * sorties in against Cuba, we must be prepared to follow up with an invasion in about * seven * days. If we start out on that kind of a program, it seems to me the Soviets are very likely to feel forced to reply with military action some place, particularly if these missiles -- Jupiter missiles -- are still in Turkey. We might be able to either shift the area in which they would apply their military force or give them no excuse to apply military force by taking out the Turkish Jupiters and the Italian Jupiters before we attack Cuba. One way to take them out would be to simply develop a program of bilateral negotiations between Turkey, Italy and the U. S. saying that we are today defusing the Jupiters in those two countries and replacing them with Polaris submarines stationed off the shores of those nations to carry the same targets the Jupiters were directed to in order to reduce the risk to those two nations but maintain the full defense of NATO.' Now if we were willing to undertake -- first place, I think that kind of action is desirable prior to invasion of Cuba. In the second place, if we're willing to decide to do that, we're in a much better position to present this whole thing to NATO.
Ball: What would be the reaction if the Soviet Union was to reply that they were going to maintain three atomic submarines off the United States coast?
McNamara: We would (mixed voices) We've already detected three submarines off the U. S. coast in the last forty-eight hours. Now they -- as far as we know they don't carry missiles, but that's just happenstance.
Voice: The Turks won't take them out, will they?
McNamara: I think, I think we could, first place we can tell them (words unclear)
JFK: If we took them out, we'd get the trade the Russians have offered us. If we take them out, they'll take them out.
McNamara: Well, I think we have to say to the Turks we're going to cover the targets with Polaris missiles.
JFK: Yes, but I think, if we're going to take them out of Turkey they say they'll take them out of ...

Bundy: It's one thing to stand them down, Mr. President, in political terms, it's one thing to stand them down as a favor to the Turks while we hit Cuba, and it's quite another thing to trade them out.
McNamara: But what we could do is unilaterally, unilaterally -- bilaterally with Turkey we would agreed to defuse them and replace them with Polaris. Then we'd go back to the Soviet Union and say, "Now the threat is there -- the threat is gone, you don't have to worry about that; we're going back to your letter of last night, and this is the proposal we make. We agree not to invade, you agree to take your (mixed voices)
McNamara: Turkey is gone.
Bundy: It could lead the Soviet Union (words unclear) to come back to the next problem.
(Voices unclear)
RFK: If you made an offer -- up there now -- and you also ask U Thant to find an answer to this, now if U Thant should come back and say, 'number 1, that they're going to continue to work, (words unclear) in which case I suppose we have to move in some way, or they're going to say that they're going to discontinue the work on the bases. Uh -- they say they're going to discontinue the work on the bases, they can either accept our proposal, or they can reject the proposal and say we still want Turkey for Cuba. If they reject the proposal and say they want Turkey for Cuba but they're going to discontinue the work on the bases, then I would think would be the time to have -- bring NATO in and say, "This is the proposal. Do you want to consider it? We haven't lost anything, and they've discontinued the work on the bases. Uh -- if they say they're going to continue the work on the bases, I think then we've got to decide whether -- if they have said by tomorrow morning they're going to continue the work on the basis -- whether we should have a military strike. (Voices mixed) I think if you have a meeting of NATO tomorrow morning -- uh -- I don't see that that's going to -- I think it's going to shoot this other possibility which U Thant has suggested, of going forward with this letter and seeing if we can trade the non-invasion of Cuba for this, and I think we're keeping the pressure on, we don't look like we're weakening on the whole Turkey complex. I mean I don't see that you're losing anything by not having a meeting tomorrow morning, except the fact -- I admit you're risking something, because some of the allies are going to say you're out of your mind...
Bundy: I would prefer to let Finletter find out for a day what people think...(words unclear)
JFK: It's going to be -- You see, they haven't had the alternatives presented to them. They'll say, "Well God, we don't want to trade them off." They don't realize that in two or three days we may have a military strike which could bring perhaps the seizure of Berlin or a strike on Turkey, and then they'll say "By God we should have taken it." So when the time -- the crucial time comes, obviously we want it, now the question is whether it's tomorrow morning or Monday morning. (Voices unclear)
McNamara: I think the point is related to the strike. If tomorrow we don't have a favorable answer from U Thant or Khrushchev to this message that's going out now, is it important to strike tomorrow or do we have some more time. If we have some more time, then you can still have the NATO meeting. It would seem to me the NATO meeting ought to be held before the strike. If it's necessary to strike tomorrow, there ought to be a NATO meeting tomorrow morning.
RFK: May I just say -- what if he says, "We're going to discontinue the work on the bases and we going to -- uh -- we're going to make the missiles

inoperative, and we'll work out with you United Nations supervision, that could take three weeks to just work that problem out there. And then what are we doing for...
McNamara: If he said he's going to discontinue work on the bases and he's willing to make them inoperable, we carry on surveillance
RFK: And we continue the -- uh -- the --
McNamara: The blockade
RFK: The blockade (voices unclear)
McNamara: That's a good course of action...
RFK: He's in bad shape.
McNamara: No, that's an excellent course of action which I don't believe he's going to accept. The probability is he won't say he'll stop work on the bases, and we're faced with a decision tomorrow what to do.
RFK: Yeah, but of course we're in -- before the world we're in much better shape.
Thompson: It would seem to me that we ought to surface all of this correspondence including this letter. He broke his proposal before you got it, and I'd do the same thing. Then you've got the world -- the attention of the world focused back on Cuba and Latin America and the fact that work there is not (words unclear) and this makes it I think much tougher for him to go ahead (words unclear).
JFK: What I'm concerned about is that NATO -- Norstad said that the BBC radio and TV said that there's no connection and that there's going to be a lot of tough talk in New York; he's saying that they all said it and they're going to say it in Paris -- there's no connection. They don't have a -- they don't realize that -- what's coming up.
Rusk: On the other hand,, Mr. President, if NATO seems solid on this, this has a chance of shaking Khrushchev off this point.
Martin: Suppose that we give him a letter which is addressed to his letter of yesterday and ask U Thant to release them both -- he's the fellow to release them -- and then he releases correspondence which consists really of an offer from Khrushchev and we -- we come back and write.
Bundy: Thank you.
Martin: Perhaps we'll say, "thank you, Yes." And it doesn't mention Turkey. Then it seems to me that...
Bundy: He's in a difficult position.
Voice: How much will Finletter be allowed to tell the NATO people? What's their view of the alternatives?
(voice unclear)
JFK: Well, I think that he'd probably just say that the work's going on, that we're not going to take these -- that we're not interested in this deal, then I think we're going to have to do something -- I don't think he has to say that it is -- but the escalation is going to go on, and we think this is very likely, that there would be some reprisal against possibly Turkey and possibly against Berlin, and we should be aware of that. What we don't want is to have a cheap turndown by them, without realizing that the turndown puts us in the position of then having to do something. What we're doing to be faced with is -- because we wouldn't take the missiles out of Turkey, then maybe we'll have to invade or make a massive strike on Cuba which may lose Berlin. That's what concerns me.
(mixed voices)
Rusk: Mr. President, here's one other variation here that Mr. Foster has given some thought to, and that is that we say that the missiles in Cuba and the missiles in Turkey be turned over to the UN for destruction and that the

-- uh -- nuclear defense of NATO, including Turkey, is provided by other means. An actual disarmament step, send them off for destruction on both sides.
Thompson: The Soviets don't want to let anybody get at them, and see what their technology is.
Voice: Take them out.
JFK: I think that -- uh -- the real problem is what we do with the Turks first.
Voice: Yeah.
JFK: If we follow Secretary McNamara, what we're going to do is say to the Turks -- which they're bound to think is -- uh -- under Soviet pressure, we want to get your missiles out of there.
McNamara: Well what I'd say -- what I'd say to the Turks: "Look here, we're going to have to invade Cuba. You're in mortal danger. We want to reduce your danger while at the same time maintaining your defense. We propose that you defuse those missiles tonight. We're putting Polaris submarines along your coast. We'll cover the same targets that your Jupiter missiles did, and we'll announce this to the world before we invade Cuba and thereby would reduce the pressure on the Soviet Union to attack you, Turkey, as a response to our invasion of Cuba." Now this is what I would say to the Turks.
RFK: Now, then they say -- uh -- what if the Soviet Union attacks us anyway. Will you use the missiles on the nuclear submarines?
McNamara: Then I think, before we attack Cuba I think we've got to decide how we'll respond to Soviet military pressure on NATO, and I'm not prepared to answer the question.
Voice: Aren't the Soviets going to take their missiles out if we take them out of Turkey?...
Voice: an impossible position...
McNamara: Well, I don't know what we'd do, if you worked this out with Turkey first, then with an announcement to the world, and then say to the Soviets (unclear interruption) Yes, now we accept your deal of last night
JFK: The question is whether we can get the Turks to...
McNamara: Well I think...
Taylor: You're deeply in trouble with NATO by this bilateral kind of approach..
McNamara: Well, the other course of action is not to have the bilateral sort of approach, to invade Cuba, and have Turkey, uh,...
Bundy: Well we haven't tried the block -- the enlargement of the blockade. We haven't even thought about it for some hours, and it's been on my mind a good deal. POL we still have to...
Rusk: If we get a negative answer to the message that's just gone up to U Thant, we really ought to consider whether in actually as low key as is possible although there'll be a tremendous flap about it -- in order to provide -- to give you the necessary authority to call up additional units beyond those provided by the 150,000 organization you'd declare a state of national emergency.
(voice unclear)
McNamara: I'd call a requisition of twenty-nine ships.
Rusk: I think some mobilization measures, not only here but in other -- in NATO countries, might be very timely here in shaking Khrushchev off this position at this point. (Pause) His -- his change of position, in a matter of hours here, means either that -- uh --

Bundy: Ted points out that his message of last night is not categorical about taking the missiles out. It says the specialists would go out.
Voice: That's right
(mixed voices)
JFK: This morning's is more precise, isn't it?
Voice: There's nothing strange (words unclear) different bargain
Thompson: Mr. President, if we go on the basis of a trade which I gather is — somewhat in your mind, we end up, it seems to me with the Soviets still in Cuba with planes and technicians and so on even though the missiles are out, and that would surely be unacceptable and put you in a worse position...
JFK: Yeah, but our technicians and planes and guarantees would still exist for Turkey. I'm just thinking about what — what we're going to have to do in a day or so, which is * 500 * sorties and * seven * days, and possibly an invasion, all because we wouldn't take missiles out of Turkey, and we all know how quickly everybody's courage goes when the blood starts to flow, and that's what's going to happen in NATO, when they — we start these things, and they grab Berlin, and everybody's going to say, "Well that was a pretty good proposition." Let's not kid ourselves that we've got — that's the difficulty. Today it sounds great to reject it, but it's not going to, after we do something.
Nitze: There are alternatives. One of them is to tell (words unclear) that this * five hundred * is going to result in an attack by them some place even if you do. The other alternative is to make a blockade, total, and
(Substantial passage of mixed voices)
JFK: I think we're in pretty good shape with this morning's message about the work ceasing, so I think if he feels that strongly. (Pause) Does he mind our sending the message?
Voice: No, he thought the message is good, (words unclear) but he said that this is what comes from trying...
JFK: Well what I'm concerned is that the NATO groups will all take up our position on this before they've understood what our — if they've met already in New York, they're going to be talking in Paris, and the word is going to be coming out that this is unacceptable, pretty soon, before they've had a chance to realize that the...
Nitze: Yesterday I had a meeting with the Four and brought them right up to the point of seeing how serious this was, and I think Dean talked to them about the alternatives they face.
Voice: A message to go to NATO — to Finletter (words unclear)
JFK: Do you think we ought to call the meeting, if we have it, or Stikker?
Voice: Stikker's absent.
Voice: He's in the hospital.
Bundy: Finletter can get the meeting called. His own advice is against having them in a group, but he may not be as shrewd as Norstad.
(mixed voices)
JFK: Norstad just feels that no matter what we do, there's going to be — we've got to have NATO have a hand on this thing or otherwise we'll find no matter — if we take no action or if we take action — they're all going to be saying we should have done the reverse — and we've got to get them with us. Now the question really is — two or three — two questions — first, whether we go immediately to the Turks and see if we can work out some — see if they're receptive to the kind of deal which the Secretary talked about. If they're <u>not</u> receptive then we ought to go to the general

NATO meeting because the NATO meeting may put enough pressure on them. (Pause) I just tell you I think we're better off to get those missiles out of Turkey and out of Cuba, because I think the way of getting them out of Turkey and out of Cuba is going to be very grave (words unclear), and very bloody, one place or another.
(mixed voices)
Nitze: The Turks will not take them -- will not agree to take them out except under NATO pressure.
Dillon: I don't see any point in talking to the Turks (words unclear) you have to do it through NATO.
Bundy: Well, I'm not sure -- because I think -- let's speculate with this, Mr. President. If you have that conviction, and you are yourself sure that -- uh -- this is the way we want -- the best way out -- then I would say that an immediate personal telegram (words unclear) was the best thing to do.
JFK: Well, I don't think we accept it. What I think you'd have to do is get the Turks to agree -- accepting it over their opposition and over NATO opposition I think would be -- I'd rather go the total blockade route, which is a lesser step then the military action. What I'd like to do is have the Turks and NATO equally feel that this is the wise move.
Sorensen: I wonder, Mr. President, inasmuch as your statement this morning does give some answer to the public statement of the Soviets, whether we can't defer this for twenty-four or forty-eight hours while we try the private letter route in answer to his private letter of last night. There's always a chance that he'll accept that. (words unclear) We meanwhile would have broken up NATO over something that never would have come to NATO.
Rusk: Bear in mind that, our -- bearing in mind that our specific arrangements have already been set forth in New York to U Thant. Adlai Stevenson has suggested a letter here that may not be bad in this particular context.

"I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and find it an indication of a willingness on your part to seek a calm solution of the problem. I wrote the letter to assure you that my desire is the same. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba, and all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use rendered inoperable. Assuming this is done promptly" -- we're likely to hear something about U. N. action now. "I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them this weekend to work out an arrangement for a permanent solution of the Cuban problem with the Acting Secretary General and with your representative. If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not (words unclear) completely arranged in not more than a couple of days."

"I note and welcome indications in your second letter which you have made public that you would like to work toward a more general arrangement as regards other elements. I would like to say again that we very much want to move in this direction. If your mention of Turkey signified -- of Turkey and other countries signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting the whole of Europe, we are of course quite prepared to consider with our allies the suggestions that you and your partners in the Warsaw Pact might have in mind. I think that the mutual explanations in which you and I have been engaged in the past few days, and the discussions in New York, have gone far

enough to set forth a very concrete agenda for peace, depending upon the removal of the weapons in Cuba and the accompanying guarantees of Cuban independence. But to continue work on the missile bases or prolong the discussion of removing missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba by linking these problems with the broader questions of European and world security would intensify the Cuban crisis and would be a grave risk to the peace of the world which you described in your letter of yesterday. I therefore most earnestly urge you to join us in a rapid settlement of the Cuban crisis as your letter of October 26th suggests is possible, so that we can then go on to an early solution of other serious problems which I am convinced are not insoluble."

Voice: Adlai just told me he's been talking along these lines to all our representatives up there, and they're all...

JFK: He's going to come back and say, "What about that proposal I made this morning?" So we (word unclear) don't you think we ought to say very hard what we've got to do, in the end, is that we've got to get an understanding in the next -- on the question of the cessation of work.

Rusk: That can be done on the basis of your message to U Thant that's just gone up there, but the...

Voice: Let's get this settled first, and we'll...

(mixed voices)

Rusk: to have a letter in hand though, which would give him a chance to work it out without relation to Turkey.

JFK: This is to Khrushchev

Rusk: No, he wanted a copy of a letter to Khrushchev. That does not really make much of a point on the Turkish point.

RFK: (words unclear) this letter?

Rusk: Yes

(mixed voices)

Sorensen: Why not put in the specific points that are in this letter, though? Otherwise it's about the same.

(low voices)

JFK: The point of the matter is Khrushchev's going to come back and refer to his thing this morning on Turkey. And then we're going to be screwing around for another forty-eight hours. I think what we've got to do is say that we've got to make the key of this letter the cessation of work. That we're all in agreement on. There's no question about that. Then the question whether Turkey's in or just Cuba. Otherwise he'll come back and say, "Well, we're glad to settle the Cuban matter. What is your opinion of our proposal about Turkey?" So then we're on until Monday afternoon, and the work goes on, and we haven't had a chance to specifically get his good faith on the cessation of work. We haven't got an answer to that question. So I think we ought to make that the key question -- the cessation of work. Then if we get the cessation of work, we can settle the Cuban question and a few other things. Otherwise he can hang us up for three days while he goes on with the work. (Pause)

(words unclear)

Rusk: I don't think Adlai and U Thant have yet abandoned the possibility of working this out without direct relation to Turkey though.

RFK: I thought -- you haven't got those to the point that we have in this letter and in that letter.

JFK: Let's go with this letter, Mr. Secretary. Let's start with our letter to (word unclear) let's start with that, because otherwise we'll never get an answer. We're going to take the cease-work and (words unclear)

I think our letter is specific that it's desirable. I think we then go to page 3: "I have given my representatives instructions to permit them to work out (words unclear) If you give your representatives similar instructions... there's no reason why there should not be a complete announcement to the world no later than tomorrow. I learned of your public messages (words unclear) crisis in Cuba. When we get agreement there, I shall certainly be ready to discuss the matter." Now the only problem with this letter again on page 3 is "when we get agreement on Cuba," which he isn't going to give us. He's now moved on to the Turkish thing so we're just going to get a letter back saying "well we'll be glad to settle Turkey if we'll settle —settle Cuba if we'll settle Turkey. So I think we have to make the crucial point in this letter, without opening up Turkey, is the question will he, at least in the next twenty-four hours, while we discuss all these matters, will he agree with me to stop the work on the bases. That's the only thing we can, because we have — because he either has to say Yes or No. If he says No to that, then we're — at least have -- we have some indication. Then we're (word unclear)
McNamara: Take -- take out paragraph 1 and put it in the end. Make that -- that isn't part of the deal. The deal is they remove the weapons, we guarantee not to invade, and then put paragraph 1 at the end. We...
Voice: Yeah, that (mixed voices) (pause)
JFK: unclear question to "Bob" on proposal (Voices explaining new order of paragraphs — not clear)
Dillon: ...certain things (word unclear) get agreement then -- we've covered the whole thing.
(voice unlcear)
JFK: Well in Number 1, you'd undertake agreement to cease work on offensive missile bases in Cuba and promptly to render inoperable all weapons systems in Cuba and permit UN verification of this action. That would be number 1.
McNamara: Right.
JFK: Then we would get into discussion of all those matters.
McNamara: Right.
Bundy: But I think that that ought to (words unclear) be made as a separate matter in the letter.
Sorensen: I just raise the question to make sure that we do insist on UN verification, because I understand from the Defense Department we could verify it by ourselves, and even, they say...
JFK: Well, let's not let the UN in?
Sorensen: Yeah..
RFK: Well I think actually, if they put them under trees and what we were expecting a week ago, or ten days, would that...
Sorensen: A week ago -- the work has stopped
(mixed voices)
RFK: (words unclear) trees (words unclear)
Voice: If the Cubans would agree not to interfere with reconnaissance.
Voice: international verification -- I think we'd better stick with that.
JFK: Well let's see what he comes back with here. I mean I don't think we're going to get as much (words unclear) but I mean let's make it as reasonable as possible. You're not — yet.
Rusk: See if you don't think that you could use Adlai — his draft — and put in the specific things down there where the arrow is.
(mixed voices)

JFK: Yeah, his second paragraph is useful. Just put in "this to be verified -- this to be satisfactorily verified -- this to be verified under -- well, right.
(Reads inaudibly from a draft) (pause)
Rusk: What Adlai says about what to do about Turkey -- another problem is pretty good. (pause)
JFK: The only thing is -- what he's saying is that they've got to get the weapons out of Cuba before we'll discuss the general detente. Now we're not going to be able to effect that. (words unclear) He doesn't agree with that.
Rusk: Let a couple of us go out and try to put the specifics of this letter in (words unclear) with the paragraphs of Adlai.
JFK: It seems to me what we ought to -- to be reasonable. We're not going to get these weapons out of Cuba, probably, anyway. But I mean -- by negotiation -- we're going to have to take our weapons out of Turkey. I don't think there's any doubt he's not going to (word unclear) now that he made that public, Tommy, he's not going to take them out of Cuba if we...
Thompson: I don't agree, Mr. President, I think there's still a chance that we can get this line going.
JFK: He'll back down?
Thompson: Well, because he's already got this other proposal which he put forward...
JFK: (words unclear) Now this other public one, it seems to me, has become their public position, isn't it?
Thompson: This is, maybe, just pressure on us, I mean, to accept the other, I mean so far...
(mixed voices)
Thompson: The important thing for Khrushchev, it seems to me, is to be able to say "I saved Cuba, I stopped an invasion," and he can get away with this, if he wants to, and he's had a go at this Turkey thing, and that we'll discuss later. And then, and that discussion will probably take...
JFK: All right, what about at the end of this, we use this letter and say "will be a grave risk to peace. I urge -- urge you to join us in a rapid settlement of the Cuban crisis as your letter (word unclear) suggests, and (words fast and not audibly read) The first ingredient, let me emphasize, for any solution is a cessation of the -- uh -- work and the possibility (word unclear) under reasonable standards" -- I mean I want to just come back to that: Otherwise time -- uh -- slips away on us.
(Pause)
(Words unclear and mixed voices)
Sorensen: In other words, Mr. President, your position is that once he meets this condition of the -- uh -- halting of the work and the inoperability, you're then prepared to go ahead on either the specific Cuban track or what we call the general detente track.
JFK: Yeah, now it all comes down -- I think it's a substantive question, because it really depends on whether we believe that we can get a deal on just the Cuban -- or whether we have to agree to his position of tying. Tommy doesn't think we do. I think that having made it public how can he take these missiles out of Cuba (voice) if we just do nothing about Turkey.
Voice: (word unclear)...give him something else -- (words unclear and mixed voices) -- something else.
Voice: And the promise that when all this is over, there can be a larger...

JFK: He's going to want to have that spelled out a little.
Thompson: The position, even in the public statement, is that this is all started by our threat to Cuba. Now he's removed that threat.
RFK: He must be a little shaken up or he wouldn't have sent the message to you in the first place.
JFK: That's last night.
RFK: Yeah, but I mean -- so that you can -- it's certainly conceivable that you could get him back to that...(words unclear) I don't think we should abandon...
JFK: Well, I think Adlai's letter all right then.
RFK: I think we can always go to that.
(mixed voices)
Voice: What it means, Bob, is (words unclear) as confused as...
Voice: They're more confused
Voice: I really think -- uh -- (mixed voices)
JFK: (words unclear) Let's send this. All right, now, the other two things that we have to decide are one, about the NATO meeting and (words unclear). In this case, then, we won't have a NATO meeting tomorrow morning, because we won't get an answer back (mixed voices)
RFK: Are we going to put this one out? Is this one of the ones we put out? (mixed voices)
Voice: We'll give it to the Times.
Voice: (words unclear) not have the secret message, Khrushchev's of last night.
Voice: Yes
Voice: You going to put that out?
Voice: No
Voice: desirable
Voice: Adlai's suggestion was that we release this and then let them put the pressure on the Soviets to...
RFK: The only thing is we're proposing in here the abandonment -- no that -- at some point
Voice: What?
RFK: The abandonment of Cuba
(Mixed voices, laughter, pause)
RFK: (low voice) You think it would be worth while to call?
JFK: Who?
RFK: Eisenhower?
(Voice unclear -- laughter - pause)
(Low voices and mixed voices)
Bundy: You know it puts some heat on him if you put out -- if you can get his message out of last night.
RFK: How about you put, as you have said before (words unclear) -- publicly assured the world before -- there will be no (words unclear) change of policy.
JFK: Well I'd say, I'd rather say that the United States has no hostile intentions towards Cuba, just so we state it as an obvious fact.
RFK: Then you can come back...
JFK: I don't see really what the advantage is -- what is the -uh- why is U Thant going to publish this?
Voice: To force out the -- uh- the Khrushchev letter to which this is a response.
(mixed voices)

Voice: This was Stevenson's proposal. Stevenson's proposal is that we release this letter, this letter be released, in order to get this back on the Cuban track, and away from, the focus away from his letter...
Dillon: His long letter.
JFK: (words unclear) removal of the weapons in Cuba and peace in the Caribbean (words unclear) can't you say that?
(A few words unclear)

[End Meeting Item 41.1, Reference Reel 2,
meeting continued on Meeting Item 41A.1]

Meeting Item 41A.1, Reference Reel 1
[meeting continued from Meeting
Item 41.1, Reference Reel 2]

Rusk: (words unclear) going to be worried about that because you're not dealing precisely here with an agreement. We're simply talking about a concrete agenda for peace.
Voices: Yes -- yeah.
JFK: (words unclear) we ought to put it out until we know whether there's any chance of acceptance. There's going to be a hell of a fight about that. I don't mind taking it on if we're going to get somewhere. I don't want to take on the fight if we're not going to get
(mixed voices -- pause)
JFK: Want to read it?
Voice: Yes.
JFK: Here we go.
Rusk: "Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and find in it the indication of a willingness on your part to seek a calm solution to the problem. I wrote the letter to assure you that my desire is the same. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba, and all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use rendered inoperable under effective United Nations arrangements."

Bundy: The sentence is not quite complete -- "to be rendered" (Pause)
Voice: "to be rendered"
JFK: I just think, line two, that find an indication of his willingness -- Just -- uh -- "statement of your willingness." or -- uh -- "welcome your statement of your desire." (words unclear)
JFK: Change a little --, start again, Mr. Secretary.
Rusk: "I have read your letter of October 26 with great care and find in it a statement"
JFK: Welcome your statement -- welcome your statement.
Voice: Cut the next sentence.
JFK: of your desire.
(Pause)
Voice: Statement of a -- uh
JFK: of your desire
Rusk: of a desire on your part to seek a prompt solution to the problem
JFK: statement of your desire
Rusk: welcome the statement of your desire
(Pause)
Rusk: (words unclear) just say my desire is the same.
JFK: Just say, My desire is the same as his. I can assure you of the great interest of the people of the United States to -- uh -- find a satisfactory solution to this.
(pause and noises)
Rusk: "The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba, and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable under effective

United Nations arrangements. Assuming this is done promptly I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them this weekend to work out an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem with the Acting Secretary General and with your representative. If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days.

"I note and welcome indications in your second letter which you have made public that you would like to work toward a more general arrangement as regards other elements

JFK: Now wait a sec -- that second letter is the one on Turkey. "Note and welcome" -- "I note your second letter" -- I don't think we ought to welcome it...

Rusk: I note the indications in your second letter which you have made public that you would like to work toward a more general arrangement as regards other elements. I would like to say again that we very much want to move in this direction. If your mention of Turkey signifies...

JFK: Well now let's say -- "move in this direction." It seems to me -- uh -- why don't we make that more general? I don't know about the -- I'd like to -- I would like to say that the United States is very much interested in -- uh -- what?

Voice: Such discussion.

JFK: Turkey and -- uh -- I'd like to say that the United States...

(Mixed voices)

Voice: General reduction of arms, or the nuclear threat. (Pause)

JFK: areas of tension?

Rusk: interest in reducing tensions (words unclear)

JFK: Yeah

(Pause)

Rusk: Well now I think we'd better change this specific reference to Turkey. If your mention of Turkey and other countries

JFK: Why not just say "other countries" and leave Turkey out.

Rusk: mention of other countries signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting -- affecting the whole of -- uh -- Europe....

McNamara: If your mention of the defenses of NATO signifies your...

McCone: (words unclear) in that letter he tied it very specifically into the Turkish situation. I don't think he tied it in that public letter as an example of -- uh.

JFK: No, he just tied it into Turkey. The difficulty is we're not ready tonight.

McCone: No, I know, but -- uh -- this morning before I studied that letter, because I hadn't seen a copy of it, I was under the impression that his reference to Turkey was just sort of an example of. It is a specific proposal...

JFK: That's right. We have to keep it vague, unfortunately, or fortunately, because we haven't cleared it with Turkey or NATO. So I suppose we have to fudge it somewhat, but I agree with you, he's just talking about Turkey.

(Pause)

Rusk: If your mention of NATO bases signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting the whole of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are of course quite prepared to consider with our allies the suggestions that you and your partners in the Warsaw Pact might have in mind. I think that the mutual explanations in which you and I have been engaged in the past few

days, and the discussions in New York, have gone far enough to set forth a concrete agenda for peace.
Bundy: Could I interrupt — do we have to talk about their partners in the Warsaw Pact? It's really what they have — what you have in mind.
(mixed voices)
Bundy: "What you have in mind?"
JFK: Ya, I think you're right.
(Pause)
Rusk: I think the mutual explanation in which you and I have been engaged in the past few days, and the discussions in New York, have gone far enough to set forth a concrete agenda for peace, depending upon the removal of the weapons in Cuba and assurance of peace in the Caribbean. But the continued work on the missile bases and prolonging the discussion of removing missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba while linking these problems with the broader questions of European and world security would intensify the Cuban crisis and would be a grave risk to the peace of the world which you described in your letter of yesterday. I therefore most earnestly urge you to join us in a rapid settlement of the Cuban crisis as your letter of October 26th suggests is possible, so that we can then go on to an early solution of other serious problems which I am convinced are not insoluble.
JFK: (words unclear) As I say, this letter is nothing (words unclear) as long as it doesn't get...
RFK: I don't understand -- can I just say -- what's wrong -- uh -- what about all the points that we made in this letter. What do you suggest?
Rusk: Well these are points that have already been -- uh -- been set out, up there.
RFK: Yeah, but I thought that the answer — that this letter was accepting his proposal for...
Rusk: The reason for the -- the actual reason we didn't have those points in this letter was the President's desire not to get his hands too tied with respect to the Turkish problem.
RFK: Well I don't think this does that
Sorensen: One, two, three, four, particularly if this letter is going to be made public, are pretty good to have on the record.
JFK: At 4b we undertake to give assurance with respect to the territorial integrity and independence of Cuba...
Sorensen: No, we changed that.
(Mixed voices. Voice - the Caribbean.
JFK: Well that's what we did here, but I don't know...
RFK: But that's not -- I think you changed that in there. Send this letter and say you're accepting his offer -- he's made an offer and you're in fact accepting it. And you think -- I think that letter sounds slightly defensive about the fact -- God, don't bring in Turkey now; we want to settle -- we're not -- I don't know whether it adds anything. (Pause) I mean I think this letter -- he made an offer last night. This letter accepts the offer.
Rusk: By the way, there's another -- there's another paragraph to be added. The first ingredient -- let me emphasize that the cessation of work on missile sites and measures to render such weapons inoperable under effective international guarantees.
JFK: Well, in any case, the two letters are more or less -- there's no policy difference, is there?
RFK: Well, I think there's an entirely different quality...

questions because, uh, with this type of missile, uh, can be launched very quickly with a concealed expedience.

Bundy: Do we have any...

Taylor: So that...

Bundy: ...intelligence, uh...

Taylor: ...even today, this, this one, uh, area, might be operational. I can see that it's, it's highly possible...

Bundy: One very important question is whether there are other areas which conceivably might be even more operational that have not identified.

McNamara: This is why I think the moment we leave here, Mac, we just have to take this new authority we have and put it...

Bundy: May I ask General Carter [whether the intelligence, the collateral intelligence relates to this area, as I understood it this morning?]

Carter: That's right. That's why we specifically covered this area on the one Sunday because the [unintelligible], you see...

McNamara: May I go back for a second, however, to the point that was raised a moment ago? Mr. President, I don't believe that if we had two weeks and we knew that at the end of two weeks we were going in, I don't believe we could substantially lessen the five or seven-day period required after the air attack, prior to the invasion, for the size force we're talking about because we start with the assumption the air attack must take them by surprise. We would not be able to take the actions required to shorten the five-to-seven day period and still assure you of surprise in the air attack. And therefore, we haven't been able to figure out a way to shorten that five-to-seven day period while maintaining surprise in the air attack...

JFK: What are you doing for that five days? Moving ships or where [unintelligible]...

McNamara: Moving ships and moving.... We have to move transport aircraft b the scores around the country. We should move ships. Actually, the ship movement would not be as extensive in the seven-day invasion as it would be in a, a...eleven day, after the air strike.

Taylor: It would take place after the air strike.

McNamara: We, we, we have been moving already, on a very quiet basis, munitions and POL. We will have by the twentieth, which is Friday, I guess, we will have stocks of munitions, stocks of POL pre-positioned in the southeast part of this country. So that of movement is beginning...

kind

JFK: What's POL, uh?

McNamara: Petroleum, oil, lubricants. So that kind of movement has already been taking place and it's been possible to do it quietly.

JFK: What about armor and so on? What about all the...

McNamara: the, the armor movement would be noticeable if it were carried out in the volume we require. And hence, the point I would make is that knowing ahead of time, two weeks ahead of time, that we would carry out the invasion would not significantly reduce the five-to-seven day interval between the strike by air and the invasion time of...given the size force we're talking about.

Taylor: I think our point of view may change somewhat because of an adjustment here. The decision would take out only the known missile sites and not the airfields. There is a great danger of, of equipment dispersal of all the, the interesting aircraft. Uh, you'd be in suprise, there's [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible]

Talyor: Missiles can't run off quite, quite as readily.

JFK: The advant-, what is... The advantage of taking out these airplanes would be to protect us against a reprisal...

Taylor: Yes.

JFK: ...by them. I would think you'd have to pre-, assume they'd be using, uh, iron bombs and not nuclear weapons because obviously why would the Soviets permit nuclear war to begin under that sort of half-assed way?

McNamara: I think that's reasonable.

Speaker[?]: But they still...

Speaker[?]: But they have...

Speaker[?]: ...have ten IL-28s and twenty...

Speaker[?]: Yes. Yes. They may carry out [unintelligible]. Yes.

Speaker[?]: ...twenty-five big ones.

JFK: So you think that if we're going to take out the, uh, missile sites you'd want to take out these planes at the same time?

Carter: There are eight airfields that are capable of mounting this jets. Eight [unintelligible]...

Bundy: But politically, if you're trying to get him to understand the limit and the non-limit and make it as easy for him as possible, there's an enormous premium on having a small, as small and clear-cut an action as possible, against the hazard of, uh, going after all the operational airfields becomes a kind of...

JFK: General.

Taylor[?]: I wonder if we could get, uh...

Bundy: ...[unintelligible] nuclear war.

Taylor: ...the number of hours required for each type of air strike, if we were just going for...

Carter: Yeah, sure, sure.

JFK: Well, now, what is it, uh, we have what is it we want to, we need to do in the next 24 hours to prepare for any of these three? It seems to me that we want to do more or less the same things no matter what we finally decide [unintelligible]...

Bundy: We've authorized, Mr. President, we have a decision for additional intelligence reconnaissance, a minor decision that we'll talk to Keating. Seems [like?]...

JFK: I don't think Keating...

Bundy: No.

JFK: ... will be that helpful.

Bundy: Leave that out.

JFK: Yeah.

RFK: I think that'll, then he'll be saying afterwards that we tried to...

Bundy: All right, the next, uh...

RFK: ...dun him.

Bundy: I should think we need to know the, the earliest readiness for th various sizes of air strike and how long they would take to execute.

Speaker[?]: Yes.

JFK: The immediate probability...

Dillon: One other question is what, if anything, has to be done, uh, to b prepared for, un, eventuality of a Soviet reaction?

JFK: And then I think what we ought to do...

McNamara[?]: What sort of alert to do...

JFK: ...is to figure out what are the minimum number of people that we really <u>have</u> to tell. I suppose, well, there's (Charles A.) de Gaulle [unintelligible].

Bundy: Right. You want de Gaulle. It's hard to say about (Konrad) Adenauer. You've got to tell, it seems to me you're going to have to tell SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe).

JFK: Hmm.

Bundy: ...and, uh, and the commandant.

Dillon: I would think this business about the Soviet reaction, that there, that might be helpful, uh, if we could maybe take some, uh, general war preparation type of action that would show them that we're ready if they want to start anything, without what you might risk starting anything.

Bundy: One...

Dillon: You just don't know.

Bundy: On this track, one obvious element on the political side is do we say something simultaneously or, uh, to the Cubans, to the Soviets, or do we let the action speak for itself?

Rusk: This point whether we say something to the Cubans and the Soviets before any, before...

JFK: I think we ought to, what we ought to do is, is uh, after this meeting this afternoon, we ought to meet tonight again at six, consider these various, uh, proposals. In the meanwhile, we'll go ahead with this maximum, whatever is needed from the flights, and, in addition, we will... I don't think we go much time on these missiles. They may be... So it may be that we just have to, we can't wait two weeks while we're getting ready to, to roll. Maybe just have to just take <u>them out</u>, and continue our other preparations if we decide to do that. That may be where we end up. I think we ought to, beginning right now, be preparing to... Because that's what we're going to do <u>anyway</u>. We're certainly going to do number one; we're going to take out these, uh, missiles. Uh, the questions will be whether, which what I would describe as number two, which would be a general air strike. That we're not ready to say, but we should be in preparation for it. The third is the, is the, uh, the general invasion. At least we're going to do number one, so it seems to me that we don't have to wait very long. We, we ought to be making <u>those</u> preparations.

Bundy: You want to be clear, Mr. President, whether we have <u>definitely</u> decided <u>against</u> a political track. I, myself, think we ought...

Taylor: Well, we'll have...

Bundy: ...to work out a contingency on that.

Rusk: We, we'll develop both tracks.

JFK: I think we ought to do the OAS. I think that's a legal time. I don't think we ought to do NATO. We ought to just decide who we talk to and how long ahead and how many people, really, in the government. There's going to be a difference between those who know that...this will leak out in the next few days...there are these, uh, uh, bases, until we say or the Pentagon or State won't be hard. We've already said it on the [unintelligible]. So we, let's say, we've got two or three days.

Bundy: Well, let's play it, shall we play it still harder and, and, simply say that there's no evidence...I mean we have to...

JFK: We ought to stick the battle plan till we want to do something.

Bundy: ...[unintelligible] the alliance [unintelligible].

JFK: Otherwise we give ourselves away, so let's...

Bundy: May I make one other cover plan suggestion...

JFK: Yes.

Bundy: ...Mr. President? There will be meetings in the White House. I think the best we can do is to keep the people with a specific Latin American business black and describe the rest as "intensive budget review sessions," but I haven't been able to think of any other...

JFK: Nobody,' it seems to me, in the State Department. I discussed the matter with, uh, [Charles E.] Bohlen of the Soviet bloc and told him he could talk to [Llewellyn E.] Thompson. So that's two. It seems to me that there's no one else in the State Department that ought to be talked to about it...

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible] in the department.

JFK: ...in any level at all, and, uh, until we know a little more. And then, as I say, in Defense we've got to keep it as tight as possible...

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible]

JFK: ...particularly what we're going to do about it. Maybe a lot of people know about what's there, but what we're going to do about it really ought to be, you know, the tightest of all becau otherwise we bitch it up

McNamara: Mr. President, may I suggest that we come back this afternoon prepared to, to answer three questions. First, should we surface our surveillance? I think this is a very important...

Speaker[?]: Very important point.

McNamara: ...question at the moment. We ought to try to decide today either yes or no.

JFK: By "surface our"...

McNamara: I mean we should state publicly...

JFK: Oh.

McNamara: ...that, that you have stated we will, we'll act to take out any offensive weapons, we are scheduling U-2 flights or other surveillance...

Bundy: What's the skull number, commissar? [Laughs]

McNamara: ...or reconnaissance flights to, uh, to obtain this information. We'll make the information, uh, public.

JFK: There may not be one. All right, why not?

McNamara: This is one question. A second question is should we precede the military action with political action? If so, on what, uh, timing? I would think the answer's almost certainly yes. And I wouldn't, I would think particularly of the contacts with Khrushchev. And I would think that if these are to be done, they must be scheduled in terms of time very, very carefully in relation to a potential military action. There must be a very, very precise series of, of contacts with him, and indications of what we'll do at certain times following that. And thirdly, we should be prepared to answer your questions regarding the, the effect of these strikes and the time required to carry them off. I think...

JFK: How long it would take to get'em organized.

McNamara: E-, e-, exactly. We'll be prepared...

JFK: In other words, how many days from tomorrow morning would it.... How many mornings from tomorrow morning would it take to get the, to take out just these missile...

McNamara: Missile sites, right.

JFK: ...sites which we, [well?] we need to know now? How long before we get the information about the rest of the island, do you figure, General?

Carter: Could take weeks, Mr. President.

JFK: Weeks?

Speaker[?]: Uh...

Carter: For complete coverage of a cloud covered island.

Bundy or McNamara[?]: Depending on the weather.

Taylor: Well, we, we've got about 80 percent now, don't we [unintelligible]?

Lundahl: Yes, sir. It depends much on what we get out of yesterday's flight, sir. They won't be [unintelligible]...

Carter: There are clouded areas, Mr. President...

Speaker[?]: Right, but there are areas...

Carter: ...as I understand it and there are...

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible]

Carter: ...areas that are very substantial...

Speaker[?]: We'll have a report on those...

Carter: ...in permanent [helium?].

Speaker[?]: ...covered with clouds over it.

Lundahl: We'll have preliminaries by six o'clock tomorrow morning.

JFK: Well, the [top] there is the...

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible]

JFK: ...the part of the island isn't covered by, uh, this flight we're uh, by tomorrow morning. What about, uh, doing that, uh, tomorro plus the clouded part doing low level? Have we got a plane that goes...

Carter: We can certainly go low level...

Speaker[?]: Go low level, lower level [unintelligible]...

Carter: ...and we have been reluctant to do that. The, the one thing to worry about on low level is that that will create a sense of tactical alert in the island, and I'm not sure we want to do that Our guess is that the high level ones have not, in fact, been detected.

Taylor: I think that's correct.

Bundy[?]: No reactions.

JFK: I would think that if we are going to go in and take out this and any others we find that we would, uh, at the same time do a general low level...

Carter: You could at the same time do a low level of all that we have not seen.

JFK: ...photographic reconnaissance.

Speaker[?]: Associated with.

Carter: That would certainly be sensible.

JFK: Then we would be prepared...

Carter: As a matter of fact...

JFK: ...almost any day to take those out.

Carter: ...for evidentiary purposes, uh, someone has made the point this morning, that if we go in on a quick strike, we ought to have a photographic plane take shots of the [hits?].

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible]

Taylor[?]: I think that's right, that's [unintelligible].

JFK: All right, well, now, I think we've got to, uh, [unintelligible] for this for us got to be doing anything quickly and quietly and completely that's what we've got to be doing the next two or thre days. So we'll meet at six?

Speaker[?]: Do you think...

RFK: How long...Excuse me. I just wondered how long it would take if you took it out ahead an invasion?

Taylor: Got to mount an invasion?

RFK: No, how long would it take got to...

Speaker[?]: What is that...

RFK: ...uh, take over the island?

Taylor: Very hard got to estimate, Bobby...

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible]

[There are several conversations going on and only portions of each are intelligible.

Taylor: ...but I would say that we, in five or six days the main resistance ought to be overcome. We might then be in there for, for a month thereafter [cleaning up?].

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible] just [unintelligible].

McNamara: Five or seven days of air plus five days of invasion plus...

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible]

RFK: I wonder if CIA could give us what state, uh, the [unintelligible] CIA what the latest, uh, is [popular or populace?] [unintelligible]. Yeah, so we get some idea about our reception there. I just hate to even waste these six hours, so it may be that we will want to be, uh, doing some movements, uh, in the next six hours, uh...

Speaker[?]: About the execution of the [launching?] [unintelligible].

JFK: Yeah.

[Multiple speakers; the following is the only intelligible conversation]

JFK: I want to, uh, add [unintelligible] better also. [I don't know?] About you, are you coming to lunch?

Speaker[?]: Yeah. Both of us were.

JFK: Who else is supposed to come to lunch?

Rusk: I was supposed to, but, hmm, [unintelligible]...

JFK: George, are you supposed to come?

Speaker[?]: No, no. [He's?], see if they've got the [unintelligible].

JFK: Do you want to take [out that?]?

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible], are you supposed to go now?

JFK: Yeah, six o'clock tonight?

Speaker[?]: Six o'clock.

JFK: All right. Seven o'clock.

Bundy[?]: Seven, seven is better actually for you, Mr. President. Is six-thirty manageable? That would be still better because you're supposed to be out there at eight.

JFK: Well, that's all right. That's, that's [unintelligible] then, uh, seven. Between six-thirty and seven. As close to six-thirty as you can be here. How many would there be? I'd like to have, if you add the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff her...

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible]

JFK: Well, then you bring who you think ought got to be bought.

Bundy: May I urge everybody got to use the East Gates rather than the West Gates?

JFK: I think we ought got to get... What's Mr. [John A.] McCone doing up here, General?

Carter: He's uh, burying his stepson tomorrow morning back...

Speaker[?]: He just [threw me?], I just talked with him on the phone. I think he'd rather decide.

JFK: So why don't you, you discussed [unintelligible]? Is he familiar with this information?

Carter: Yes, sir, he's aware of what has happened.

RFK: I talked with him about an hour ago. [unintelligible] here tomorrow morning [unintelligible]. He said he was going got to talk after the meeting, maybe just tell him we had a meeting [unintelligible].

JFK: All right, now the other question is on, uh, the [unintelligible] General Eisenhower. Where is the General, now?

Speaker[?]: Eisenhower...

JFK: I'll take care of that. I'll have [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: I want got to get say a list of the [unintelligible] of the [unintelligible] the president [unintelligible].

Carter: It's too complicated got to...

Rusk: George.

Speaker[?]: George.

Rusk: The president wants you got to take my place at lunch.

Ball: All right, I've got this, you know that I've got a 1 o'clock pre speech, that's all.

Rusk: Well, well, but maybe they could reschedule that.

Speaker[?]: Oh, well, we'll see how he's [unintelligible] at the conference [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: Yes, yes.

Speaker[?]: They can reschedule that, that's fine.

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible] the military [unintelligible].

JFK: Well, as I say, [I say?] you're familiar with [unintelligible].

Taylor: Well, uh, [unintelligible] the SAC bombers.

JFK: No, no, no. We'd get [unintelligible] out of [unintelligible].

Taylor: [unintelligible] make a decision her got to use whatever facilities you have.

Speaker[?]: What about [unintelligible], I'll call him about this thing tomorrow.

Speaker[?]: That's not the right person [unintelligible] [two or got to?] low level reconnaissance.

Speaker[?]: Yeah.

[End of reel of 1.]

(Beginning of reel 2. Reel 2 repeats some of the conversation from the end of reel 1. Several conversations are going on at the same time and very little is intelligible]

Speaker[?]: Yeah.

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible] tomorrow [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: [unintelligible] right person now [got to do?] low level reconnaissance.

McNamara: Yeah. I was just talking got to [Heinz?]. He'll get there right now. [unintelligible] What I think [unintelligible]. Everybody else will sit down at the table [unintelligible] and consider wha gaps there are.

Speaker[?]: This is the point I want [unintelligible] on this [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: I'm trying got to find out [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: I know.

McNamara: Why don't you drive? Pick up your car and you drive over got to this, the Pentagon and have lunch with [unintelligible].

why don't call from here and...

McNamara: This one still [unintelligible]....come over This could be [unintelligible]. Anybody else you choose.

Bundy: One, two...[unintelligible] then you can sit down...

Speaker[?]: Are you [unintelligible]?

McNamara: [Unintelligible] in great detail.

Speaker[?]: See what we really need.

Johnson: I have, I have leased under my authority [unintelligible]. I have kept that relationship. Uh, the only objective reason we should [unintelligible] switch planes makes sense. If you had, uh, immediate assassination or if you had something else, I'm, I'm away from you 4 or 5 hours. I have a Grumman "Gulfstream" that I've leased and I want you to lease it for MATS after the election. Let me use it instead of the "Jetstar." It's a helluva lot better for these small airfields and I think [unintelligible] fit in more people. Well, anyway, I have a lease now and I'd, what I'd like to have is, uh, the best communication that you have here. If it can be done.

McNamara: Oh, sure.

Johnson: As it is, my [unintelligible] when I get 100,200 miles from Washington, my telephone [unintelligible] but the highest it will go [unintelligible].

McNamara: Sir, things like this [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: Let me just check [before?] I ask him?

Speaker[?]: What will it be around here about [unintelligible]?

Bundy: Well, he's going to telephone [unintelligible].

Speaker[?]: Low, low level. If you think that [unintelligible].

McNamara: He ought to just over there [unintelligible].

Oh, thank you. Would you just then take the call into [unintelligible]? Have [unintelligible] just sit down and your': right, they're great at that.

Speaker[?]: [Unintelligible], too.

Speaker[?]: Yes, sir.

Cuba Tape

(This is a transcription of tapes recorded in the Cabinet Room on Saturday, October 27, 1962.

The tape begins with an inconclusive discussion of current tactical questions, including plans to stop a ship (Grozny) and a proposal for two daylight surveillance missions, morning and afternoon. This discussion is interrupted a few minutes into the meeting as the President reads a ticker item:)

JFK: (Reading) Premier Khrushchev told President Kennedy yesterday he would withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba if the United States withdrew its rockets from Turkey.

(voices unclear.)

Voice: He didn't really say that, did he?

JFK: That may not be -- he may be putting out another letter.

(Mixed voices. Calls for Pierre [Salinger].)

JFK: That wasn't in the letter we received, was it?

Voice: No. (Voices unclear)

JFK: Is he supposed to be putting out a letter he's written me or putting out a statement?

Salinger: Putting out a letter he wrote to you.

JFK: Let's just -- uh -- keep on going (words unclear)

Voice: It's in a different statement.

Rusk: Well, I think we better get -- uh -- (words unclear) Will you check and be sure that the letter that's coming in on the ticker is the letter that we were seeing last night.

(mixed voices)

JFK: What's the advantage of the second mission?

McNamara: It creates a pattern of increasing intensity of surveillance, Mr. President. We believe that we should do this. Now, personally I would recommend, although we don't need...

Voice: Are there two eights?

McNamara: Yes, two eights. On the missile sites (words unclear). And I would also recommend, although we don't have to decide now, that we conduct a night surveillance mission tonight. There appears increasing evidence that they're working night and day on these sites. (words unclear) two in daylight and one at night.

Bundy: The night is laid on but not finally authorized?

(mixed voices)

Voice: We believe there ought to be an announcement of that

(mixed voices)

Rusk: I really think we ought to have a talk about the political part of this thing, because if we prolong it more than a few days on the basis of the withdrawal of these missiles from Turkey -- not from Turkey, from Cuba -- the Turkish thing hasn't been injected into this conversation in New York and it wasn't in the letter last night. It thus appears to be something quite new.

(words unclear)

McNamara: That's what worries me about the whole deal. Just go through that letter; to a layman it looks to be full of holes, and I think my proposal would be to be...

Bundy: (interrupting) keeping the heat on

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McNamara: Keep the heat on. This is why I would recommend the two daylight and the one night missions, and I fully agree we ought to put out an announcement that we are going to send the night mission over.
Pause
Bundy: Which way do you want it to stand, that we approved it, Mr. President, subject to appeal, or do you want to hold it...
McNamara: (interrupting) We can hold it, Mr. President, we
(Voices unclear)
JFK: I think we ought to go ahead if they want it, so it's all right with me. I think we might have one more conversation about it, however, at about six o'clock just in case during the day we get something.
McNamara: There's plenty of time -- we keep it on alert.
JFK: That's right. We plan to put it on unless there's something in the daytime.
Bundy: Well the announcement can -- that is a complication. We can't very well make the announcement and not do it.
(And the conclusion, after further exchange, is to have the announcement all ready to go at the Pentagon.)
JFK: I ought to have...In case this is an accurate statement, where are we with our conversations with the Turks about the withdrawal of these ...
Nitze: Hare says this is absolutely anathema, and as a matter of prestige and politics. George is ready with a report from Finletter.
Ball: Yeah, we have a report from Finletter, and we've also got a report from Rome on the Italians which indicates that that would be relatively easy. Turkey creates more of a problem. We would have to work it out with the Turks on the basis of putting a Polaris in the waters, and even that might not be enough according to the judgment that we've had on the spot. We've got a -- we've got one paper on it already, and we're having more work done right now. It is a complicated problem, because these were put in under a NATO decision, and (words unclear)
Nitze: The NATO requirement involves the whole question as to whether we are going to denuclearize NATO, and I would suggest that what you do is to say that we're prepared only to discuss Cuba at this time. After the Cuban thing is settled we can thereafter be prepared to discuss anything...
JFK: (interrupting) I don't think we can -- if this an accurate -- and this is the whole deal -- we just have to wait -- I don't think we can take the position...
Bundy: (interrupting) It's very odd, Mr. President, if he's changed his terms from a long letter to you and an urgent appeal from the Counselor [Fomin] only last night, set in a purely Cuban context, it seems to me we're well within our -- there's nothing wrong with our posture in sticking to that line.
JFK: But let's wait and let's assume that this is an accurate report of what he's now proposing this morning -- there may have been changes over there -- a change over there.
Bundy: He -- uh -- I still think he's in a difficult position to change it overnight having sent you a personal communication...
JFK: (interrupting) Well now let's say he has changed it. This is his latest position.
Bundy: I would answer back saying I would prefer to deal with your -- with your interesting proposals of last night.
JFK: Well now that's just what we ought to be thinking about. We're going to be in an insupportable position on this matter if this becomes his proposal. In the first place, we last year tried to get the missiles out of

there because they're not militarily useful, number 1. Number 2, it's going to -- to any man at the United Nations or any other rational man it will look like a very fair trade.
Nitze: I don't think so. I don't think -- I think you would get support from the United Nations on the proposition, "Deal with this Cuban thing." We'll talk about other things later, but I think everybody else is worried that they'll be included in this great big trade, and it goes beyond Cuba...
Rusk: (interrupting) That's true of the Allies; it would not be true of the neutrals.
Bundy: No.
Rusk: (words unclear) goes on at the moment, to think about this. One possibility would be to, if this is persistent
Voice: Why are you stopping, Mr. Secretary?
Rusk: (words unclear)
JFK: (reading) A special message appeared to call for negotiations and both nations, Cuba and Turkey, should give their consent to the United Nations to visit their territories. Khrushchev said the Security Council of the Soviet Union was solemnly pledged not to use its territory as a bridgehead for an attack on Turkey, called for a similar pledge from the United States not to let its territory be used as a bridgehead for an attack on Cuba. Broadcast (words unclear) it was out of the question for the U. S. to abandon its Turkish military bases. Now we've known this was coming for a week -- uh -- we can't -- it's going to be hung up here now (words unclear).
(mixed voices)
JFK: How much negotiation have we had with the Turks?
Rusk: We haven't talked with the Turks. The Turks have talked with us -- the Turks have talked with us in -- uh -- NATO.
JFK: Well, have we gone to the Turkish government before this came out this week? I've talked about it now for a week. Have we had any conversation in Turkey, with the Turks?
Rusk: We've asked Finletter and Hare to give us their judgments on it. We've not actually talked to the Turks.
Ball: We did it on a basis where if we talked to the Turks, I mean this would be an extremely unsettling business.
JFK: Well this is unsettling now George, because he's got us in a pretty good spot here, because most people will regard this as not an unreasonable proposal, I'll just tell you that. In fact, in many ways...
Bundy: But what most people, Mr. President?
JFK: I think you're going to find it very difficult to explain why we are going to take hostile military action in Cuba, against these sites -- what we've been thinking about -- the thing that he's saying is, "If you'll get yours out of Turkey, we'll get ours out of Cuba." I think we've got a very tough one here.
Bundy: I don't see why we pick that track when he's offered us the other track, within the last twenty-four hours. You think the public one is serious?
(words unclear)
JFK: Yeah. I think you have to assume that this is their new and latest position and it's a public one.
Rusk: What would you think of releasing the letter of yesterday?
Pause
Bundy: I think it has a good deal of virtue.

JFK: Yes, but I think we have to be now thinking about what our position's going to be on this one, because this is the one that's before us, and before the world.
(Short pause)
Sorensen: As between the two I think it clear that practically everyone here would favor the private proposal.
Rusk: We're not being offered the choice — we may not be offered the choice.
JFK: But seriously, there are disadvantages also in the private one, which is a guarantee of Cuba. But in any case this is now his official (sic), and we can release his other one, and it's different, but this is the one that the Soviet government obviously is going on.
Nitze: Isn't it possible that they're going on a dual track, one a public track and the other a private track; the private track is related to (words unclear), and the public track is one that's in order to confuse the public scene (words unclear) additional pressures.
JFK: Possible...
(Voices unclear)
Thompson: I think it's one that the Soviets take seriously.
Rusk: I think, yes, I think that the -- uh -- NATO-Warsaw Pact arms problem is a separate problem and ought to be discussed between NATO and Warsaw Pact. They've got hundreds of missiles looking down the throat of every NATO country. And I think this is -- we have to get it into that context. The Cuba thing is a Western Hemisphere problem, an intrusion in the Western Hemisphere.
(Short pause - mixed voices)
Nitze: I think we ought to stand as much as we can on the separate stages.
Voice: Absolutely. (mixed voices)
Nitze: Fight the Turkish one with the best arguments we can. I'd handle this thing so that we continue on the real track which is to try to get the missiles out of Cuba pursuant to the private negotiation.
Bundy: The other way, it seems to me -- if we accept the notion of a trade at this stage, our position will come apart very fast. It's a very difficult position. It isn't as if we'd got the missiles out, Mr. President. It'd be different. Or if we had any understanding with the Turks that they ought to come out, it would be different. Neither of these is the case.
JFK: I'd just like to know how much we've done about it and how much did we talk about it...
Bundy: We decided not to, Mr. President. We decided not to play it directly with the Turks.
Rusk: ... our own representatives
Ball: If we talked to the Turks, they would take it up in NATO. This thing would be all over Western Europe, and our position would have been undermined.
Bundy: That's right.
Ball: Because immediately the Soviet Union would know that this thing was being discussed. The Turks feel very strongly about this. They -- uh -- we persuaded them that this was an essential requirement, and they -- they feel that it's a matter of prestige and a matter of real...
(mixed voices)
Bundy: ...In their own terms it would already be clear that we were trying to sell our allies for our interests. That would be the view in all

of NATO. It's irrational, and it's crazy, but it's a terribly powerful fact.
Thompson: Particularly in the case that this is a message to the UN, to U Thant. It seems to me we ought to get word to Stevenson that if this is put up up there he should immediately say we will not discuss — discuss the Turkish bases.
Bundy: The problem is Cuba. The Turks are not a threat to the peace. Nobody can (words unclear).
JFK: I think it would be very desirable to tell (word unclear) that until we get time to think about it, this thing -- the fact of the matter is that we received a letter last night from Khrushchev with an entirely different proposal. Therefore we first ought to get clarification from the Soviet Union of what they're talking, at least give us -- as I say you're going to find a lot of people think this a rather reasonable condition.
JFK: (reading bits from something) Besides he must guarantee not to intervene in Turkey and we must do the same in Cuba. (a dozen words unclear) Well, we know what the problem is there.
Rusk: Well, I think that it's relevant here to be able to say that we support the declaration of Iran that they would not accept foreign missiles in Iran. The Turkish problem is a NATO-Warsaw Pact problem, and it's an arms problem between these two groups that is something for these two groups to talk about with each other as a problem of disarmament with respect to NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
(Pause)
Dillon: Well, there's also this thing of upsetting the status quo, and we did not upset it in Iran. (words unclear) not being upset there, and they do the...
(Pause)
JFK: He's put this out in a way that's caused maximum tension and embarrassment. It's not as if it was a private proposal, which would give us an opportunity to negotiate with the Turks. He's put it out in a way that the Turks are bound to say they don't agree to this. (words unclear)
Dillon: There's another (words unclear) there's another -- uh -- military thing to it. It may be preparations for counteraction against those particular bases that we -- uh -- (words unclear) Cuba (words unclear) could be that.
(Short pause, whispers and mixed voices)
JFK: Until we have gotten our position a little clearer we ought to go with this -- uh -- last night business so that that gives us about an hour or two, we don't have Khrushchev...
Rusk: (interrupting) There's nothing coming in yet on our tickers. I...
JFK: He says he'd like to consider the following statement be issued — this is Stevenson — (reading) the United States does not have any territorial designs against Cuba, but of course we cannot tolerate Soviet-Cuban aggression against us or our sister republics (words unclear) the Soviet offer to withdraw weapons in Cuba (words unclear) assurance of our peaceful intentions towards Cuba. In the meantime it is imperative that further developments of Soviet bases stop and discussions proceed with the Secretary General of the United Nations in New York. Governor Stevenson recommends that such a statement be made in order to prevent the Soviets from capturing the peace offensive. Governor Stevenson also recommends that we not consider the Turkish offer as reported in the attached Reuters dispatch as an alternative or an addition to the Khrushchev proposal in his

letter. I think that -- uh -- we ought to go at -- we ought to get a statement ready which will -- uh -- I'm not sure that -- which would -- uh -- these references to last night's -- back on that, number one. Number two something about the work on the bases stopping while we're going to have a chance to discuss these matters. I don't know what we're going to say on the Turkish matter.
Thompson: Khrushchev may have picked up the statement which Kreisky, the Austrian Foreign Minister, made day before yesterday -- has made and which he may think was inspired by us, in which he raised the question of Turkish...
Low Voice: Of course maybe the Russians got Kreisky to do it, too.
(Pause -- very low voices on drafting details of something for 75 seconds)
Rusk: And if we publish the letter of last night, Tommy, what other letters will get published (words unclear)
Thompson: I think probably this -- uh -- whole exchange, this refers -- uh -- starting with this crisis -- this refers to the previous letters. It starts out by saying, "I received your letter." I've got the feeling that if you have someone explaining the situation, you have to publish the exchange.
JFK: I don't know. You perhaps don't have to put out the letter as much as you do the three proposals or so.
(Long pause. Voices mixed, occasional, and low)
RFK: The first point being that this -- uh -- this question of Cuba and the (word unclear) must be resolved within the next few days; it can't wait. The negotiations and discussions must -- uh -- get on, and the work that is continuing despite our protests has been going on. So therefore it's got to be resolved quickly. Uh -- this action that has been taken is not an action just by the United States but is an action by all of the Latin American countries plus the United States. This has nothing to do with the security of the countries of Europe, which do have their own problems. Uh -- we would -- uh -- obviously consider negotiating the giving up of bases in -- uh -- Turkey if we can assure the -- uh -- Turks and the other European countries for whom these bases were emplaced that there can be some assurances given to them for their own security. This will entail inspection as we anticipate that there will be some inspection in Cuba and in the United States -- uh -- at the time that these bases are withdrawn from Cuba and we give assurances that we are not going to invade Cuba. Something along those lines.
(Pause. Low voices exchanging unclear views on US-UN relations. A new message reported arriving.)
RFK: I don't see how we can ask the Turks to give up their defense
Voice: What do you think they could...
RFK: No -- uh -- (word unclear) unless the Soviet Union is also going to give up their -- uh --
Voices: weapons.
McNamara: Not only the weapons, but agree not to invade Turkey.
(Voices overlapping)
McNamara: And allow inspection to ensure that they haven't.
RFK: We would be glad for it (voices overlapping). We think that's a very good point made by the Russians, and we would be glad to -- and we finally feel that this is a major breakthrough and we would be glad to discuss that. In the meantime this is a threat to the United States and not just that -- to all of Latin America and let's get that done.

Voice: I think that's tough on (word unclear) to say that this is what we want.
(Voices overlapping.)
McNamara: Well, Khrushchev's statement to U Thant is absolutely contradictory to his statement to the President. The question is which came first. I thought the reply to U Thant came first.
Rusk: What's the statement to the President?
McNamara: The long letter.
Voice: Oh.
(mixed voices)
(There follows an inconclusive discussion of times of the messages.
The reel of tape ends here,

[End Meeting Item 40.3, Reference Reel 1, continued on Reference Reel 2]

and the next reel begins with low voices and side conversations, not clear -- President not present. The gathering comes to order after about five minutes as Rusk begins to read from the Khrushchev public letter. He reads its highlights rapidly.)

McNamara: Dean, how do you interpret the addition of still another condition over and above the letter that came in last night? We had one deal in the letter, and now we've got a different deal. And -- uh -- in relation ...

(mixed voices; one: Shouldn't we point this out by letter?)

McNamara: How can we negotiate with somebody who changes his deal before we even get a chance to reply and announces publicly the deal before we receive it?

Bundy: I think there must have been an overruling in Moscow.

Voice: What does Tommy say?

Voice: (Words unclear) - Bob, we've got three positions.

Thompson: (Words unclear) a long letter last night he wrote himself.

Rusk: And was that sent out without clearances?

Thompson: Without clearances, yes.

(mixed voices)

McNamara: It completely changes the character of the deal we're likely to be able to make, and also therefore our action in the interim. So I (words unclear) really keep the pressure on (words unclear) the situation.

Bundy: This should be knocked down publicly. A private -- let me suggest this scenario -- we knock this down publicly in the way we've just described, separating the issues, keeping attention on Cuba, and the four-point reply that Bob has framed. Privately we say to Khrushchev, "Look -- uh -- your public statement is a very dangerous one because -- uh -- it makes impossible immediate discussion of your private proposals and requires us to proceed urgently with the things that we have in mind. You'd better get straightened out."

Voice: This is exactly what I'd say.

McCone: I think that's exactly right.

Voice: And we release the fact that there was the other letter?

Bundy: No, we don't. I guess we say we are reluctant to release this letter which would display the inconsistency in your position, but we don't have very much time.

McNamara: The point, Bobby, is he's changed the deal. (Words unclear) Before we even got the first letter translated, he added a completely new deal and he released it publicly, and under these circumstances (words unclear)

(voices)

RFK: What is the advantage? I don't know what -- where you are in twenty-four hours from now -- uh -- so we win that argument but what twenty-four hours...

voices
McNamara: We incorporate a new deal in our letter.
(Voices unclear and overlapping, and someone says: "remove the missiles, clear the production sites, and then inspection.")
RFK: Now the problem is going to be -- uh -- not just this fact that we have this exchange with him and (words unclear) but the fact that he's going to have a ploy publicly that's going to look rather satisfactory at present. How are we going to have him do anything but take the ball away from us publicly, if we don't -- if we just write him a letter.
(Voices)
Bundy: (words unclear) to surface his earlier message, Bobby...
RFK: All of that. I think that we're going to have to, in the next three or four hours, not just put the ball completely in -- uh -- in his hands and allow him to do whatever he wants. We have an exchange with him and say he's double-crossed us, and we don't know which deal to accept, and then he writes back, and in the meantime he's got all the play throughout the world, and the fact that he (word unclear)
McNamara: Just turn it down publicly.
RFK: Yeah, but I think that's awful tough...
(Voices overlap.)
McCone: I don't think you can turn that down publicly without -- uh -- referring publicly to his letter of yesterday.
RFK: I'd like to have the consideration of my thoughts (words unclear). He's offered this deal -- uh -- (words unclear) that he will withdraw the bases in Cuba for assurances that we don't intend to invade. We've always given those assurances. We will be glad to give them again. He said, in his letter to me, he said that we were to permit inspection. Obviously that entails inspection not only of Cuba but entails inspection of the United States to ensure that we're not -- by United Nations observers -- to ensure that we're not getting ready to -- uh -- invade. Now this is one of the things U Thant -- the bases in Cuba -- uh -- involve -- uh -- the security of the Western Hemisphere. This is not just a question of the United States. This is a question of all the Latin American countries, which have all joined together in this effort. Time is running out on us. This must be brought to fruition. -- uh -- The question of the Turkish bases, we think that's excellent, that you brought that up, and that -- uh -- that -- uh -- there should be disarmament of the Turkish bases, but that has nothing to do with the security of the Western Hemisphere. It does have to do with the security of Turkey, and we would be happy, and we're sure the Turks would be, of making a similar arrangement in Turkey. We will withdraw the bases from Turkey if -- uh -- and allow (word unclear) inspection of Turkey to make sure we've done that, and you withdraw your invasion bases of -- uh -- of the Soviet Union and permit inspection there.
Voice: I think it's too complicated, Bobby.
RFK: Well, I don't think it is.
JFK: Wait, just, it seems to me the first thing we ought to try to do is not let the Turks issue some statement that's wholly unacceptable. So that before we've even had a chance to get our own diplomacy the first thing it seems to me we ought to emphasize is that (noises) But they've given us several different proposals in twenty-four hours. And work's got to stop today, before we talk about anything. At least then we're in a defensible position. The other thing is to not have the Turks making statements, so that this thing -- Khrushchev puts it out and the next thing the Turks say they won't accept it. Then whatever we do in Turkey -- in Cuba -- it seems

to me he has set the groundwork to do something in Turkey. So I think we ought to have the Turks -- we ought to have a talk with the Turks because I think they've got to understand the peril that they're going to move in the next week. When we take some action in Cuba, the chances are that he'll take some action in Turkey, and they ought to understand that. And in fact he may even come out and say that once (words unclear) he's tried to be fair and if we do any more about Cuba then he's going to do it to Turkey. So I think the Turks ought to think a little (noise). We ought to try to get them not to respond to this till we've had a chance to consider what action we'll take. Now how long will it take to get in touch with the Turks? (Voices overlapping: "it's going to be awfully hard," "the NATO problem")

Rusk: I think this is the thing the Turks ought to say that -- uh -- the security of Turkey, and the military arrangement in Turkey are part of the NATO problem or NATO.

Bundy: Part of the Atlantic -- part of the Western Alliance -- and have no other and they have nothing to do with (word unclear, possibly "NATO"). They ought to -- they can certainly make a statement disassociating themselves.

Voices: Yes

Bundy: It seems to me it's important that they should. If anyone pulls them in, it'll be us, and they can't be expected to do that.

JFK: Well, but -- uh -- we want to give them some guidance. These are American missiles, not Turkish missiles; they're under American control, not Turkish control.

Rusk: The missiles -- don't they own the missiles?

McNamara: They belong to Turkey and are manned by Turks, but the warheads are in U. S. custody.

Voice: It seems to me that...

Rusk: And they're committed to NATO.

JFK: In other words we couldn't withdraw the missiles anyway. (words unclear)

McNamara: They belong to Turkey.

JFK: All we could withdraw is the warheads?

McNamara: Well, we can't even really withdraw the warheads. We simply are custodians of the warheads for the account of the Turks in the recognition that you must release them.

JFK: Well now we've got -- what we have to do first is get -- uh -- I would think is just -- uh -- act very quickly, till we've had a chance to think a little more about it -- that what we ought to say is that we have had several, publicly and privately, different proposals -- or differing proposals -- (words unclear by other voices). They all are complicated matters that involve some discussion to get their true meaning. We cannot permit ourselves to be impaled on a long negotiating hook while the work goes on at these bases. I therefore suggest that -- uh -- work -- that the United Nations immediately, with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, take steps with regard to the cessation of the work, and then we can talk about all these matters, which are very complicated.

Bundy: I think it would be very important to say at least that the current threat to peace is not restricted to Cuba. There's no pain in saying that if you think you're going to make a trade later on. I think also that we ought to -- uh -- say that we have an immediate threat -- what is going on in Cuba, and that is what has got to stop. Then I think we should say the public Soviet -- the broadcast message is at variance with other proposals which have been put forward --

JFK: In the last twelve hours...
Bundy: In the last twelve hours. And interpret those for background.
JFK: That being so -- uh -- until we find out what is really being suggested and what can really be discussed, we have to get something on work -- the main weakness here is the work's going on.
Bundy: That's right.
JFK: We may -- now let's not kid ourselves; they've got a God -- they've got a very good proposal, which is the reason they made it publicly not privately...
Bundy: The work's going on. While you were out of the room, Mr. President, we reached an informal consensus -- I don't know whether Tommy agrees -- that this -- last night's message was Khrushchev and this one is his own hard-nosed people overruling him -- this public one -- that they didn't like what he said to you last night. Nor would I, if I were a Soviet hard-nose.
Thompson: I think in view of the Kreisky speech they have to have thought this was our underground way of testing this and they thought they had to...
Bundy: Who said that?
JFK: The only thing is, Tommy, why wouldn't they say it privately if they were serious. The fact they give it to us publicly -- I think they know the kind of complexity that...
Voice: Soviet officials...
Bundy: And it's a way of pinning themselves down.
JFK: Now let's -- uh -- I would think the first thing we have to do is to -- as I say, rather than get into the details -- the fact that work is going on is the one defensible public position we've got. They've got a very good card. This one is going to be very tough, I think, for us. It's going to be tough in England, I'm sure -- as well as other places on the continent -- we're going to be forced to take action, that might seem, in my opinion, not a blank check but a pretty good check to take action in Berlin on the grounds that we were wholly unreasonable. Most think -- people think that if you're allowed an even trade you ought to take advantage of it. Therefore it makes it much more difficult for us to move with world support. These are all the things that -- uh -- why this is a pretty good play of his. That -- uh -- being so -- uh -- I think that we -- the only thing we've got him on is the fact that now they've put forward varying proposals in short periods of time, all of which are complicated, and under that shield this work goes on. Until we can get some un -- agreement on the cessation of work, how can we possibly negotiate with proposals coming as fast as the wires can carry them.
Bundy: And the ships are still moving. In spite of his assurances to U Thant his ships still...
JFK: I don't think we ought to emphasize the ships (words unclear)
Dillon: There's one other -- uh -- very -- might be a very dangerous sentence in this thing that no one has particularly mentioned, but it's a thing I've been afraid of all along on a Cuban trade, and it's where he says, "How are we to react when you have surrounded our country with bases about which your military speak demonstratively?" that opens up our whole base system...
JFK: I thought he pinned it to Turkey, though.
Dillon: Oh no. Then he goes on and says that, but he's left it open to (voices unclear) say it's -- uh --
JFK: It (words unclear) the direct phrase suggests it's Turkey.

Thompson: Mr. President, it's larger than the missiles, because he says 'the means which you consider aggressive' which -- this could include planes, the presence of technicians, and everything else. That means the real abandonment of our base in Turkey (words unclear).
Bundy: Yah, obviously that's subject to various shades. He could take missiles for missiles, which wouldn't be good enough from our point of view because its (word unclear) to Cuba. It would be tough anyway.
JFK: It would be tough for three weeks (words unclear) because the problem is if the work on their bases stops, that's in my opinion our defensible position.
McNamara: Stop the (words unclear) the operability of it -- uh --
(mixed voices)
McNamara: I would certainly put that in the same message. It isn't enough to stop work on a base that's already operable.
JFK: We've got to -- now let's see now -- let's see what Stevenson's suggesting. (Pause) What? Yeah (to voices not heard)
Voice: I don't think it's a strong line to suggest the peculiar ways of debating (words unclear). It's going to look to the public as though we're confused.
JFK: Well no, the only thing that I'm trying to suggest is all these proposals come; they're all complicated, and what they can do is hang us up in negotiations on different proposals while the work goes on.
Nitze:: That looks like a rationalization of our own confusion. I think you've got to take a firmer line than that.
Bundy: I myself would send back word, by Fomin, for example, that last night's stuff was pretty good; this is impossible, at this stage of the game, and that time is getting very short.
JFK: What's our public position?
Bundy: Our public position is as you outlined it, but I think that it's very important to get them to get the message that they -- if they want to stop something further in Cuba, they have to do better than this public statement.
(short pause)
JFK: See if you can get Stevenson on the phone.
(short pause)
Bundy: Mr. Secretary, have you got a draft -- typed?
(words unclear)
Rusk: I'm just scribbling off something here. I think we ought to say something pretty closely (word unclear)
(long pause -- low voices not clear)
JFK: You have any idea how many bases -- missiles may be facing Turkey? Intermediate?
McNamara: Not off hand, Mr. President.
Voice: I would guess it was on the order of at least a hundred, within range.
Voice: We have fifteen Jupiters.
JFK: Fifteen Jupiters in Turkey?
(voices unclear)
Voice: To get the bombers out of Cuba we'd have to get the nuclear weapons and planes out of Turkey.
Thompson: It seems that you can't tell which one went first. One went there and one went here, but he thinks that they were sent about the same time.
(voices unclear)
McNamara: Absolutely contradictory.

(mixed voices)
Low Voice: Are we sure that the Russians might not have -- that the Russian language view, might not have implied or might not be interpreted by the Russians, when we're talking about ships carrying proclaimed material?
(Pause)
Thompson: He certainly doesn't have the text but he knew when he heard the broadcast.
JFK: (Talking to Stevenson on phone) Well -- uh -- well, Governor we'd be -- I think your message -- uh -- you know the letter that I received last night was different than this. What's your judgment (listens 15 secs) Right (listens 15 secs) Yes (listens 7 secs) Yes (listens 25 secs) (word unclear) Yeah (listens 40 secs) and to act against Cuba ...in addition (listens 30 secs.) Sounds like a (words unclear) (listens 18 secs). Yeah, that's what it presented us (listens 18 secs.) I think we've been around and around too much of that. Fine, well I think the only -uh- what we've got to do is get them to agree to stop work while we talk about all these proposals; they're all possibilities. (listens 30 seconds) Ok, good. Fine, thank you.
JFK: What about our -- what about our putting something in about Berlin?
Dillon: Well that's (words unclear) if you start talking about Cuba and about Turkey, and then you talk...
JFK: Let's get it out of this problem, then we might as well I mean just decide on sand in his gears for a few minutes.
Voice: In what way?
JFK: Well, satisfactory guarantees for Berlin.
Pause
JFK: That's not any good, I'm just trying to cope with what the public problem is about -- because everybody's going to think that this is very reasonable.
Dillon: This Turkish thing has got to be thrown -- you're quite right, Mr. President -- into the overall European context, and you can bring in Berlin; I think it's fine. Because it's not only going to be Turks that are going to be answering here, but the Germans are going to be making statements in the next few hours, as well as other people about this when they're asked, and they're going to take a very strong position.
JFK: Yes...So we've got to call Hare...
Dillon: You're going to have statements out of Bonn too.
Voice: They're trying to find out where he is, Mr. President (words unclear)
JFK: Who has talked to the Turks? Has Finletter talked to them?
Voice: No (voice unclear)
Rusk: The Prime Minister talked to our delegation to -- uh -- to -- uh --
(word unclear)
(short pause)
Dillon: I would say that you say that the Turkish proposal opens the way to a major discussion of a lot of tensions in Europe, including Berlin.
(voices unclear)
Dillon: Oh no no no no no no
Voice: I don't think you -- if you mention that, you've lost the Germans.
Rusk: That's right, right then and there.
(mixed voices)

[End Meeting Item 40.3, Reference Reel 2]

Meeting Item 41.1, Reference Reel 1

McNamara: They turned away from their targets and returned to base.
(short pause)

Taylor: (words unclear) they run into resistance
Rusk: Mr President, it looks like we'll have to make a statement today as to what we do about that as far as surveillance is concerned.
JFK: Well we better wait till we hear more about why they aborted. (voices unclear)
McNamara: Mr. President I wonder if it wouldn't be wise to put the announcement about night surveillance whether we decide to carry it out tonight or not. This is the announcement we would propose.
(pause, low voices unclear)
Voice: They've (words unclear) commonly referred to is -- uh -- different than the resolution.
Rusk: Bob, before you put this out, the second sentence I would delete, unless you have a special need for it and go straight to the (words unclear). Now just before the Foreign Ministers (words unclear) which isn't really very strong as decisions go.
Voice: It's no help. I'm sorry to say this -- this communique (mixed voices, including discussion of which paper is under discussion and further discussion of surveillance announcement, word not clear, with conclusion by JFK: "we'd better wait.")
Voice: I'd better make sure that nobody does anything wrong on this.
(There follows a confused discussion of a draft response to Soviet position. Mixed voices are not clear except as noted below.)
JFK: On this last paragraph, Mr. Secretary, I think we ought to say "As I was preparing this letter, which was prepared in response to your private letter of last night, I learned of your -- this immediate crisis in Cuba, and so forth. When we get action there I shall certainly be ready to discuss the matters you mentioned in your public message. So that's more forthcoming than (words unclear). What we're saying -- we're rejecting his public message, but we might as well...
Dillon: Be prepared to discuss our actions, the detailed thinking (voices unclear)
JFK: Well, be prepared to discuss the -- uh -- your public message -- the matters in your public message, or the issues in your public message. (Short pause) Nothing is going to be successful; you might as well realize that. That's why I'm just wondering whether -- uh -- (words unclear) when he's rejected it (words unclear). Then where are we going to be? Tomorrow he'll come back and say the United States has rejected this proposal we've made. So I think that we ought to be thinking also of saying that we're going to discuss all these matters if he'll cease (words unclear). That's the only place we've got him. So I think we ought to be able to say that -- uh -- the matter of Turkey, and so on, in fact all these matters, ought to be -- can be discussed if he'll cease work. Otherwise he's going to announce that we've rejected his proposal. And then where are we? (Short pause) We're all right if he would cease work and dismantle the missiles. Then we can talk another two weeks. But until we get that -- so I think we ought to put that in -- just say, I read of your public message accepting (words unclear) bases in Cuba. -- uh -- (words unclear) contact as necessary. (Apparently reading from draft) You must realize that these other matters involving NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries will require time for discussion. Unless we all agree, unless we all mean to announce that we've rejected it, I don't think we ought to do it today. I think we ought to say if we're going to discuss this, we're going to have to have a cease of work. (words unclear) to get a cessation of work, (word unclear). And therefore the burden's on him. That's our only...it seems to me...defense

against the appeal of his -- uh -- trade. (Pause) I think we (words unclear) glad to discuss this and other matters, we've got to get a suspension of work.
RFK: And the bases being observed and dismantled
(low voices unclear for about a minute)
Voice: Mr. Zorin has been to U Thant, and one of the people who was there came out and said that the position that Zorin had taken was that the first letter was confidential and it was designed to reduce tension but that as far as he was concerned the second letter contained the substantive proposal.
Voice: the second letter the substantive proposal.
JFK: I think we ought to say to U Thant this afternoon that -- uh -- can he give us any assurances -- can he get any assurances from the Soviet Union that work has ceased. We ought to get that -- seems to me -- before the end of the afternoon. Just that simple message to U Thant. He ought to call Zorin in before we discuss these other matters.
Voice: All right; that's a good idea.
Voice: All right with me.
JFK: Yes, why don't we send that up to U Thant right now while we discuss these other matters which are complicated, involve other countries and which are bound to take time, and everybody will recognize that.
Voice: This is Stevenson's feeling too, and this ought to be a condition before we...
JFK: Well why don't we just make that -- send that message just to U Thant? If we can get assurance from -- which can be inspected that they will cease the work and then we'll discuss these matters. Then I think we're on a much better ground. (voices unclear) We ought to make it a formal request, I think, George.
Ball: All right
(Voices unclear, probably discussing draft answer to Russians)
JFK: Well just let this go for just a second while we send a message to U Thant. (lowers voice) I think we ought to say the Soviet Union message of this morning introduces -- I think we ought to release this (word unclear) what do you think? introduces matters not involved in the Cuba issue but involving -- uh -- the relationships of countries in the -- other than the Western Hemisphere, which are complicated and unfamiliar and will take some time. If we're going to discuss these we must have some assurances which can be verified that the Soviet Union will cease work on the missiles and that the missiles which are presently there have been made inoperable. Would the Secretary General get from the Soviet Union these assurances. In that case the United States would be prepared to discuss any proposals of the Soviet Union.
(Pause 5 seconds, voices)
Rusk: Is anybody a shorthand expert in here? (laughter)
(Long pause)
Sorensen: (reading) The proposal made by the Soviet Union this morning involves a number of countries and issues unrelated to the existing threat to peace posed by Soviet planes and missile bases in Cuba. The lengthy discussions required for any possible settlement of these matters cannot be undertaken by this country until it is assured that work on these bases is halted and the bases themselves are inoperable.
JFK: I wouldn't say "lengthy" because that sounds -- uh -- I have the Soviet Union, in its message of this morning has introduced issues which are directly -- which are not directly related to the Cuban crisis. The United

States would be glad to discuss these matters with the Secretary General and the Soviet Union but they do involve the interests of the fifteen countries of NATO and obviously would take, therefore, some time. I would like the Secretary General -- I ask, therefore, the Secretary General whether he can get assurances from the Soviet Union -- uh -- assurances from the Soviet Union which can be verified by the United Nations that the missiles and so on and so on and about the missile bases that they have been rendered inoperable. If this can be done then the conversations can take place in an atmosphere which would be more suitable.
Dillon: Couldn't they say that they're not interested in the fifteen other countries you say would require consultation. (words unclear)
JFK: Ted why don't you -- uh -- is that agreeable -- Mr. Secretary, that letter to -- uh -- U Thant to get assurances (words unclear) and verified?
Voice: George Ball is getting him on the phone right now.
JFK: U Thant
Voice: Yes
JFK: I'd like to get that out of the way. I'd like to have a written message which could be used in this -- uh. --
low voices unclear for 10-15 seconds.
RFK: I would think -- uh -- Jack it would be well (words unclear) complication
JFK: Yeah that's right, that's why we want to get it out tomorrow morning (words unclear)
Bundy: I talked to Bohlen in Paris. He said the knockdown of the trip to Cuba had been very well received there. He thought there was no problem in France.
(Mixed voices)
Rusk: Probably needed for a revolt in NATO that (words unclear)
Bundy: Well I've also talked to Finletter and asked him to check the Permreps and say that the United States stands for this position but if the NATO countries should feel that it places them in unusual hazard, he is authorized to elicit their points of view (laughter) (words unclear) stir them on that point.
(short pause)
Taylor: We have some more information on the afternoon flight, Mr. Secretary. These planes took off at 1541. There were four in the afternoon flight. The planes took off at 1541. (word unclear). One developed mechanical trouble so a pair turned back. (words unclear) approach the Cuban coast in three flight plans. One flight plan was fired on.

(The report continues, with little consecutive audible clarity but the net of it is that all the planes are on their way back and direct reports after their return will not be available before 6 o'clock. The President asks what kind of fire was received and the answer is not clear. The night-flight statement is presented and the President holds it up, "I want to have a talk with the Secretary," and know more also about this latest episode. "and we may want to do something else.")

There follows low and apparently less general conversation including a discussion, not very audible, by Rusk of possible public comment on the off-course U-2 over the Soviet Union. The President responds:
JFK: I think we're better off not to do it if we can get away with not having some leak. But I think -- I think our problem is to maintain our credibility with Khrushchev.

Bundy: We didn't do it even then until he commented to us, last time.
JFK: Well, very close — didn't we?
Bundy: No, sir.
JFK: Well I don't think there's any advantage now. It just makes -- it gives him a story tomorrow. It makes it look like we're maybe (word unclear). I don't see the advantage.
(voices unclear)
McNamara: Mr. President, may I say in relation to that, I think if we haven't announced already, and I know we haven't we shouldn't now. One of our afternoon aircraft was hit by a 37 millimeter shell. It's coming back, it's all right, but it simply indicates that there's been quite a change in the character of the orders given to the Cuban (word unclear). I don't think we ought to confuse the issue by issuing a White House...
JFK: I agree; let's let it go.
(Pause and low conversation and comments not clear on drafts to Khrushchev and U Thant)
JFK: I think we've got two questions. One is, do we want to have these conversations go on, on Turkey and these other matters while there's a sort of standstill in Cuba, or do we want to say that we won't talk about Turkey and these other matters until they've settled the Cuban crisis. I think these are (words unclear) questions. And I don't think we're going to get there -- they're not going to -- now that they've taken the public position obviously they're not going to settle the Cuban question until they get some compensation in Cuba [sic]. That being true, I think the best position now, with him and publicly, is to say we're glad to discuss this matter and this whole question of verification and all the rest once we get a positive indication that they've ceased their work in Cuba. Otherwise -- uh -- what we're really saying is "We won't discuss Turkey till they settle Cuba," and I think that he will then come back and say the United States has refused his offer, and I don't think that's as good a position as saying we're glad to discuss his offer if we can get a standstill in Cuba. That puts us in a much stronger world position because most people will think his offer is rather reasonable. I think we ought to put our emphasis right now on the fact that we want an indication from him in the next twenty-four hours that he's going to stand still and disarm these weapons. Then we'll say that under <u>those</u> conditions we'll be <u>glad</u> to discuss these matters. But I think that if we don't say that he's going to say we rejected his offer, and therefore he's going to have public opinion with him. So I think our only hope to escape from that is to say that we insist that he stand still. Now we don't think he'll do that, and therefore we're in much better shape to put our case on that than rather that Turkey's irrelevant.
(Pause, 15 seconds, then low voices, 20 seconds)
JFK: Ya, I think we ought to say "if" his proposal. (reading) The proposal made by the Soviet Union broadcast — this would be to the Secretary General -- this morning involved a number of countries and complicated issues not directly related to the existing threat to peace posed by Soviet offensive missile bases in Cuba. The United States would be glad to discuss this matter with you and others after consultation with the members of NATO, whose interests are also involved. The discussions required for any peaceful settlement of these other matters, however, will require time for consultation with the countries whose interests -- uh -- with these countries and cannot be undertaken by this country until it is assured that work on these bases in Cuba has halted and the bases themselves are inoperable. I therefore request with the utmost urgency that you seek

such assurances from the Soviet Union in order that negotiations can go forward. Anybody object to that?
Voice: No it's fine.
JFK: OK, we'll send that, now. You want to ask Adlai to deliver it right away and ask for an answer, don't you think?
Voices: ("I'll get that off" among them)
Voice: The only question I'd like to raise about that is that while really it sets Turkey as a quid pro quo...
Voice: That's my worry about it.
JFK: Well, the negotiations. The point is -- the point is that we're not in a position today to make the trade. That's number one. And we won't be -- maybe -- may in three or four days, I don't know, we have to wait and see what the Turks say. We don't want to be -- we don't want the Soviet Union or the United Nations to be able to say that the United States rejected it. So I think we're better off to stick on the question; freeze, and then we'll discuss it....
Bundy: Well there are two (words unclear) different audiences here, Mr. President, there really are, and I think that if we sound as if we wanted to make this trade, to our NATO people and to all the people who are tied to us by alliance, we are in real trouble. I think that -- we'll all join in doing this if it's the decision, but I think we should tell you that that's the universal assessment of everyone in the government that's connected with these alliance problems.
RFK: Well now what reports did you get from Chip Bohlen, saying that?
Bundy: That the knockdown in this White House statement this morning was well received. Finletter's report is in. Hare's long telegram is in. They all make the same proposition, that if we appear to be trading our -- the defense of Turkey for the threat to Cuba we -- we will -- we just have to face a radical decline in the...
JFK: Yes, but I should say that also, as the situation is moving, Mac, if we don't for the next twenty-four or forty-eight hours, this trade has appeal. Now if we reject it out of hand and then have to take military action against Cuba, then we also face a decline. Now the only thing we've got for which I would think we'd be able to hold general support would be -- well let's try to word it so that we don't harm NATO -- but the thing that I think everybody would agree to -- while these matters, which are complicated, are discussed, there should be a cessation of work. Then I think we can hold general support for that. If they don't agree to that, the Soviet Union, then we retain the initiative, that's my...
Sorensen: I would suggest, Mr. President, when we come to the sentence where we say we'll be glad to discuss this matter, we put in the phrase "Inasmuch as they (that is, these initiatives) relate to disarmament proposals this nation has previously put forward the United States will be glad to discuss this matter."
JFK: I don't think that's much -- that's the whole disarmament
McCone: When you separate out...
(mixed voices)
McNamara: Couldn't we just add in there, "Inasmuch as they relate to -uh- you want to make it the entire issue of NATO, not just Turkey. (voices) That's clear. (voices) Inasmuch as they relate to the defense of NATO, bases in Italy, Turkey, the UK and elsewhere -- then you go on. So you link it all together and you -- and you take away the attention from Turkey. In that case I don't see anything wrong with it.
(Low mixed voices for 2 1/2 minutes.)

Sorensen: Why don't we -- how about if we insert this morning's statement.
Voice: This morning's statement...
Sorensen: After we talk about the con -- the required consultation with NATO and so on, simply say "I repeat, however, the position of the United States that preliminary to consideration of any proposals..."
RFK: Yeah, but he wants to find out -- take the initiative away by saying to the Soviet Union tonight, "President Kennedy -- the United States Government -- wants to know, prior to initiating discussions on any matters, that you will give us assurances that work on the bases has stopped."
Voice: That's right
RFK: No I don't think that that does.
Voices unclear
RFK: The point that has to be made in the statement. Will you give the United States Government assurances that before we try to negotiate...
(There follows 30 minutes of mixed voices and discussion proceeding evidently without the President. McNamara repeats his point, to get away from specific reference to Turkey. Sorensen notes that most of what's needed is in the morning statement. Sometimes many voices at once but also further audible discussion not transcribed here because the President was not present.
The President returns and the revised letter to U Thant is quickly approved, to be given to U Thant and then released at six.)
JFK: I just talked to General Norstad. He thinks that we ought to have a meeting of the NATO Council tomorrow morning to present this to them so that they all have a piece of it. Otherwise no matter what we do -- if we don't take it, we're blamed, if we do take it, we're just as blamed. Very right.
Bundy: I talked to Finletter and asked him to present it individually. Would you prefer to have a meeting?
JFK: Ya, I think we ought to have one. And I think the United States position ought to be that here it is, and we ought to have the -- uh -- if we don't take it what the prospects will be, as well as what we do. Otherwise its too easy to say well let's not take it. We ought to get up a message to Finletter, instructions, and he ought to call for a meeting at 9 or 10 in the morning.
RFK: You don't think it blows the possibility of this other one (words unclear)
JFK: What
RFK: It blows the possibility in your first letter.
JFK: Why?
RFK: Of getting an acceptance of the proposal that goes up in your letter now, which is (words unclear) has nothing to do with that I think that if they understand you have a meeting in NATO...
Voice: That's the disadvantage of a Council meeting.
Voice: That's just a report.
Rusk: It doesn't have to be known that -- uh -- that that is the only purpose of the discussion...
RFK: They're going to know that.
Dillon: It's probably obvious that they made a suggestion about Turkey which the NATO Council would be interested in meeting about.
Bundy: I don't think there's any pain in the meeting. Why don't we get the meeting called...

JFK: The advantage of the meeting is that if we reject it, they participate in it, if we accept it, they participate in it. I think we ought to...

RFK: The possibility is if you wait twenty-four hours and see if they accept this other thing (words unclear) accept it yet.

The letter that he offered which we accepted today. We wrote him this letter that you've approved where we say that we won't invade Cuba in return.

[End Meeting Item 41.1, Reference Reel 1, continued on Reference Reel 2]

Ball: You see the way the record will stand, Mr. President, is this, that we got out a blast this morning in which we said look we don't think this is really relevant. Then you send a query this afternoon as to whether they're willing to stop work. Then if we send a letter this afternoon along the line of the letter that we were proposing, which ties it back to his message of last night -- if this was simply a kind of fishing expedition in Moscow to see if they could get beyond that he'd put in his last night's letter, they may get the impression that they can't do it, in which case we...
Bundy: That's what I think
Ball: We might get something. Otherwise we can then go forward along the other track.
Thompson: If you have a NATO meeting, I gather from some word we've had from Italy, the Italians are likely to come up with a proposal to withdraw the bases there, the missiles there. I don't know if we ever got that message, did we?
Voice: We have a letter from Freddy Reinhardt saying that the Italians really don't care at all about...
Thompson: There was supposed to be a message coming through from...
Voice: Well I don't know.
Rusk: Well now in view of that message just gone up to U Thant we wind up this letter. (reading) As I was preparing this letter let me (words unclear) many countries and complicated issues not related to Cuba and the Western Hemisphere. The United States would be glad to discuss these matters with you and other governments concerned. The immediate crisis is in Cuba, and it is there that (words unclear) is necessary. With that behind us we can make progress on other vital issues.
(low voices)
JFK: In this language are you rejecting their proposal of this morning?
Bundy: I don't think so. It's rejecting...
Rusk: I wouldn't think so.
Dillon: It's rejecting the immediate tie-in (words unclear)
JFK: Now don't we just have to ask -- we don't have to reject the tie-in. If we're going to reject it we ought to have all of NATO reject it. What we want to insist on now is a cessation of work, et cetera, while we discuss it. Then we may reject it, but NATO ought to reject it, because I think the reprisal is going to be on all NATO. And I don't want them around saying -- that's the essence of it -- it's just a question of timing, isn't it?
Ball: I would suggest this, Mr. President, if you have a NATO Council meeting in the morning, I think you're going to get a flat rejection of this, which then ties our hands. I mean, then you can't go forward very easily in the face of this, because the NATO Ambassadors met this afternoon in New York and they took a very strong line against any discussion of this.
(mixed voices)

JFK: I don't think the alternative's been explained to them. You see they just think it's a continuation of the quarantine. They don't have any notion that we're about to do something. That's got to be on them. You see that hasn't been explained to NATO. I'm not going to get into that before they do something.
Dillon: If you have a Council meeting you'll probably get a strong reaction from a great many of the members of NATO against our taking any action in Cuba. They say "Don't trade," but they also say, "Don't do anything in Cuba."
Voice: Exactly.
(low voices)
McNamara: Mr. President, I wonder if we should not take certain actions with respect to the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy before we act in Cuba. If we decided to take that action with respect to the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy before we acted in Cuba, then we could tell NATO that at the time we talked to them about this proposal from Khrushchev and our response to it. If we act in Cuba, the only way we can act now is with a full attack. I don't think we can make any limited attacks when they're shooting at our reconnaissance aircraft because we would -- we would not dare to go in with the kind of limited attack that we've been thinking about the last twenty-four hours without taking out their SAM-sites. The moment we take out the SAM-sites and the MIG airfields we're up to the * 500 * sortie program. If we send * 500 * sorties in against Cuba, we must be prepared to follow up with an invasion in about * seven * days. If we start out on that kind of a program, it seems to me the Soviets are very likely to feel forced to reply with military action some place, particularly if these missiles -- Jupiter missiles -- are still in Turkey. We might be able to either shift the area in which they would apply their military force or give them no excuse to apply military force by taking out the Turkish Jupiters and the Italian Jupiters before we attack Cuba. One way to take them out would be to simply develop a program of bilateral negotiations between Turkey, Italy and the U. S. saying that we are today defusing the Jupiters in those two countries and replacing them with Polaris submarines stationed off the shores of those nations to carry the same targets the Jupiters were directed to in order to reduce the risk to those two nations but maintain the full defense of NATO.' Now if we were willing to undertake -- first place, I think that kind of action is desirable prior to invasion of Cuba. In the second place, if we're willing to decide to do that, we're in a much better position to present this whole thing to NATO.
Ball: What would be the reaction if the Soviet Union was to reply that they were going to maintain three atomic submarines off the United States coast?
McNamara: We would (mixed voices) We've already detected three submarines off the U. S. coast in the last forty-eight hours. Now they -- as far as we know they don't carry missiles, but that's just happenstance.
Voice: The Turks won't take them out, will they?
McNamara: I think, I think we could, first place we can tell them (words unclear)
JFK: If we took them out, we'd get the trade the Russians have offered us. If we take them out, they'll take them out.
McNamara: Well, I think we have to say to the Turks we're going to cover the targets with Polaris missiles.
JFK: Yes, but I think, if we're going to take them out of Turkey they say they'll take them out of ...

Bundy: It's one thing to stand them down, Mr. President, in political terms, it's one thing to stand them down as a favor to the Turks while we hit Cuba, and it's quite another thing to trade them out.
McNamara: But what we could do is unilaterally, unilaterally -- bilaterally with Turkey we would agreed to defuse them and replace them with Polaris. Then we'd go back to the Soviet Union and say, "Now the threat is there -- the threat is gone, you don't have to worry about that; we're going back to your letter of last night, and this is the proposal we make. We agree not to invade, you agree to take your (mixed voices)
McNamara: Turkey is gone.
Bundy: It could lead the Soviet Union (words unclear) to come back to the next problem.
(Voices unclear)
RFK: If you made an offer -- up there now -- and you also ask U Thant to find an answer to this, now if U Thant should come back and say, 'number 1, that they're going to continue to work, (words unclear) in which case I suppose we have to move in some way, or they're going to say that they're going to discontinue the work on the bases. Uh -- they say they're going to discontinue the work on the bases, they can either accept our proposal, or they can reject the proposal and say we still want Turkey for Cuba. If they reject the proposal and say they want Turkey for Cuba but they're going to discontinue the work on the bases, then I would think would be the time to have -- bring NATO in and say, "This is the proposal. Do you want to consider it? We haven't lost anything, and they've discontinued the work on the bases. Uh -- if they say they're going to continue the work on the bases, I think then we've got to decide whether -- if they have said by tomorrow morning they're going to continue the work on the basis -- whether we should have a military strike. (Voices mixed) I think if you have a meeting of NATO tomorrow morning -- uh -- I don't see that that's going to -- I think it's going to shoot this other possibility which U Thant has suggested, of going forward with this letter and seeing if we can trade the non-invasion of Cuba for this, and I think we're keeping the pressure on, we don't look like we're weakening on the whole Turkey complex. I mean I don't see that you're losing anything by not having a meeting tomorrow morning, except the fact -- I admit you're risking something, because some of the allies are going to say you're out of your mind...
Bundy: I would prefer to let Finletter find out for a day what people think...(words unclear)
JFK: It's going to be -- You see, they haven't had the alternatives presented to them. They'll say, "Well God, we don't want to trade them off." They don't realize that in two or three days we may have a military strike which could bring perhaps the seizure of Berlin or a strike on Turkey, and then they'll say "By God we should have taken it." So when the time -- the crucial time comes, obviously we want it, now the question is whether it's tomorrow morning or Monday morning. (Voices unclear)
McNamara: I think the point is related to the strike. If tomorrow we don't have a favorable answer from U Thant or Khrushchev to this message that's going out now, is it important to strike tomorrow or do we have some more time. If we have some more time, then you can still have the NATO meeting. It would seem to me the NATO meeting ought to be held before the strike. If it's necessary to strike tomorrow, there ought to be a NATO meeting tomorrow morning.
RFK: May I just say -- what if he says, "We're going to discontinue the work on the bases and we going to -- uh -- we're going to make the missiles

inoperative, and we'll work out with you United Nations supervision, that could take three weeks to just work that problem out there. And then what are we doing for...
McNamara: If he said he's going to discontinue work on the bases and he's willing to make them inoperable, we carry on surveillance
RFK: And we continue the -- uh -- the --
McNamara: The blockade
RFK: The blockade (voices unclear)
McNamara: That's a good course of action...
RFK: He's in bad shape.
McNamara: No, that's an excellent course of action which I don't believe he's going to accept. The probability is he won't say he'll stop work on the bases, and we're faced with a decision tomorrow what to do.
RFK: Yeah, but of course we're in -- before the world we're in much better shape.
Thompson: It would seem to me that we ought to surface all of this correspondence including this letter. He broke his proposal before you got it, and I'd do the same thing. Then you've got the world -- the attention of the world focused back on Cuba and Latin America and the fact that work there is not (words unclear) and this makes it I think much tougher for him to go ahead (words unclear).
JFK: What I'm concerned about is that NATO -- Norstad said that the BBC radio and TV said that there's no connection and that there's going to be a lot of tough talk in New York; he's saying that they all said it and they're going to say it in Paris -- there's no connection. They don't have a -- they don't realize that -- what's coming up.
Rusk: On the other hand,, Mr. President, if NATO seems solid on this, this has a chance of shaking Khrushchev off this point.
Martin: Suppose that we give him a letter which is addressed to his letter of yesterday and ask U Thant to release them both -- he's the fellow to release them -- and then he releases correspondence which consists really of an offer from Khrushchev and we -- we come back and write.
Bundy: Thank you.
Martin: Perhaps we'll say, "thank you, Yes." And it doesn't mention Turkey. Then it seems to me that...
Bundy: He's in a difficult position.
Voice: How much will Finletter be allowed to tell the NATO people? What's their view of the alternatives?
(voice unclear)
JFK: Well, I think that he'd probably just say that the work's going on, that we're not going to take these -- that we're not interested in this deal, then I think we're going to have to do something -- I don't think he has to say that it is -- but the escalation is going to go on, and we think this is very likely, that there would be some reprisal against possibly Turkey and possibly against Berlin, and we should be aware of that. What we don't want is to have a cheap turndown by them, without realizing that the turndown puts us in the position of then having to do something. What we're doing to be faced with is -- because we wouldn't take the missiles out of Turkey, then maybe we'll have to invade or make a massive strike on Cuba which may lose Berlin. That's what concerns me.
(mixed voices)
Rusk: Mr. President, here's one other variation here that Mr. Foster has given some thought to, and that is that we say that the missiles in Cuba and the missiles in Turkey be turned over to the UN for destruction and that the

-- uh -- nuclear defense of NATO, including Turkey, is provided by other means. An actual disarmament step, send them off for destruction on both sides.
Thompson: The Soviets don't want to let anybody get at them, and see what their technology is.
Voice: Take them out.
JFK: I think that -- uh -- the real problem is what we do with the Turks first.
Voice: Yeah.
JFK: If we follow Secretary McNamara, what we're going to do is say to the Turks -- which they're bound to think is -- uh -- under Soviet pressure, we want to get your missiles out of there.
McNamara: Well what I'd say -- what I'd say to the Turks: "Look here, we're going to have to invade Cuba. You're in mortal danger. We want to reduce your danger while at the same time maintaining your defense. We propose that you defuse those missiles tonight. We're putting Polaris submarines along your coast. We'll cover the same targets that your Jupiter missiles did, and we'll announce this to the world before we invade Cuba and thereby would reduce the pressure on the Soviet Union to attack you, Turkey, as a response to our invasion of Cuba." Now this is what I would say to the Turks.
RFK: Now, then they say -- uh -- what if the Soviet Union attacks us anyway. Will you use the missiles on the nuclear submarines?
McNamara: Then I think, before we attack Cuba I think we've got to decide how we'll respond to Soviet military pressure on NATO, and I'm not prepared to answer the question.
Voice: Aren't the Soviets going to take their missiles out if we take them out of Turkey?...
Voice: an impossible position...
McNamara: Well, I don't know what we'd do, if you worked this out with Turkey first, then with an announcement to the world, and then say to the Soviets (unclear interruption) Yes, now we accept your deal of last night
JFK: The question is whether we can get the Turks to...
McNamara: Well I think...
Taylor: You're deeply in trouble with NATO by this bilateral kind of approach..
McNamara: Well, the other course of action is not to have the bilateral sort of approach, to invade Cuba, and have Turkey, uh,...
Bundy: Well we haven't tried the block -- the enlargement of the blockade. We haven't even thought about it for some hours, and it's been on my mind a good deal. POL we still have to...
Rusk: If we get a negative answer to the message that's just gone up to U Thant, we really ought to consider whether in actually as low key as is possible although there'll be a tremendous flap about it -- in order to provide -- to give you the necessary authority to call up additional units beyond those provided by the 150,000 organization you'd declare a state of national emergency.
(voice unclear)
McNamara: I'd call a requisition of twenty-nine ships.
Rusk: I think some mobilization measures, not only here but in other -- in NATO countries, might be very timely here in shaking Khrushchev off this position at this point. (Pause) His -- his change of position, in a matter of hours here, means either that -- uh --

enough to set forth a very concrete agenda for peace, depending upon the removal of the weapons in Cuba and the accompanying guarantees of Cuban independence. But to continue work on the missile bases or prolong the discussion of removing missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba by linking these problems with the broader questions of European and world security would intensify the Cuban crisis and would be a grave risk to the peace of the world which you described in your letter of yesterday. I therefore most earnestly urge you to join us in a rapid settlement of the Cuban crisis as your letter of October 26th suggests is possible, so that we can then go on to an early solution of other serious problems which I am convinced are not insoluble."

Voice: Adlai just told me he's been talking along these lines to all our representatives up there, and they're all...

JFK: He's going to come back and say, "What about that proposal I made this morning?" So we (word unclear) don't you think we ought to say very hard what we've got to do, in the end, is that we've got to get an understanding in the next -- on the question of the cessation of work.

Rusk: That can be done on the basis of your message to U Thant that's just gone up there, but the...

Voice: Let's get this settled first, and we'll...

(mixed voices)

Rusk: to have a letter in hand though, which would give him a chance to work it out without relation to Turkey.

JFK: This is to Khrushchev

Rusk: No, he wanted a copy of a letter to Khrushchev. That does not really make much of a point on the Turkish point.

RFK: (words unclear) this letter?

Rusk: Yes

(mixed voices)

Sorensen: Why not put in the specific points that are in this letter, though? Otherwise it's about the same.

(low voices)

JFK: The point of the matter is Khrushchev's going to come back and refer to his thing this morning on Turkey. And then we're going to be screwing around for another forty-eight hours. I think what we've got to do is say that we've got to make the key of this letter the cessation of work. That we're all in agreement on. There's no question about that. Then the question whether Turkey's in or just Cuba. Otherwise he'll come back and say, "Well, we're glad to settle the Cuban matter. What is your opinion of our proposal about Turkey?" So then we're on until Monday afternoon, and the work goes on, and we haven't had a chance to specifically get his good faith on the cessation of work. We haven't got an answer to that question. So I think we ought to make that the key question -- the cessation of work. Then if we get the cessation of work, we can settle the Cuban question and a few other things. Otherwise he can hang us up for three days while he goes on with the work. (Pause)

(words unclear)

Rusk: I don't think Adlai and U Thant have yet abandoned the possibility of working this out without direct relation to Turkey though.

RFK: I thought -- you haven't got those to the point that we have in this letter and in that letter.

JFK: Let's go with this letter, Mr. Secretary. Let's start with our letter to (word unclear) let's start with that, because otherwise we'll never get an answer. We're going to take the cease-work and (words unclear)

I think our letter is specific that it's desirable. I think we then go to page 3: "I have given my representatives instructions to permit them to work out (words unclear) If you give your representatives similar instructions... there's no reason why there should not be a complete announcement to the world no later than tomorrow. I learned of your public messages (words unclear) crisis in Cuba. When we get agreement there, I shall certainly be ready to discuss the matter." Now the only problem with this letter again on page 3 is "when we get agreement on Cuba," which he isn't going to give us. He's now moved on to the Turkish thing so we're just going to get a letter back saying "well we'll be glad to settle Turkey if we'll settle —settle Cuba if we'll settle Turkey. So I think we have to make the crucial point in this letter, without opening up Turkey, is the question will he, at least in the next twenty-four hours, while we discuss all these matters, will he agree with me to stop the work on the bases. That's the only thing we can, because we have — because he either has to say Yes or No. If he says No to that, then we're — at least have -- we have some indication. Then we're (word unclear)
McNamara: Take -- take out paragraph 1 and put it in the end. Make that -- that isn't part of the deal. The deal is they remove the weapons, we guarantee not to invade, and then put paragraph 1 at the end. We...
Voice: Yeah, that (mixed voices) (pause)
JFK: unclear question to "Bob" on proposal (Voices explaining new order of paragraphs — not clear)
Dillon: ...certain things (word unclear) get agreement then -- we've covered the whole thing.
(voice unlcear)
JFK: Well in Number 1, you'd undertake agreement to cease work on offensive missile bases in Cuba and promptly to render inoperable all weapons systems in Cuba and permit UN verification of this action. That would be number 1.
McNamara: Right.
JFK: Then we would get into discussion of all those matters.
McNamara: Right.
Bundy: But I think that that ought to (words unclear) be made as a separate matter in the letter.
Sorensen: I just raise the question to make sure that we do insist on UN verification, because I understand from the Defense Department we could verify it by ourselves, and even, they say...
JFK: Well, let's not let the UN in?
Sorensen: Yeah..
RFK: Well I think actually, if they put them under trees and what we were expecting a week ago, or ten days, would that...
Sorensen: A week ago -- the work has stopped
(mixed voices)
RFK: (words unclear) trees (words unclear)
Voice: If the Cubans would agree not to interfere with reconnaissance.
Voice: international verification -- I think we'd better stick with that.
JFK: Well let's see what he comes back with here. I mean I don't think we're going to get as much (words unclear) but I mean let's make it as reasonable as possible. You're not — yet.
Rusk: See if you don't think that you could use Adlai — his draft — and put in the specific things down there where the arrow is.
(mixed voices)

JFK: Yeah, his second paragraph is useful. Just put in "this to be verified -- this to be satisfactorily verified -- this to be verified under -- well, right.
(Reads inaudibly from a draft) (pause)
Rusk: What Adlai says about what to do about Turkey -- another problem is pretty good. (pause)
JFK: The only thing is -- what he's saying is that they've got to get the weapons out of Cuba before we'll discuss the general detente. Now we're not going to be able to effect that. (words unclear) He doesn't agree with that.
Rusk: Let a couple of us go out and try to put the specifics of this letter in (words unclear) with the paragraphs of Adlai.
JFK: It seems to me what we ought to -- to be reasonable. We're not going to get these weapons out of Cuba, probably, anyway. But I mean -- by negotiation -- we're going to have to take our weapons out of Turkey. I don't think there's any doubt he's not going to (word unclear) now that he made that public, Tommy, he's not going to take them out of Cuba if we...
Thompson: I don't agree, Mr. President, I think there's still a chance that we can get this line going.
JFK: He'll back down?
Thompson: Well, because he's already got this other proposal which he put forward...
JFK: (words unclear) Now this other public one, it seems to me, has become their public position, isn't it?
Thompson: This is, maybe, just pressure on us, I mean, to accept the other, I mean so far...
(mixed voices)
Thompson: The important thing for Khrushchev, it seems to me, is to be able to say "I saved Cuba, I stopped an invasion," and he can get away with this, if he wants to, and he's had a go at this Turkey thing, and that we'll discuss later. And then, and that discussion will probably take...
JFK: All right, what about at the end of this, we use this letter and say "will be a grave risk to peace. I urge -- urge you to join us in a rapid settlement of the Cuban crisis as your letter (word unclear) suggests, and (words fast and not audibly read) The first ingredient, let me emphasize, for any solution is a cessation of the -- uh -- work and the possibility (word unclear) under reasonable standards" -- I mean I want to just come back to that: Otherwise time -- uh -- slips away on us.
(Pause)
(Words unclear and mixed voices)
Sorensen: In other words, Mr. President, your position is that once he meets this condition of the -- uh -- halting of the work and the inoperability, you're then prepared to go ahead on either the specific Cuban track or what we call the general detente track.
JFK: Yeah, now it all comes down -- I think it's a substantive question, because it really depends on whether we believe that we can get a deal on just the Cuban -- or whether we have to agree to his position of tying. Tommy doesn't think we do. I think that having made it public how can he take these missiles out of Cuba (voice) if we just do nothing about Turkey.
Voice: (word unclear)...give him something else -- (words unclear and mixed voices) -- something else.
Voice: And the promise that when all this is over, there can be a larger...

JFK: He's going to want to have that spelled out a little.
Thompson: The position, even in the public statement, is that this is all started by our threat to Cuba. Now he's removed that threat.
RFK: He must be a little shaken up or he wouldn't have sent the message to you in the first place.
JFK: That's last night.
RFK: Yeah, but I mean -- so that you can -- it's certainly conceivable that you could get him back to that...(words unclear) I don't think we should abandon...
JFK: Well, I think Adlai's letter all right then.
RFK: I think we can always go to that.
(mixed voices)
Voice: What it means, Bob, is (words unclear) as confused as...
Voice: They're more confused
Voice: I really think -- uh -- (mixed voices)
JFK: (words unclear) Let's send this. All right, now, the other two things that we have to decide are one, about the NATO meeting and (words unclear). In this case, then, we won't have a NATO meeting tomorrow morning, because we won't get an answer back (mixed voices)
RFK: Are we going to put this one out? Is this one of the ones we put out? (mixed voices)
Voice: We'll give it to the Times.
Voice: (words unclear) not have the secret message, Khrushchev's of last night.
Voice: Yes
Voice: You going to put that out?
Voice: No
Voice: desirable
Voice: Adlai's suggestion was that we release this and then let them put the pressure on the Soviets to...
RFK: The only thing is we're proposing in here the abandonment -- no that -- at some point
Voice: What?
RFK: The abandonment of Cuba
(Mixed voices, laughter, pause)
RFK: (low voice) You think it would be worth while to call?
JFK: Who?
RFK: Eisenhower?
(Voice unclear -- laughter - pause)
(Low voices and mixed voices)
Bundy: You know it puts some heat on him if you put out -- if you can get his message out of last night.
RFK: How about you put, as you have said before (words unclear) -- publicly assured the world before -- there will be no (words unclear) change of policy.
JFK: Well I'd say, I'd rather say that the United States has no hostile intentions towards Cuba, just so we state it as an obvious fact.
RFK: Then you can come back...
JFK: I don't see really what the advantage is -- what is the -uh- why is U Thant going to publish this?
Voice: To force out the -- uh- the Khrushchev letter to which this is a response.
(mixed voices)

Voice: This was Stevenson's proposal. Stevenson's proposal is that we release this letter, this letter be released, in order to get this back on the Cuban track, and away from, the focus away from his letter...
Dillon: His long letter.
JFK: (words unclear) removal of the weapons in Cuba and peace in the Caribbean (words unclear) can't you say that?
(A few words unclear)

[End Meeting Item 41.1, Reference Reel 2,
meeting continued on Meeting Item 41A.1]

Meeting Item 41A.1, Reference Reel 1
[meeting continued from Meeting
Item 41.1, Reference Reel 2]

Rusk: (words unclear) going to be worried about that because you're not dealing precisely here with an agreement. We're simply talking about a concrete agenda for peace.
Voices: Yes -- yeah.
JFK: (words unclear) we ought to put it out until we know whether there's any chance of acceptance. There's going to be a hell of a fight about that. I don't mind taking it on if we're going to get somewhere. I don't want to take on the fight if we're not going to get
(mixed voices -- pause)
JFK: Want to read it?
Voice: Yes.
JFK: Here we go.
Rusk: "Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and find in it the indication of a willingness on your part to seek a calm solution to the problem. I wrote the letter to assure you that my desire is the same. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba, and all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use rendered inoperable under effective United Nations arrangements."

Bundy: The sentence is not quite complete -- "to be rendered" (Pause)
Voice: "to be rendered"
JFK: I just think, line two, that find an indication of his willingness -- Just -- uh -- "statement of your willingness." or -- uh -- "welcome your statement of your desire." (words unclear)
JFK: Change a little --, start again, Mr. Secretary.
Rusk: "I have read your letter of October 26 with great care and find in it a statement"
JFK: Welcome your statement -- welcome your statement.
Voice: Cut the next sentence.
JFK: of your desire.
(Pause)
Voice: Statement of a -- uh
JFK: of your desire
Rusk: of a desire on your part to seek a prompt solution to the problem
JFK: statement of your desire
Rusk: welcome the statement of your desire
(Pause)
Rusk: (words unclear) just say my desire is the same.
JFK: Just say, My desire is the same as his. I can assure you of the great interest of the people of the United States to -- uh -- find a satisfactory solution to this.
(pause and noises)
Rusk: "The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba, and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable under effective

United Nations arrangements. Assuming this is done promptly I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them this weekend to work out an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem with the Acting Secretary General and with your representative. If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days.

"I note and welcome indications in your second letter which you have made public that you would like to work toward a more general arrangement as regards other elements

JFK: Now wait a sec -- that second letter is the one on Turkey. "Note and welcome" -- "I note your second letter" -- I don't think we ought to welcome it...

Rusk: I note the indications in your second letter which you have made public that you would like to work toward a more general arrangement as regards other elements. I would like to say again that we very much want to move in this direction. If your mention of Turkey signifies...

JFK: Well now let's say -- "move in this direction." It seems to me -- uh -- why don't we make that more general? I don't know about the -- I'd like to -- I would like to say that the United States is very much interested in -- uh -- what?

Voice: Such discussion.

JFK: Turkey and -- uh -- I'd like to say that the United States...

(Mixed voices)

Voice: General reduction of arms, or the nuclear threat. (Pause)

JFK: areas of tension?

Rusk: interest in reducing tensions (words unclear)

JFK: Yeah

(Pause)

Rusk: Well now I think we'd better change this specific reference to Turkey. If your mention of Turkey and other countries

JFK: Why not just say "other countries" and leave Turkey out.

Rusk: mention of other countries signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting -- affecting the whole of -- uh -- Europe....

McNamara: If your mention of the defenses of NATO signifies your...

McCone: (words unclear) in that letter he tied it very specifically into the Turkish situation. I don't think he tied it in that public letter as an example of -- uh.

JFK: No, he just tied it into Turkey. The difficulty is we're not ready tonight.

McCone: No, I know, but -- uh -- this morning before I studied that letter, because I hadn't seen a copy of it, I was under the impression that his reference to Turkey was just sort of an example of. It is a specific proposal...

JFK: That's right. We have to keep it vague, unfortunately, or fortunately, because we haven't cleared it with Turkey or NATO. So I suppose we have to fudge it somewhat, but I agree with you, he's just talking about Turkey.

(Pause)

Rusk: If your mention of NATO bases signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting the whole of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are of course quite prepared to consider with our allies the suggestions that you and your partners in the Warsaw Pact might have in mind. I think that the mutual explanations in which you and I have been engaged in the past few

days, and the discussions in New York, have gone far enough to set forth a concrete agenda for peace.
Bundy: Could I interrupt — do we have to talk about their partners in the Warsaw Pact? It's really what they have — what you have in mind.
(mixed voices)
Bundy: "What you have in mind?"
JFK: Ya, I think you're right.
(Pause)
Rusk: I think the mutual explanation in which you and I have been engaged in the past few days, and the discussions in New York, have gone far enough to set forth a concrete agenda for peace, depending upon the removal of the weapons in Cuba and assurance of peace in the Caribbean. But the continued work on the missile bases and prolonging the discussion of removing missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba while linking these problems with the broader questions of European and world security would intensify the Cuban crisis and would be a grave risk to the peace of the world which you described in your letter of yesterday. I therefore most earnestly urge you to join us in a rapid settlement of the Cuban crisis as your letter of October 26th suggests is possible, so that we can then go on to an early solution of other serious problems which I am convinced are not insoluble.
JFK: (words unclear) As I say, this letter is nothing (words unclear) as long as it doesn't get...
RFK: I don't understand -- can I just say -- what's wrong -- uh -- what about all the points that we made in this letter. What do you suggest?
Rusk: Well these are points that have already been -- uh -- been set out, up there.
RFK: Yeah, but I thought that the answer — that this letter was accepting his proposal for...
Rusk: The reason for the -- the actual reason we didn't have those points in this letter was the President's desire not to get his hands too tied with respect to the Turkish problem.
RFK: Well I don't think this does that
Sorensen: One, two, three, four, particularly if this letter is going to be made public, are pretty good to have on the record.
JFK: At 4b we undertake to give assurance with respect to the territorial integrity and independence of Cuba...
Sorensen: No, we changed that.
(Mixed voices. Voice - the Caribbean.
JFK: Well that's what we did here, but I don't know...
RFK: But that's not -- I think you changed that in there. Send this letter and say you're accepting his offer -- he's made an offer and you're in fact accepting it. And you think -- I think that letter sounds slightly defensive about the fact -- God, don't bring in Turkey now; we want to settle -- we're not -- I don't know whether it adds anything. (Pause) I mean I think this letter -- he made an offer last night. This letter accepts the offer.
Rusk: By the way, there's another -- there's another paragraph to be added. The first ingredient -- let me emphasize that the cessation of work on missile sites and measures to render such weapons inoperable under effective international guarantees.
JFK: Well, in any case, the two letters are more or less -- there's no policy difference, is there?
RFK: Well, I think there's an entirely different quality...

JFK: All right, look, brother. If we go back to this letter, all we'd want to change would be 4b, where we say we'd "undertake to give assurances with respect to territorial integrity and political independence" -- we'd just substitute "would undertake to give assurances regarding peace in the Caribbean."
Sorensen: No, I thought we said we'd (word unclear) not to invade Cuba. That's the language he asked for...
JFK: That's correct, but I don't think, if we're going to make this public at this point, when we don't know how much we're going to get, we don't want to get in that far.
RFK: I think you can say that, if he comes back and say I want to...
Bundy: You've got to give him something.
JFK: What?
Bundy: You've got to give him something to get him back on this track.
RFK: Well, can't you say "Like I've said publicly before."
Voice: As I have said publicly before.
JFK: Governor Stevenson's version -- he likes his draft so much better. He's going to have to conduct it. I don't see that there's a substantive difference about it. Do you?
RFK: I think there is...
JFK: Why?
RFK: Because I think, one, its just in general terms, rather defensive, and is just says we don't want to get in -- please don't into discussion of NATO, or Turkey, because we want to talk about Cuba. The other one says, "You made an offer to us, and we accept it," and you've also made a second offer which has to do with NATO, and we'll be glad to discuss that at a later time. The other first letter -- of Adlai -- I don't think says anything, I don't think we're any further along, except we don't like you -- what you said.
(Pause)
Sorensen: (low voice) It may be possible to take (words unclear) elements of his, part of ours.
RFK: I wouldn't repeat about the NATO thing twice. (Words unclear) You've got it once, twice. I think it sounds rather defensive about this has really thrown us off by the fact that you've brought this thing up. I think we just say he made an offer, we accept the offer, and it's silly bringing up NATO at this time, based on whatever their explanations have. (Words unclear)
JFK: What is the reason Adlai's unhappy about our first letter?
Voice: He feels that our first letter sounds -- sounds too much like an ultimatum -- that it's making demands --
(mixed voices)
RFK: But accepting what he says
(mixed voices)
JFK: Well we can't -- I'll tell you --
Sorensen: I tell you, Mr. President, I think Adlai -- I think if we could take our letter, introduce some of the elements of his

letter in the last part of it, that might do it. I'm not sure how yet.
RFK: Why do we bother you with it? Why don't you guys work it out and...
(mixed voices)
JFK: I think we ought to move. I don't -- there's no question bothering me, I just think we're going to have to decide which letter we send...
RFK: Why don't we try to work it out without you being able to pick...
(Prolonged laughter)
JFK: The one you're going to have to worry about is Adlai, so you might as well work it out with him.
(Laughter-louder)
Sorensen: Actually I think Bobby's formula is a good one. Does it sound like an ultimatum if we say, "we are accepting your offer in your letter last night and therefore there's no need to talk about these other things."
(mixed voices)
Rusk: (reading) I think the mutual explanations in which you and I have been engaged in the past few days, and the discussion in New York, have gone far enough to set forth a concrete agenda for peace, depending upon the removal of the weapons in Cuba and assurance of peace in the Caribbean. I read your letter to mean that this is acceptable...
JFK: Your letter of October 26th?
Rusk: I read your letter of October 26th to mean that this will be acceptable.
Voice: unacceptable.
(Mixed voices)
Voice: The elements of the proposal which you have put forth seem to me to be --
(Mixed voices)
Voice: These elements seem to me to be as follows.
(Mixed voices)
JFK: As I say, we're not going to -- he's not going to -- now Tommy isn't so sure, but anyway, we can try this thing, but he's going to come back, I'm certain, but the only thing is I don't want him -- that's why we've got to end -- end with saying, whatever we're going to do, that we've got to get a cessation of work.
Bundy: That's right, but I think that Bobby's notion of a concrete acceptance on our part of how we read last night's telegram is very important.
Taylor: Mr. Kennedy...
JFK: In other words you want to -- you have to get them to say we accept your proposal.
RFK: (words unclear) accept it and then say you -- I just the last paragraph of the other letter and however way you phrase it.
Taylor: Mr. President, the Chiefs have been in session during the afternoon on -- really the same basis as we have over here.

This is -- the recommendation they give is as follows: that the big strike -- OP Plan 3-12 -- be executed no later than Monday morning the 29th unless there is irrefutable evidence in the meantime that offensive weapons are being dismantled and rendered inoperable; that the execution of the Strike Plan be part of the execution of 3-16, the Invasion Plan, * seven * days later.
(Pause)
RFK: That was a surprise.
(Laughter)
(mixed voices)
Taylor: It does look now from a military point of view --
(mixed voices) What are the reason... (mixed voices)
Taylor: They just feel that the longer we wait now.
Dillon: Well, also we're getting shot at as we...
(mixed voices)
JFK: (low voice not clear on getting this letter "phoned" -- probably aside to Rusk). Bobby, you want to go out now and get this letter set with Adlai? The next question is the Turkish one and -- uh -- NATO.
(Pause)
JFK: We've got Secretary McNamara's proposal and -- (pause) did we ever send that message to Hare, Mac, that you and I talked...
Bundy: No, we have a long message in from Hare, which arrived this afternoon, in which he responds to the message sent to him on Wednesday at great length. (mixed voices) that he'll do his damnedest but it's very difficult, which is in essence what he -- the way it comes out.
JFK: Well now we have the question of a choice between the bilateral arrangement with Turkey -- in which we more or less do it, or whether we go through NATO and let NATO put the pressure on, and also explain to the Turks what's going to happen to them if it does -- if they end up slow in this matter.
Dillon: All of this is going to take an awful lot more time than Monday morning.
Voice: Yeah, yeah.
McNamara: I wonder if there is a way to shorten it. If you're going to deal directly with the Turks, the President simply sends a message to the Prime Minister and says this is the problem and this is the way I think it ought to be solved, and I'm prepared to do it tonight. And I need an answer from you within six hours -- or eight hours -- something like that. That's one way to do that. Now -- now let me tell you of my conversation with Andreotti?
JFK: Who's Andreotti?
McNamara: The Defense Minister of Italy. I talked to him just two weeks ago about these Jupiters in Italy, and the Italians would be happy to get rid of them if we want them out...
Bundy: The difference between Reinhardt's report and -- uh -- and Hare's is between night and day.
McNamara: I realize that, but there are -- uh -- what I'm suggesting is that we can do this with both Italy and Turkey and

get Italy to go along with us, I think, and this will put some additional pressure on Turkey.
(voice unclear)
McNamara: No, but --
Voice: The aftereffects (words unclear)
JFK: You want to do it -- if we're going to that, Bob, and that may be the way we ought to do it -- the effect of that, of course, I don't know how you -- not having had it explained in NATO what's going to be the effects of continuing with it -- it's going to look like we're -- uh -- caving in. Now, do we want to -- uh -- go through NATO to do that, or do we want to do it bilaterally? To get it done you probably have to do it bilaterally, to take all the political effect (words unclear) NATO. Do we want to have a meeting in the morning of NATO and say, "If we don't do it, here's the problem."
(mixed voices)
Voice: I think you have to do it simultaneously.
Bundy: I think the disadvantage of having a NATO meeting and going to the Turks tonight and tomorrow is that you don't give this track a fair run that we just tried out...
McNamara: Yes, I agree, Mac. I really don't think we have to move immediately on the Turkish track, but I think we ought to get...
Bundy: Ground up to do so.
McNamara: We have to get ground up to do it, and we have to look at some of the actions in between. Now, are we going to stop surveillance while -- while these discussions go on, on the deal of last night? We have intense ground fire against our (words unclear)...
Taylor: I wouldn't worry -- I wouldn't pay any attention.
McNamara: Well, I asked Ros to talk to Curt LeMay and...
Taylor: No, I wouldn't... (mixed voices). Flak came up in front of the flight, and they -- they veered away. (mixed voices) That's not been determined.
Gilpatric: I talked to Captain (name not clear) -- there's some difference -- I think you have to wait until a little later.
McNamara: (words unclear) Let's put it this way. We had fire on the surveillance. Now the first question we have to face tomorrow morning is, are we going to send surveillance flights in? And I think we have basically two alternative. Either we decide not to send them in at all or we decide to send them in with proper cover. If we send them in with proper cover and they're attacked, we must attack back, either the SAMs and/or MIG aircraft that come against them, or the ground fire that comes up. We have another problem tomorrow -- the Grozny approaching the zone -- we sent out a message today outlining the interception zone which was publicly released, (voice unclear). Well, we sent it to U Thant and it's released publicly. The Grozny will be coming into the zone. Khrushchev has said he is ordering his ships to stay out of the zone. If a Russian ship

moves into the zone after he's said that publicly, we have two choices: stop it and board it, or don't. Now when you...
Voice: Stop it.
McNamara: When you put the two of these together -- the question of -- you know stopping surveillance and not stopping the ship -- it seems to me we're too weak...
Voice: Yeah, yeah.
Taylor: I'd say we must continue surveillance. That's far more important than the ship.
McNamara: Well -- uh -- my main point is I don't think at this particular point we should -- uh -- show a weakness to Khrushchev, and I think we would show a weakness if we -- if we failed on both of these actions.
Taylor: And we must not fail on surveillance. We can't give up twenty-four hours at this stage.
McNamara: All right, I fully agree, Max. I was just trying to lay out the problem. Therefore I would recommend that tomorrow we carry on surveillance, but that we defer the decision as late as possible in the day to give a little more time because if we go in with surveillance, we have to put a cover on, and if we start shooting back, we've escalated substantially.
JFK: When would you shoot...
Dillon: (words unclear) cover on? I don't understand.
McNamara: Well, we can't send these low -- we can't send these low-altitude aircraft in (mixed voices)
JFK: If you're going to take a reprisal -- the cover isn't much good because you've got antiaircraft guns. You've got somebody up there at 10,000 feet and actually they can't give much more cover -- what you'd really -- seems to me -- have is a justification for a more elaborate action, wouldn't you? Do we want to worry about whether we're going to shoot up that one gun, or do we want to -- just -- uh -- use this as a reason for doing a lot of other...
(mixed voices)
Taylor: The main thing is to assure effective reconnaissance. Whether that -- what that implies, we won't know really till we (mixed voices)
JFK: I would think we ought to take a chance on reconnaissance tomorrow, without the cover, because I don't think cover's really going to do you much good. You can't protect -- well -- hide them from ground fire (mixed voices) tomorrow, and you don't get an answer from U Thant, then we ought to consider whether Monday morning we -- we -- uh -- I'm not convinced yet of the invasion because I think that's a much -- I think we may...
Taylor: I agree with that. My personal view is that we (mixed voices) and also ready to invade but make no advance decision on that.
McNamara: Well, I doubt...
JFK: ... I don't think the cover's going to do much good.
McNamara: No, I -- I fully agree. I don't think you should stop the surveillance tomorrow. That I want to underline. Point

number two is, if we carry on a surveillance tomorrow, and they fire on it...
Taylor: Now that's a big one -- then we know...
McNamara: Then I think we ought to either do one of two things. We ought to decide at that moment we're either going to return that fire, tomorrow, but in a limited fashion against the things that fired against us, or against their air defenses, or, alternatively, if we don't return the fire tomorrow, we ought to go in the next day with (words unclear) sorties. One or the other.
(mixed voices)
JFK: I'm rather inclined to think that the more general response... However, why don't we wait. Let's be prepared for either one tomorrow -- let's wait and see whether they fire on us tomorrow. Meanwhile we've got this message to U Thant -- and we're -- so let's be well prepared.
Dillon: We've got to be very clear then that -- uh -- if we're doing this tomorrow, and they do shoot weapons, and then we do need to have the general response, there's no time to do what you're talking about with Turkey, and then we...
JFK: That's why I think we ought to get to that. I think what we ought to do is not worry so much about the cover, do the reconnaissance tomorrow. If we get fired on, then we meet here, and we decide whether we do a much more general (mixed voices) announce that the work is going ahead, announce that we haven't got an answer from the Soviets, and then we decide that we're going to do a much more general one than just shooting up some gun down there.
Dillon: Yes, but what moving ahead with this Turkish...
JFK: Well that's what I want to come to now, (mixed voices) Now let's think over the Turkish thing.
Nitze: How about -- I don't think we're going to be able to get the NATO meeting (words unclear) encouragement. How about getting the NATO ambassadors in here?
Dillon: Why can't you do the NATO Meeting in Paris?
Nitze: How are you going to get them instructions?
JFK: Well, it's 11 o'clock now. We can get them to Finletter in 6 or 7 or 8 hours, 9 hours.
Nitze: (word unclear) a heck of a time -- Sunday.
(mixed voices)
Thompson: Wouldn't it be possible to send something short of what Bob suggested (mixed voices) to the Turks and the Italians, their Prime Ministers, saying that as things are developing -- our planes were fired on today -- as things are developing it may become necessary for us to take forceful action in Cuba. Uh -- there is the risk that this would involve an attack on missiles in Turkey or Italy, depending on who you're talking to. We are therefore considering whether or not it would be in your interest for us to remove these, taking other steps to do this, and we may be having to take this up in NATO. Now this is a preliminary...

JFK: Well that's what we suggested to Hare. (words unclear). Well, but that's what we were talking about doing. We ought to send out to the Turks that this is their neck. Of course they're liable to say, "Well, we can take it." So we've got to have it look to the general interest, and a more effective defense for you. Now, they're not going to want to do it, but we may just decide we have to do it in our interest. Now the question is, if we decide we have to take it out, wouldn't we much rather have NATO saying it, rather than...
Bundy: I don't think we'll get that, Mr. President.
JFK: (words unclear) Once you start explaining it to them what's going to happen?
Bundy: I doubt if the Council will recommend that we stand down Turkish missiles.
Thompson: Even with an offer of a Polaris? Who would have told you that.
McCone: Well -- uh -- those missiles kind of make us a hostage. We have -- that's the way I interpret the Turkish position now and also a couple of years ago.
(mixed voices)
Rusk: When we talked about Polaris in place of the missiles, the Turkish reaction was the missiles are here, and as long as they're here you're here.
JFK: Well I tell you there's a few club members of NATO who won't like it much. Most of the NATO members aren't going to be very happy about it, because the problem is Berlin or something.
McNamara: Here's one way to put it. The Jupiter missile is obsolete. It's more obsolete then the Thor missile. The British have recognized the obsolescence of the Thor and have decided to take it out and replace it with other systems of which Polaris is an effective one. And we propose the same thing be done for Turkey...
Voice: And Italy too
McNamara: And Italy too, exactly. Both of them are obsolete.
Thompson: The Turks have asked for planes and plane parts, and we can...
McNamara: We can say we'll send more planes.
JFK: Well, they will, as I say, it's bound to be looked on though as the United States -- they'll say that this is because the United States -- to make a trade. We get -- I don't see how we can put it to them without the trade. (word unclear) What we want, obviously, is the Turks to suggest it, but they're pretty tough, and they probably figure that -- uh -- that their security is better with them in than it is with them out.
Voice: Sure. That's exactly right.
(mixed voices)
McNamara: We have our air squadrons there with nuclear weapons. There's at least as much...
JFK: We want -- In other words, Bob, we want to send a message to our ambassador to begin this track, (words unclear) some message to NATO (words unclear) what the facts of life are. You see they

don't know what's coming up. (pause) It's not going to be so happy. If they decide -- if the Turks say no to us, it would be much better if NATO was also saying no than it will be if everybody will say, which is what always happens, a few days later when the trouble comes, that we should have asked them, and they would have told us to get 'em out.
RFK: We estimate that -- what if we have until Wednesday or Thursday (words unclear)
JFK: On the air strike.
RFK: Yeah, I mean that you could do -- uh -- I think there's some danger, as I said earlier, in calling the NATO meeting...
Rusk: Particularly a Sunday meeting would attract a lot of attention.
RFK: I think if you waited till tomorrow morning and he's rejected it -- our acceptance of his other offer and -- uh -- then you know whether the work's going to continue and you know some of these other things, and then on Monday morning you call a meeting of NATO, and you say this is what we're up against; they're going ahead with this, and this is what we suggest, and by then we'd know what we would want to do. I don't think we really know what -- know exactly what we want to do.
JFK: Well one, it seems to me, ought to begin a negotiation with the Turks now.
RFK: I think somebody perhaps should go over.
Bundy: I think it's very difficult to negotiate with the Turks as long as we think there's anything in last night's track. Now I think that's what's dividing us at the moment. (Words unclear).
RFK: By tomorrow morning you could send somebody over to them and say now this is what -- uh -- you'd get these tomorrow morning and you'd say -- uh -- now we think...
[(One-line statements by Bundy and Dillon censored.)]
(Pause)
McCone: I think it's very probable that that initial discussion that Ray Hare had with the Turks leaked in some way... (words unclear).
Bundy: He didn't talk to the Turks.
McCone: Well he reported it.
Bundy: No no not to the Turks.
McCone: Well I have the impression that...
Bundy: The letter doesn't (words unclear) not talk to the Turks. He was estimating the situation himself.
Voice: I think (words unclear) there was an early conversation (words unclear) raised the question with him (words unclear) of news reports.
Bundy: That's different. (words unclear)
Voice: He had specific instructions not to talk to the Turks. (words unclear)
JFK: First of all (words unclear) are the Turks more likely to take them out if we have a bilateral, or NATO decision?
Voice: I think NATO

Dillon: NATO. As far as an overall decision...
(voices unclear)
Voice: that they'll go along with whatever is decided within NATO.
Voice: In NATO, that's what they said.
RFK: What is the rush about this other than the fact that we have to make...
McNamara: I think the rush is what do we do...
Voice: The U-2
McNamara: The U-2 is shot down -- the fire against our low-altitude surveillance
RFK: U-2 shot down?
McNamara: Yes, (words unclear) said it was found shot down.
RFK: Pilot killed?
Taylor: It was shot down near Banes which is right near a U-2 (sic) site in Eastern Cuba.
Voice: A SAM-site.
Taylor: The pilot's body is in the plane. Apparently this was a SAM-site that had actually had the energy (words unclear) It all ties in in a very plausible way.
(voice unclear)
JFK: This is much of an escalation by them, isn't it?
McNamara: Yes, exactly, and this -- this relates to the timing. I think we can defer an air attack on Cuba until Wednesday or Thursday, but only if we continue our surveillance and -- and -- uh -- fire against anything that fires against the surveillance aircraft, and only if we maintain a tight blockade in this interim period. If we're willing to do these two things, I think we can defer the air attack until Wednesday or Thursday and take time to go to NATO...
JFK: How do we explain the effect -- uh -- this Khrushchev message of last night and their decision, in view of their previous orders, the change of orders? We've both had flak and a SAM site operation. How do we -- I mean that's a...
McNamara: How do we interpret this? I know -- I don't know how to interpret...
Voice unclear
Taylor: They feel they must respond now. The whole world knows where we're flying. That raises the question of retaliation against the SAM-sites. We think we -- we have various other reasons to believe that we know the SAM-sites. A few days ago...
JFK: How can we put a U-2 fellow over there tomorrow unless we take out all the SAM-sites?
McNamara: That's just exactly--in fact, I don't think we can.
(Voices unclear)
Taylor: (Words unclear) It's on the ground - the wreckage is on the ground. The pilot's dead.
McNamara: In the water, isn't it?
Taylor: I didn't get the water part.
Bundy: If we know it, it must be either on friendly land or on the water.

Voice: It is on Cuban land.
(Words unclear)
Taylor: That's what I got (words unclear).
McCone: I wonder if this shouldn't cause a most violent protest (words unclear) a letter right to Khrushchev. Here's, here's an action they've taken against -- against us, a new order in defiance of -- of public statements he made. I think that...
Voice: I think we ought...
Voice: They've fired the first shot.
McCone: If there's any continuation of this, we just take those SAM-sites out of there.
(Voices over each other)
Voice: Isn't this what we told the NATO people we'd do?
Voice: Yes we told (words unclear)
Bundy: You can go against one. Can you, now, tonight?
McNamara: No, it's too late. This is why it gets into tomorrow, and I -- without thinking about retaliation today, what are we going to do if we want to defer the air attack to Wednesday or Thursday?
(voices unclear)
Taylor: It would be very dangerous, I would say, Mr. Secretary, unless we can reconnoiter -- reconnoiter each day. (words unclear) reconnaissance.
McNamara: And if we're going to reconnaissance, carry out surveillance, each day, we must be prepared to fire each day.
JFK: We can't very well send a U-2 over there, can we, now? And have a guy killed again tomorrow?
Taylor: We certainly shouldn't do it until we retaliate and say that if they fire again on one of our planes, that we'll come back with great force.
Voice: I think you've just got to take out that SAM-site, you can't (word unclear) with them.
JFK: Well, except that we've still got the problem of -- even if you take out this SAM-site- the fellow still is going to be awfully vulnerable tomorrow from all the others, isn't he?
(voices unclear)
Voice: If you take one out (words unclear)
McNamara: I think we can forget the U-2 for the moment...
(mixed voices)
Rusk: It builds up, though, on a somewhat different plane than the all-out attack plan.
McNamara: We can carry out low-altitude surveillance tomorrow, take out this SAM-site, and take out more SAM-sites tomorrow and make aircraft (words unclear)
JFK: Well now, do we want to announce tonight that this U-2 was shot down?
McNamara: I think we should.
(mixed voices)
Gilpatric: Earlier today, Mr. President, we said any interference with such surveillance will meet counteraction and surveillance will...

JFK: Do we want to announce we're going to take counteraction or just take it tomorrow morning?
Voice: Take it (voices unclear).
JFK: The U-2 was shot down?
Gilpatric: No, no. This general statement that we would enforce surveillance.
JFK: Well now do we want to just announce that an American plane was shot down? A surveillance plane was shot down in Cuba? It seems to me that's been...
Voice: I would announce it after you've taken (words unclear)
Taylor: Well in a sense Havana has announced it, that's where we...
JFK: Well, I think we ought to announce it because it shows off...
Voice: Havana announced it...
JFK: These protestations about...
Voice: Came from over there.
Voice: This about the pilot is from Havana?
(voice unclear)
JFK: We haven't confirmed that, have we?
(Pause)
JFK: There are so goddam many... we could take it all day if ... well let's say if we're sure the U-2's been shot down it seems to me we've got to announce it -- it's going to dribble out. Havana's announced it anyway. You ought to announce it...
Voices: Yeah.
JFK: Then we ought to not say anything, don't you think, and just take the reprisal without making any announcement. We don't want to announce that we're going to take a reprisal against that SAM-site tomorrow or would that make our reprisal more difficult?
Voice: It would certainly make it more difficult.
JFK: I think we ought to announce that -- uh -- that -- uh -- action is being taken -- action will be taken to protect our fliers.
McNamara: Exactly. Then we ought to go in at dawn and take out that SAM-site, and we ought to send the surveillance aircraft in tomorrow with the regular flights early in the morning, and we ought to be prepared to take out more SAM-sites and knock out the...
JFK: Well what we ought to do then is get this announcement written (words unclear) Ros, why don't you write this out, plus this thing about what we're going to do, and then we'll get back to what we're going to do about the Turks (words unclear).
(Voices unclear)
McNamara: Well I think he was shot coming in.
Rusk:: The map I have showed him the other way round.
(Mixed voices)
RFK: In addition there was one other shooting at the low level.
(Mixed voices)
Voice: Where was that, Bob?
McNamara: I haven't the detail.

(Mixed voices)
Taylor: They started the shooting.
JFK: Well now, we're going to get out an announcement and (words unclear) this thing and we're going to say that -- uh -- (Pause)
McNamara: We're going to say it was shot down and we're going to continue our surveillance protected by U.S. fighter aircraft...
Dillon: Suitable protection.
Voice: The assumption is
McNamara: I'd just say fighter aircraft so there isn't any doubt about it (words unclear)
RFK: Tomorrow morning add POL?
McNamara: I wouldn't do it tonight, Bobby, I'd just announce this one. Tomorrow morning we ought to go in and take out that SAM-site and send our surveillance in with proper protection, immediately following it or on top of it, or whatever way the (words unclear).
Taylor: (words unclear) [(Clause censored)] The plane is on the ground and not in the water.
Voice: In Cuba.
(Mixed voices)
Voice: We must put it out. Otherwise they will put it out.
Voice: We don't know.
JFK: It's overdue anyway isn't it, so we assume...
Taylor: Hours overdue.
JFK: Do we want to say it's shot down? We don't know -- do they say it's been shot down? The Cubans? Well why doesn't Ros -- and you, General -- get a statement which would cover in any case. It may be -- we don't know it was shot down.
Voice: We don't know it.
McNamara: I think -- uh -- I think I'd say it was shot down. The probabilities are that it was shot down, and we want an excuse to go in tomorrow and shoot up that SAM-site and send in our...
Dillon: If the plane's on the ground there, it was shot down. I think it didn't just come down.
(voice unclear)
JFK: The only point is, the only thing that troubles us is the other plane was shot at.
McNamara: That's right, exactly
JFK: They say -- uh -- that's why I'd like to find out whether Havana says they did shoot it down.
Voice: We don't have anything from Havana yet, do we?
Voice: We assume these SAM-sites are manned by Soviets.
Voice: That's the significant part if it is the SAM-site.
(Pause, words unclear)
Voice: You might have Cubans. (words unclear)
McNamara: You had anti-aircraft (words unclear). This is a change of pattern, now why it's a change of pattern we don't know.
RFK: Yeah.
Voice: The important thing to find out if we possibly can is whether this was a SAM-site.

McNamara: There's no way to find out. What we know is that that particular SAM was the one that had the Fruit-Set radar...
Voice: In operation.
McNamara: Which was required for control of the missiles.
Voice: Would we know whether it's in operation?
McNamara: And it was in operation, we believe, at the same time that the U-2 was over. We checked it this morning. We checked it (words unclear).
Alexis Johnson: It's a very different thing. You could have an undisciplined anti-aircraft - Cuban anti-aircraft outfit fire, but to have a SAM-site and a Russian crew fire is not any accident.
Voice: If he had altitude and had any type of a failure, he could fly to Puerto Rico.
(mixed voices)
But if he blew up they're not going to be recovering...
(mixed voices)
(Pause -- tape blank for several minutes)
(Mixed voices)
JFK: Let's talk a little more about the Turks -- how we're going to handle that. NATO and the Turks, that's the one matter we haven't settled today.
Voice: It's very difficult that this (words unclear)
JFK: I think we ought to -- why don't we send an instruction to Hare to have a conversation, but also have the NATO meeting? And say to them what's happening over here. Otherwise we're going to be carrying a hell of a bag.
Dillon: I think we're going to have such pressure internally in the United States too, to act quickly, (words unclear).
JFK: (words unclear) That's why I think we'd better have a NATO meeting tomorrow...
Dillon: (words unclear)
JFK: Explain the thing, where we are -- uh -- I'm just afraid of what's going to happen in NATO, to Europe, when we get into this thing more and more, and I think they ought to feel that they've a part of it. Even if we don't do anything about the Turks, they ought to feel that they know what...
McNamara: I would agree, but I think we ought to know what we want NATO to do tomorrow, which means that we have to have a proposition. NATO itself won't initiate anything.
Voice: They're going to be fifteen voices without instructions.
McNamara: Without instruction from the governments, so that...
Voice: Actually what we should do tonight, Mr. President, not only get a message to NATO but get to the capitals, to our ambassadors so they can talk to the governments, because these Permanent Representatives won't be able to do anything.
JFK: We're not sending the night mission tonight, are we?
McNamara:: No, we're not.
Ball: I would suppose that what we might do would be to send a - get a NIACT message off to the governments -- the embassies

in the capitals -- and get hold of Finletter and tell him to call a NATO meeting for the end of the afternoon tomorrow which would enable, hopefully, the (words unclear).
Dillon: And in the message to the capitals say we are doing it, and that we want the Representatives to be instructed.
JFK: Of course it would be relatively easy if we wanted to get NATO to reject this thing, but that isn't necessarily what we want right now.
Voice: If they rejected it --
Voice: A briefing?
McNamara: I don't think you can go to NATO; I don't think you can send any messages out to capitals until we decide what we want to do...
Voice: That's right
McNamara: When we decide that, I think we can force it, and I think we can do it in such a way that the aftereffects will not -- not be too severe. But I think we've got to decide ahead of time what it is we want to do, and what I would suggest we decide is that we want those missiles taken out of Turkey, and simply say that we believe this is, as I do believe, in the interest of the Alliance, and that we will replace those missiles with other fire. (mixed voices). I would say, "We may have to attack Cuba. If we attack Cuba, They're holding Turkey as a hostage and they're likely to attack Turkey and this...
Bundy: To free our hands in Cuba we must get these missiles out of Turkey, is what we say.
McNamara: Yeah. Without endangering you, the Alliance, this is the theme.
Voice: That is a fight that always has to be made with these countries, it's that after all the menace of these missiles like these in Cuba is a menace to the retaliatory power of the United States which is the central defense of the whole free world including Turkey.
McNamara: Yeah, well I would put it like this, We're not trading Turkish missiles for Cuban missiles -- not a bit -- we're relieving the Alliance of a threat that is presently upon them...
Bundy: Of a local threat...
JFK: But they will say -- it's going to be regarded in the NATO meeting as a trade, isn't it? They're going to say well now are you going to deal with the Russians? We'll take them out of Turkey?
Bundy: It will be seen as a trade by a great many people, Mr. President. There's no doubt about that. We've looked that one in the eye. If you don't buy that, then it seems to me Bob has the best way of dealing with it.
JFK: Well what we'd like to do is have the Turks come and offer this.
Voice: Yeah.
McNamara: Given time you might work that out, but you can't work it out with the Turks in a short time, I'm certain of that.

(words unclear) They are terribly stubborn people to talk to on this kind of point.
(mixed voices)
Sorensen: We just have one last line, Mr. President, that Bobby thought you ought to look at. The last line on the first page.
JFK: "also endangered," you think we ought to say that.
RFK: (Words unclear) and we'll get a chance for peace in the Caribbean. I think that's all we have to say at this point.
Bundy: Ted, you want any help getting that sent?
(words unclear)
McNamara: George and Mac, we could sit down and try to draft an instruction (words unclear), first to the governments, tonight, then to Hare and then to NATO. They're all the same, in effect.
Bundy: The instruction will be one based on a decision by the President to withdraw these missiles?
McNamara Well we say that (other voices unclear) because of the danger to NATO of this situation, because we can relieve that danger while without in any way reducing the defense of NATO, we believe that steps should be taken.
(mixed voices)
Bundy: We can't withdraw the missiles, and therefore the action we take is that the President should order inoperability.
McNamara: Yes, they're defused.
JFK: The warheads. The French would charge this is -- the only thing, as I say, if this is going to come, we ought to -- the Turks and NATO, this is on the cheap for them, they'll say the United States is -- is holding out in order to try to make a deal on Cuba. No matter whether we say it's to protect Turkey or not, that's the way they're going to think about it.
Dillon: Provided that NATO agrees.
McNamara: I was going to say, we can play it on an either/or basis. We can say we're in a position where we believe we're going to have to attack Cuba. If we attack Cuba there's great likelihood that the Soviets will attack the missiles in Turkey.
(mixed voices)
Voice: Or in Italy.
McNamara: We are willing, if you would wish us to do so, to give you additional guarantees, move Polaris submarines there, deploy additional planes in, and to state beforehand that the missiles in Turkey and Italy have been rendered inoperable, before we attack Cuba, thereby increasing your safety if you wish us do so, and put it on that basis.
Voice: If they don't take it.
McNamara: If they don't take it, that's their...
JFK: And if they don't take it, we feel they should recognize the danger, accept the danger.
(mixed voices)
McNamara: Let's try to work that out.
JFK: This will be for a meeting tomorrow. I think we ought to have them (words unclear) as soon as possible.
Bundy: I would not do it tomorrow, Mr. President, myself.

JFK: I think we ought to get something (words unclear) tomorrow afternoon. You see it's already midnight there. Tomorrow afternoon.
(voice unclear)
McNamara: We send it to governments tonight and then in preparation for a meeting late tomorrow.
RFK: Who do you send it? Who do you send?
Dillon: Sending it to the heads of all the NATO governments
JFK (words unclear) because time's running out on you.
Voice: That's why we offer in any event to give the additional assistance in view of the added stress because...
McNamara: Oh yes, that's part of it.
Voice: Whether they agree with you or not, that (words unclear) will say it much better for you.
Voice: (words unclear) It's very difficult because you can't be in a position whether we render these inoperable or take them out and don't get a Cuban deal and don't get anything except Cuban elections.
McNamara: Well that's quite a bit.
(mixed voices)
Voice: All we're doing on this one; we are achieving what is equivalent to Khrushchev's price.
Dillon: The only time we say that we render them inoperable is when we've determined that we're going to attack in Cuba.
McNamara: This is the point. If we attack in Cuba, we don't say this publicly before we've attacked...
Dillon: Just a few hours before we attack and then we attack...
Voice: Let's go down this track
(mixed voices)
LBJ: What you're saying is if you're willing to give them up, as McNamara proposes, why not trade?
(mixed voices)
McNamara: Let me start my proposition over again.
Voice: And save a few hundred thousand miles.
McNamara: Let me start my proposition over again. We must be in a position to attack, quickly. We've been fired on today. We're going to send surveillance aircraft in tomorrow. Those are going to be fired on without question. We're going to respond. You can't do this very long. We're going to lose airplanes, and we'll be shooting up Cuba quite a bit, but we're going to lose airplanes every day. So you just can't maintain this position very long. So we must be prepared to attack Cuba -- quickly. That's the first proposition.

Now the second proposition. When we attack Cuba we're going to have to attack with an all-out attack, and that means * 500 * sorties at a minimum the first day, and it means sorties every day thereafter, and I personally believe that this is almost certain to lead to an invasion, I won't say certain to, but almost certain to lead to an invasion...
Dillon: Unless you get a cease fire around the world...
McNamara: That's the second proposition.

Bundy: or a general war.
McNamara: The third proposition is that if we do this, and leave those missiles in Turkey the Soviet Union may, and I think probably will, attack the Turkish missiles.

Now the fourth proposition is, if the Soviet Union attacks the Turkish missiles, we must respond. We cannot allow a Soviet attack on the -- on the Jupiter missiles in Turkey without a military response by NATO.
Tommy: Somewhere.
McNamara: Somewhere, that's right. Now, that's the next proposition.
(mixed voices)
Voice: Frankly, I don't
McNamara: Well, I've got a -- why don't I get through -- then let's go back and attack each one of my propositions.

Now the minimum military response by NATO to a Soviet attack on the Turkish Jupiter missiles would be a response with conventional weapons by NATO forces in Turkey, that is to say Turkish and U.S. aircraft, against Soviet warships and/or naval bases in the Black Sea area. Now that to me is the absolute minimum, and I would say that it is damned dangerous to -- to have had a Soviet attack on Turkey and a NATO response on the Soviet Union. This is extremely dangerous. Now I'm not sure we can avoid anything like that, if we attack Cuba, but I think we should make every effort to avoid it, and one way to avoid it is to defuse the Turkish missiles before we attack Cuba. Now this (voice unclear) this is the sequence of thought (voices mixed and unclear).
Voice: Why you don't make the trade then?
(mixed voices)

[End Meeting Item 41A.1, Reference Reel 1, meeting continued on Reference Reel 2]

Ball: I would say that in the assumption that if you defuse the Turkish missiles that saves you from a reprisal, it may - may mean a reprisal elsewhere.
McNamara: Oh, I think it doesn't save you from a reprisal.
(mixed voices)
Ball: I think you're in a position where you've gotten rid of your missiles for nothing.
McNamara: Well, wait a minute. I did't say it saved you from a reprisal. I simply said it reduced the chances of military action against Turkey.
Ball: Well, but what good does that do you (voice unclear) action against Berlin, or somewhere else.
(mixed voices)
McNamara: You have to go back in my proposition and say if there aren't Jupiter missiles in Turkey to attack, they're going to employ military force elsewhere. I'm not -- I'm not at all certain of that.
Ball: Oh, I am.
LBJ: Bob, if you're willing to give up your missiles in Turkey, you think you ought to (words unclear) why don't you say that to

him and say we're cutting a trade -- make the trade there?
(mixed voices) save all the invasion, lives and ...
(mixed voices)
Voice: The State department they invite them -- we talked about this, and they said they'd be delighted to trade those missiles in Turkey for the things in Cuba.
McNamara: I said I thought it was the realistic solution to the problem
LBJ: Sure
(mixed voices)
LBJ: What we were afraid of was he'd never offer this, but what he'd want to do was trade (mixed voices) Berlin.
Voice: This was just the kind of thing
(mixed voices)
McNamara: I'm not opposed to it, now, all I'm suggesting is, don't push us into a position where we haven't traded it and we are forced to attack Cuba, and the missiles remain in Turkey. That's all I'm suggesting. Let's avoid that position. We're fast moving into that.
Ball: Well, but I...
Voice: We're now back at the point (voice mixed)...
Bundy: We were going to let him have his strike in Turkey, as I understood it last week. (Pause) at one point at least that was the way we talked about it.
(mixed voices)
McNamara: Yeah, that's right. That was one alternative.
Ball: What -- actually, what we were thinking last week was that what he was doing was (words unclear). We thought that if we could trade it out for Turkey this would be an easy trade and a very advantageous deal. Now we've -- uh -- made that offer to him...
(voice unclear)
Ball: And then we don't want it, and we're talking about a course of action which involves military action with enormous casualties and a great -- a great risk of escalation. Now I -- I really don't think this is -- we ought to shift this one.
McNamara: Well, why don't we look at two courses of action
(mixed voice)
Voice: Let's see what consequence George draws.
Ball: Well, I would far rather -- if we're going to get the damned missiles out of Turkey anyway, say, we'll trade you the missiles, we're going to put Jupiters -- I mean we're going to put Polaris in there, you're not going to benefit by this -- but we will, if this is a matter of real concern to you, to have these on your borders, all right, we'll get rid of them, you get rid of them in Turkey -- in, in Cuba. These things are obsolete anyway -- I mean (words unclear) you're not going to reduce the retaliatory power of the NATO Alliance.
(mixed voices)
Voice: You put Polaris in there, it's going to be a lot bigger.

Ball: Yeah.
(mixed voices)
McNamara: Well, I think you have two alternatives
(mixed voices)
Bundy: I missed your statement: I have to ask you to say it again.
Ball: I'd say, sure, we'll accept your offer. If this is a matter of grave concern to you, and you equate these things, which we don't but if you do, ok, we can work it out. We're going to put Polaris in the Mediterranean because you've got the whole seas to range in, and we can't keep you out of the ocean...
Bundy: And what's left of NATO?
Ball: I don't think NATO is going to be wrecked, and if NATO isn't any better than that, it isn't that good to us.
Dillon: What happens to the missiles in Cuba over the next three weeks, while this is going on?
Ball: Well, I mean, if you do this, you do it on the basis of an immediate trade and they immediately...
Voice: And surveillance
Ball: And surveillance
(mixed voices)
Voice: What you do, with the Turks and NATO, you go through the propositions that Bob has outlined here.
McNamara: Let me suggest this: let's get the message ready on the assumption that either the Soviet don't want a trade or we don't want a trade, one or the other, and hence the trade route of Jupiters in Turkey for missiles in Cuba is not acceptable, and therefore we're going to attack Cuba. Now, let's follow that and get a message written on that basis. Before we attack Cuba we're going to reduce the danger to Turkey to a minimum.
(mixed voices)
Bundy: I'd like to see both of these messages written. (Words unclear). I think they both need to be written.
McNamara: But Mac, this other course will in a sense be that, so -- let's get first the message written on the assumption that...
Ball: (words unclear) write that. And I'll go write the other.
Bundy: Joe, let me speak to you for a moment.
RFK: (words unclear) a chance to do an (words unclear) like that I think it's worth while.
(mixed voices)
Bundy: You want to write one, or do you want me to draft it or what do you want to do (words unclear). I'll get a draft (mixed voices)
Voice: Who's it to, Bob?
McNamara: Well it's going to go to three parties. It's going to go to the Turks, to the heads of government of NATO countries, and the North Atlantic Council -- same message in effect.
(Pause)
Voice: Do people want dinner downstairs, or on trays, or do you want to wait?

Voice: Let's wait. Let's
(Pause)
McNamara: We probably ought to think about the course of action in the next two or three days, what we're going to (words unclear and other noises). Max is going back to work out the surveillance problem for tomorrow with the Chiefs and see how much cover we need and so on. So we're just going to get shot up sure as hell. There's no question about it. We're going to have to go in and shoot. We can carry this on I would think a couple of days, maybe three days, possibly even four. But we're going to lose planes. We had eight planes going out today. Two aborted for mechanical reasons. Two went through safely and returned, and four ran into fire.
(mixed voices)
McCone: You know, it seems to me we're missing a bet here. I think that we ought to take this case to -- send directly to Khrushchev by fast wire the most violent protest, and demand that he -- that he stop this business and stop it right away, or we're going to take those SAM-sites out immediately. That's what I'd tell him. I'd tell him this is a -- I'd just use one of the (mixed voices) messages he sends us, and I'd send it right off, and if he won't -- and I'd trade these Turkish things out right now. I wouldn't even talk to anybody about it. We sat for a week, and everybody was in favor of doing it, and I'd make that part of the message. I'd tell him we're going to conduct surveillance, as announced by the President, and one shot and in we come, and he can expect it. If he wants to sit down and talk about this thing, he can call off his gunfire and do it right away.
McNamara: Well, I think that we can assume that that kind of an approach will be made -- ex the -- I think we can assume an approach to trade the missiles will be made one way or another. He'll know that. But now let's assume that that's made and time goes by and nothing happens and we're losing airplanes. What -- what do we do there?
Dillon: Well, I mean this is a job for the...
(mixed voices)
McNamara: Let's assume that the approach is made...
Voice: And he doesn't do it.
McNamara: Either he doesn't do it or he comes back -- let me go back a second. When I read that message of last night this morning, I thought, My God I'd never sell -- I'd never base a transaction on that contract. Hell, that's no offer. There's not a damned thing in it that's an offer. You read that message carefully. He didn't propose to take the missiles out. Not once -- there isn't a single word in it that proposes to take the missiles out. It's twelve pages of -- of fluff.
Voice: Well his message this morning wasn't...
(mixed voices)
McNamara: Well, no, I'm speaking of the last-night message. The last-night message was twelve pages of fluff. That's no

contract. You couldn't sign that and say we know what we signed. And before we got the damned thing read the whole deal changed -- completely changed. All of which leads me to conclude that the probabilities are that nothing's going to be signed quickly. Now my question is, assuming nothing is signed quickly, what do we do. (Pause) Well, I don't think attack is the only answer. I think we ought to be prepared for attack, all-out attack, but I think we ought to know how far we can postpone that. But I don't think that's the only answer, and we ought to think of some other answers here. Now John's suggestion, I think, is obviously one -- to try to negotiate a deal.
McCone: I wouldn't try to negotiate a deal. (mixed voices) I'd send him a threatening letter. I'd say, you've made public an offer. We'll accept that offer. But you shot down a plane today before we even had a chance to send you a letter, despite the fact that you knew that we were sending unarmed planes on a publicly announced surveillance. Now we're telling you, Mr. Khrushchev, this just one thing, that we're sending unarmed planes over Cuba. If one of them is shot at, we're going to take the installations out, and you can expect it. And therefore, you issue an order immediately.
Voice: Right.
McCone: And I'd be prepared to follow that up.
McNamara: But what I'd do is disassociate that from the Turkish missiles, John, that's part of your message that I would...
McCone: No, I wouldn't because then the pressure get's (word unclear) he get another proposal. He'll have Berlin thrown in.
(low voices
McCone: He'll get something else thrown in tomorrow. He'll get Berlin. That's what I think.
McNamara: Well, I think that's possible. (words unclear) That's possible. That's why I think we have to be prepared for attack.
(mixed voices)
McNamara: Let's go down and try and draft, get this (words unclear) just so we have later tonight some alternative here.
Voice: Draft it and meet here later.
(mixed voices)

(The meeting breaks up, and many leave; probably the President has left somewhat earlier. There follows sporadic low-voiced conversation until Rusk returns, and the Vice President and Rusk and Dillon begin to talk with each other. After a routine review for Johnson of the public steps of the day so far, the conversation continues after comments on the surveillance problem that are not clear.)

LBJ: I've been afraid of these damned flyers ever since they mentioned them. Just an ordinary plane goin' in there at two or three hundred feet without arms or an announcment. If they get -- four of them had to turn back because of (words unclear) Imagine some crazy Russian captain would be looking (words unclear) our skies. He might just pull a trigger. Looks like we're playing Fourth of July over there or something. I'm scared

of that, and I don't see -- I don't see what you get for that photograph that's so much more important than what you -- you know they're working at night; you see them working at night. Now what do you do? Psychologically you scare them. Well, Hell, it's like the fellow telling me in Congress, "Go on and put the monkey on his back." Every time I tried to put a monkey on somebody else's back I got one. If you're going to try to psychologically scare them with a flare you're liable to get your bottom shot at.

Rusk: What is George Ball doing?

Voice: He's drafting.

LBJ: He (words unclear). He says that if you're going to -- you ought to accept the trade if you're going to give up the Turkish bases, that you ought to say, ok, we'll give them up for Cuba. McNamara says tell them we'll give them up for nothing. That's the way I see it. There are two sides. (words unclear) McNamara says if we're going to hit Cuba, we've got to say to the Turks that we want you to give up your Jupiters, and we'll give you Polaris instead. Ball said, well if you're going to do that, just say to Mr. Khrushchev, Yes to your proposal today. So he's drafting (mixed voices) to take the two proposals, McNamara,s drafting one, Ball drafting the other, both of them coming back with the two. (mixed voices).

Dillon: Here is the third thing which is really the Ball line, plus McCone's ultimatum idea about surveillance. (reading)

Mr. Chairman:

We've reached a moment of utmost gravity. Your forces in Cuba have fired on our unarmed planes conducting surveillance in accordance with the resolution of the OAS. You have done this before I had an opportunity to reply to your letter of this morning, offering to remove your offensive weapons from Cuba in return for the removal of similar weapons from Turkey. This suggestion of yours requires consultation with our NATO allies. I am undertaking such consultation and am recommending that our allies agree to the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey at the same time that your missiles are removed from Cuba. Meanwhile it is essential that these weapons be made inoperable immediately. Until this is done.

Rusk: The weapons in Cuba.

Dillon: Yeah. Until this is done, subject to reasonable international control, we must continue our unarmed aerial surveillance in Cuba. If these planes -- or again these unarmed planes -- he keeps saying that -- if these unarmed planes are again fired upon, we will be required to respond with all the necessary force. The decision, Mr. Chairman, is yours. If you give orders to your forces in Cuba to cease interference with our unarmed planes, if you agree -- uh -- to immediately render the offensive weapons in Cuba inoperable, the way to peace is open. Otherwise we will be forced to act.

(Pause)

Rusk: What do you think?

LBJ: I think he's got a point. I think you're going to have a big problem right here internally, in a few more hours, in this country, (words unclear) all over the country, States of the Union, what have you done, what are you doing? The President made a fine speech. What else have you done?
Rusk: Meaning (words unclear) they want more action?
LBJ: They don't know what we're doing. They see that there are some ships coming through. There's a great feeling of insecurity. I told you the other day before these fellows came in they're reflecting it. They're going to be saying I told you, tomorrow or the next day...
Rusk: What would be the effect, in the country, of accepting the Turkish (word unclear)?
LBJ: I don't know.
(reels change; gap of time, length unknown)

[End Meeting Item 41A.1, Reference Reel 2. Meeting continued on Meeting Item 42.1]

Meeting Item 42.1
[Meeting continued from Meeting Item 41A.1, Reference Reel 2]

LBJ: What -- would you say if you said how you've got the Jupiters and they're lighted up there, the searchlights on them, and everybody knows about them, they're not worth a damn. And we'll take that old T-model out and we'll give you Polaris, a much better job -- and how do you feel? Well, he might feel that we woudn't come to him.
Rusk: We've got 17,000 men there.
LBJ: (words unclear) So we could say, we're going to come but we've got to hit Cuba, and we think that you're in less danger by pulling down these Jupiters and getting them out of here and having the Polaris than you are in the other way. Now what do you think about it? I think he might...
Dillon: If you do this -- if you at the same time send that message to everybody, you see, which is explaining why, which is the message that's being drafted.
LBJ: I think goverments are old and tired and sick. (Pause)
Voice: There may be one angle to it, Mr. Vice President, that may bother them a little bit. A Polaris submarine would be strictly a U.S. organization...
LBJ: I think what'll bother them is that this man in the United States is not coming.
Rusk: But the point is -- the point there is that we're there. Our NATO at the (words unclear) the nuclear aircraft carrier. Are those our planes?
Voice: Yes. Always. There are both U.S. - there are both US aircraft and (words unclear)
LBJ: Well then (words unclear) why don't we try to sell them on that, Mr. Secretary. (words unclear) a couple of things just say now, "You're more likely to get hit this way than you are the other," isn't that true, Tommy?
Thompson: Yeah, actually we'd have better protection (words unclear) obsolete
(mixed voices)
Thompson: The trouble with all this is that unless we're absolutely decided that we're going to hit Cuba -- bomb them

(words unclear) they'll leave their technicians in Cuba and their bombing planes in Cuba and it'll raise a hell of a mess.
(mixed voices)
Voice: Say nuclear weapons, nuclear delivery systems.
Dillon: We're just talking about missiles, because we can't talk about planes. Then we have to take our planes out of Turkey, you see, and we don't want to do that.
Pause
Thompson: The only possible (words unclear) justification for this is (word unclear) bomb.
LBJ: Look you've got to have one plane. They give up Turkey, and then they shoot another -- then they give up Berlin. You know, like a mad dog -- he takes a little blood and he...
(Mixed voices)
Dillon: We haven't run into the basic thing that all of us talked about less than a week ago. We all said that's fine we would (words unclear).
Voice: Cut the base.
Dillon: Well not the base, just the missiles.
Thompson: He's now getting the idea that he can get a lot more. This proposal is that whatever you want out of Cuba, take out of Turkey.
Dillon: Oh I see, what you were talking about a week ago was that they'd take everything out of Cuba, and we'd just take the missiles out of Turkey,, whereas now he's saying I'll take missiles out of Cuba, ypu take missiles out of here. Take airplanes out if you take airplanes out.
(mixed voices)
Thompson: That's why I think any suggestion that we're willing to accept this unless there is an irrevocable decision that we're to take these out by bombing is very dangerous. Because then we'd really be getting nothing but defeat. (words unclear) I can't believe it's necessary. You know, the night before he was willing to take this other line.
(mixed voices)
LBJ: So what happened? Is somebody forcing him to up his ante, or is he trying to just see -- maybe we'll give more -- let's try it, and I can always come back to my original position.
Thompson: Well, I think it's one of two things. Either Khrushchev was overruled and -- or Khrushchev and/or his colleges were deceived by the Lippmann piece and the fact that Kreisky put this out which made them think that we were putting this out, that we were willing to -- to make a trade.
Dillon: Well, Lippmann can work this thing differently. It's our position to say unless you agree not to shoot at our unarmed planes until these things of yours are inoperable in Cuba, then we're going to have to hit you. The choice is yours.
(mixed voices)
A confused discussion of Lippmann's position follows, largely mixed voices.

Thompson: These boys are beginning to give way. Let's push harder. I think they'll change their minds when we take continued forceful action, stopping their ship or -- or taking out a SAM-site. That kills some Russians (words unclear). But if we are not going to shoot any planes that come up or shoot (words unclear).
Dillon: Well, would you rather send them a thing like this which says if they shoot at all you're going to take them all out, or would you rather just go in and take one SAM-site out.
Thompson: I'm inclined to take one because I don't think giving an ultimatum is recommended.
(mixed voices)
LBJ: You warhawks ought to get together.
(pause)
LBJ: Well, if he was motivated by Lippmann's message, why -- is it your theory he got it after he sent his letter last night and before this one this morning?
Thompson: Well, a decision was made after the first letter. The first letter he was wobbling around rather slowly, (words unclear) but that is not to be ignored.
(prolonged mixed voices)

Then there is read, probably by McCone, a longer version of the McCone draft letter. The essential point is the same - all proposals are worth discussing but meantime shooting at planes must stop, work on bases must be halted, missiles rendered inoperable, and ultimately to be removed.
Discussion of McCone draft follows.
(Mixed voices and bad interference)
LBJ: I'm surprised that they've been allowing these planes to go in all these days anyway without any action. (words unclear) Now if we pull out (words unclear) for the last couple of days in the papers. I mean all the old appearances, and I don't think that's good for us. He's looking at it, (words unclear) behind the eight-ball a little bit, and he's got to get a little blood, and he's got it, and now when they realize he's shot down one of our pilots, we're letting their ship go through, and that ship's gone through, and we've had (words unclear). They will know what we're going to be doing. I guess it'll be done tomorrow (words unclear), and they'll shoot and we'll shoot and that's...
(Pause)
(Mixed voices and desultory comments and pauses)
Thompson: The only thing that bothers me at all about it is the -- uh -- you can see that we have two conflicting things here: One is to prepare for action in Cuba, and the other is to get a peaceful solution along the lines which he has proposed. And the purposes are conflicting because if we want to get him to accept the thing that he put in his letter last night, then we shouldn't give any indicaton that we're ready to talk about the Cuba-Turkish thing. (words unclear) We have to take one of those two courses.
(Pause)

(low voices -- talk of a translation)
Thompson: They've done two things. They've put up the price, and they've escalated...
LBJ: The action.
Thompson: The action. And I think to mention, as McCone does, that we can discuss this other thing, may be to give them a churlish benefit -- and it's an embarrassment, in effect, to Khrushchev. I think it's a further sign of weakness.
Voice: Sir?
Thompson: It's a further sign of weakness to indicate a willingness to talk about this thing which he put out, which was I think (words unclear). This is missile to missile and technician to technician and plane for plane.
LBJ: I guess what he's really saying I'm going to re -- I'm going to discuss the foreign policy of the United States for the last fifteen years in order to -- let you -- uh -- get these missiles out of Cuba. (pause) And we say, we're glad, and we appreciate it, and we want to discuss it with you.
Thompson: How was it left about this last letter to U Thant after Khrushchev (words unclear) to U Thant. Is that not to be made public? Because if we get that out in public, I think that offsets a lot of things we're at present (sic) about the public posture. It would make the Cuban thing -- I mean the Turkish thing -- look good.
(Confused further discussion with heavy extra noises. Where to reassemble? Where is McNamara's draft? More confused voices. Noises.)
LBJ: You just ask yourself what made the greatest impression on you today, whether it was his letter last night or whether it was his letter this morning. Or whether it was his (words unclear) U-2 boys?
Thompson: The U-2.
LBJ: That's exactly right. That's what everybody (words unclear) and that's what's going to make an impression on him.
(mixed voices and other sounds, pause)
JFK: (returning) I'm sorry to keep you. I think we ought to go -- essentially go back to this problem and then when we get these messages to the Turks, the British, and the NATO messages.
Bundy: We have to go back to -- we have to instruct Finletter, we have really to agree on the track, you see, Mr. President and I think there's a very substantial difference of opinion...
LBJ: McNamara is drafting that message.
(mixed voices)
JFK: Let's see what the difference is, and then we can think about that. What is the difference?
Bundy: Well I haven't been in as much of the discussion as some others, Mr President, but I'll ask Mr. Thompson to speak.
Thompson: Well, I can't express his view better than Bob McNamara could do, but -- uh -- I think we clearly have a choice here -- uh -- that either we go on the line that we've decided to attack Cuba and therefore are terribly bound to that, or we try to get

Khrushchev back on the peaceful solution, in which case we shouldn't give any indication that we're going to accept this thing on Turkey, because the Turkish proposal is I should think clearly unacceptable -- missiles for missiles, plane for plane, technician for technician, and it leaves -- if it worked out, it would leave the Russians installed in Cuba, and I think that -- uh -- (word unclear) accept. It seems to me there are many indications that -- uh -- they suddenly thought they could get -- uh -- up the price. They've upped the price, and they've upped the action. And I think that we have to bring them back by upping our action and by getting them back to this other thing without any mention of Turkey. This is bad for us, from the point of view of (words unclear). We have to cover that later, but we're going to surface his first proposal which helps the public position. It gets it back on -- centered on Cuba, and our willingness to accept it. And that -- that somewhat diminishes the need for any talk about -- about Turkey. It seems to me the public will be pretty solid on that, and that we ought to keep the heat on him and get him back on the line which he obviously was on the night before. That message was almost incoherent and showed that they were quite worried, and the Lippmann article and maybe the Kreisky speech has made them think they can get more, and they backed away...
JFK: When did Kreisky make his suggestion about Turkey?
Thompson: In a public speech to a party group.
JFK: And Lippmann had it when?
Bundy: Two days ago.
JFK: Two days ago?
Sorensen: It was in the Washington Post (words unclear)
(mixed voices)
JFK: Well, I think we ought to -- just a second -- I'll just say, of course we ought to try to go the first route which you suggest. Get him back -- that's what our letter's doing -- that's what we're going to do by one means or another. But it seems to me we ought to have this discussion with NATO about these Turkish missiles, but more generally about sort of an up-to-date briefing about where we're going. Uh --
LBJ: We have two alternatives. Secretary McNamara suggests that we draft a message to the Turks and to the NATO people, saying that we will give you Polaris for the Jupiters in Turkey. And we're going to hit Cuba and therefore we ought to do this because then it means that you're safer than you would be. That's what he says. Ball takes the position that you shouldn't -- you should get something for your trade, if you're going to give up the Jupiter, why you ought to get him to take care of Cuba.
(mixed voices)
LBJ: McCone's got one that lays down an ultimatum, that just says we're going to -- you shot down our man there, we're not going to take any more of it.
Voice: Well what do you do on Cuba, on that one?

Rusk: Mr. President, I think that the trouble with Ball's track is that their public statements today -- plane for plane, man for man, missile for missile...
Voice: Who said this?
Rusk: Ball's track -- a sort of acceptance in effect of their (word unclear) of this morning. It would just get us completely out of Turkey in every respect, and leave the Soviets very much in Cuba. It's the track of last night we want to get them back to. I think if we step up our action tomorrow, against Cuba, not against -- necessarily against the Soviet Union...
(mixed voices)
Dillon: Ambassador Thompson has another idea, was that instead of an ultimatum, a lot of talk about if you shoot any more of our unarmed planes, that it would probably be more effective and make more of an impression on him if we did do what we said we were going to do before and just go in and knock out just one SAM-site.
Voice: That would be the best way of impressing.
(mixed voices)
JFK: (words unclear) plane was shot down in Cuba?
(voice unclear)
Bundy: [(censored)]. * The Cubans (words unclear) *
(mixed voices)
Voice: Havana has announced it, that it was shot down by antiaircraft fire.
JFK: I didn't know that...(mixed voices) Well, we ought to get that and make sure that McNamara knows that
(mixed voices)
Thompson: I also think that we ought to -- if that Soviet ship comes in within this line we ought to stop it.
(Pause)
Voice: Do we have any idea what that ship's carrying?
(mixed voices -- pause)
JFK: In his messages this morning on Turkey did he say if we took out the missiles in Turkey he'd take out the missiles in Cuba?
Dillon: Yes, he said "analogous things" (mixed voices). What we considered offensive and analogous means would have to come out of Turkey.
Thompson: "I therefore make this proposal. We agree to remove from Cuba those means which you regard as offensive means. We agree to see they carry this out and make (words unclear) the UN. Your representative will make a declaration to the effect that the U.S on its part will remove the similar means from Turkey. That's why I think it's very dangerous to indicate any incentive to play on this thing. (words unclear) -- as the Secretary says -- it's either/or (words unclear) We either get out of Turkey completely or we leave the Soviets in Cuba, and only missiles out.
Bundy: Well, we could make a counterproposal, obviously,...
Thompson: Yes.

Bundy: Get everything out of Cuba, and negotiate with the Turks with the same objective. (words unclear)
JFK: We can't very well invade Cuba with all its toil, and long as it's going to be, when we could have gotten them out by making a deal on the same missiles in Turkey. If that's part of the record I don't see how we'll have a very good war. (Pause) However that is really a question - uh - what to say to (words unclear).
LBJ: It wouldn't mean just (words unclear). He takes his missiles out of Cuba, he takes his men out of Cuba, he takes his planes out of Cuba, why then your whole foreign policy is gone. You take everything out of Turkey, 20,000 men, all your (word unclear), all your planes, all your missiles, and crumple.
Voice: This Turkey thing has been (words unclear)
Voice: ... get those missiles out of there.
Rusk: Last night he was prepared to trade them for (several words unclear)
LBJ: Somebody told him to try to get a little more
(Pause, then discussion is desultory and not clear, but not on substance, for a minute.)
JFK: We've got two or three different proposals here, can we meet at nine o'clock and (words unclear) and everybody get a bite to eat, and then come back and see whether we send this message, we see about what we do about our plane, we see about our two messages to the UN -- I mean -- (words unclear) and we'll probably think about that and I think it would be better (noises) say nine o'clock?...
(Hubbub as meeting breaks up. Meeting resumes after passage of time -- length not clear from tape.)

[End Meeting Item 42.1]

Rusk: Certainly he's made a public speech on the subject. But -- uh -- we've also made some public speeches, and -- uh -- I think we're in such a confrontation that -- uh -- he's got to worry very much as the telegram last night that came in late obviously showed -- he's got to worry a great deal about how far he wants to push this thing. (words unclear) had good economic relations with the United States -- his relations with you -- the actual strategic situation -- uh -- I would think that tomorrow we take certain steps to build up the pressure -- we have the enforced surveillance; we shoot anybody who gets in our way; we see whether the town produces any result tonight for when we're here in the morning; we intercept that Soviet ship, we -- uh -- consider tomorrow afternoon including the oil in the blockade. (word unclear) In firing that goes on in Cuba, we keep the -- keep the focus on the Cubans. I had suggestions in John McCone's draft that would tend to do that -- the message to Khrushchev about the necessity for enforced surveys, that would keep the monkey on Cuba's back in this regard. If we do have to enforce our right to overfly and to have a look -- its an accidental fact that some Russian technicians may be around at the time we have to -- shoot, since they've already fired the first shot. (words unclear) It's something that is regrettable

but it's not something that we make a very public issue out of, we're enforcing this with respect to Cuba, not the Soviet Union -- the surveillance business.
Dillon: You do anything about the SAM-site that shot down our plane?
JFK: We don't know if it did yet, Doug.
(mixed voices)
Rusk: If we're going in tomorrow with - with the (words unclear) that we're going to enforce the right to surveillance.
Bundy: If we can't get assurances of allowing them to proceed (words unclear).
Mixed voices and question to Taylor: "Would you like to discuss"...
Taylor: The Chiefs have been -- I went back this (word unclear) and talked this over with the Chiefs. The problem of low level surveillance is becoming difficult because in all the flights today around the SAM-sites, the -- uh --, (words unclear), missile sites, there's low-level ack-ack. (mixed voices) Quite a bit. The planes returned (words unclear) the first to the missile sites and then the second turned back and cut out. We have some photography and I would say by tonight -- by the end of the day -- we probably have seen some of the dispositions around these sites. However the kind of (words unclear) very hard to pick up. Its very hard to know exactly where it is. (words unclear) So that by tomorrow I would say we're not ready to go back with armed reconnaissance preceding the actual photographic missions, if there's any hope of cleaning out this (words unclear). We think, however, the Chiefs would recommend, that we still go back with about six planes tomorrow, picking out targets which we don't know have this kind of flak around, to verify that the work is still going ahead, and also to prove we're still on the job. But we're approaching the point, I think, Mr. President, where low-level reconnaissance will be entirely impossible. When we reach that point, and if we're going to continue reconnaissance without actually taking out the whole works, we're faced with taking out a number of the SAM-sites that (several words unclear) medium and high-level reconnaissance. But low-level reconnaissance probably is on its way out, and I think we'll learn that tomorrow.
McNamara: I would add to that I don't believe we should carry out tomorrow's U-2 mission (mixed voices) The U-2 (mixed voices) but I do believe we should carry out the low-level reconnaissance with the necessary fighter escorts and preparations for following our reconnaissance, if it's attacked, with attack on the attackers.
Voice: You don't think that fighter escort on the low-level will help tomorrow?
Taylor: These planes are off the coast now, in case they have a cripple coming out, but (many words not clear)

Dillon: (Words unclear) I wasn't quite clear-- are the antiaircraft shooting at these things around the missile sites themselves?
Taylor: ... the vicinity of the missile sites
(mixed voices)
McNamara: Well, I think the point is that if our planes are fired on tomorrow, we ought to fire back. That's what I'd have the (mixed voices). The best indication of the antiaircraft sites that we have is around the missile sites (mixed voices)
Rusk: firing back at the missiles on the ground on the basis that you're firing back at....
(mixed voices)
JFK: Let me say, I think we ought to wait till tomorrow afternoon, to see whether we get any answer -- if U Thant goes down there -- we're rapidly approaching a real -- I don't think that firing back at a twenty millimeter coming off the ground is good. I think we ought to figure that Monday -- if tomorrow they fire at us, and we don't have any answer from the Russians, then Monday, it seems to me, we ought to -- we can consider making a statement tomorrow about the fire and that we're going to take action now any place in Cuba, on those areas which can fire, and then go in and take all the SAM-sites out. I'd rather take -- I don't think that it does any good to take out -- to try to fire at a twenty millmeter on the ground. You just hazard our planes, and the people on the ground have the advantage. On the other hand, I don't want to -- I don't think we do any good to begin to sort of half do it. I think we ought to keep tomorrow clean, do the best we can with the surveillance. If they still fire, and we haven't got a satisfactory answer back from the Russians then I think we ought to put a statement out tomorrow that we were fired upon, and we are therefore considering the island of Cuba as an open territory, and then take out all these SAM-sites. Otherwise what we're going to do is find this build-up of the - of the protection for the SAM-sites, low, and the SAM-sites high -- and we'll find ourselves without -- our requirement will be so limited, that we'll find ourselves with all the disadvantages. I think we ought to, tomorrow -- let's get U Thant our messages -- take -- if they fire on us, tell them we'll take them all out and if we don't get some satisfaction from the Russians or U Thant or Cuba tomorrow night, figure that Monday we're going to do something about the SAM-sites. What do you think?
McNamara: (words unclear) I would say only that we ought to keep some kind of pressure on (words unclear) tomorrow night, that indicates we're (word unclear). Now if we call up these air squadrons tonight, I think that settles.
(mixed voices)
McNamara: I have a paper here (several words unclear) I believe we should issue an order tonight calling up the twenty-four air reserve squadrons, roughly 300 troop carrier transports, which are required for an invasion, and this would both be a

preparatory move, and also a strong indication of what lies ahead...
JFK: I think we ought to do it.
(mixed voices)
Taylor: I might say this, that as a part of the help to cutting the time short of invasion, shipping is really more important than this, although I'm entirely for this (words unclear)
JFK: Well, tomorrow, when do we talk, Mr. Secretary, I thought maybe tomorrow we'd do the shipping. We ought to break it in two. Probably air is the focus of interest right now. What we're trying to do is get a settlement of this. I thought maybe the first one ought to be the air.
Voice: You alert them or call them up?
Voices: Call them up.
(mixed voices)
McNamara: I would like to put that out
(mixed voices)
McNamara: I can do it under the Executive Order that you signed granting me the authority (words unclear). I would like this to -- let me read this and see --
(Reading) Today U.S. unarmed reconnaissance aircraft, conducting surveillance of the build-up of offensive weapons secretly introduced into Cuba by the Soviet Union, were fired upon. Such surveillance operations were in accordance with the resolution adopted on October 23rd by the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American system under the provisions of the Rio Treaty of 1947. To ensure that the nations of the Western Hemisphere continue to be informed of the status of the threat to their security, it is essential that such reconnaissance flights continue. To protect these flight against attack, it will henceforth be accompanied by fighter escorts. The possiblity of further attack on our aircraft, and the continuous build-up of the offensive weapons systems in Cuba, require that we be prepared for any eventuality. Therefore tonight, acting under the authority granted me by Execution Order such-and-such, I have instructed the Secretary of the Air Force to order to active duty twenty-four troop carrier squadrons of the Air Force Reserve with their associated support units.
Gilpatric: You might want to take out the sentence about the fighter escorts.
McNamara: Yes, I'd leave that out. (words unclear)
Taylor: (words unclear) about fighter escort and (word unclear) low level really doesn't mix.
JFK: Do we call up any fighters, or it'll just be troop carriers?
(mixed voices)
McNamara: We could call up some fighters (mixed voices) just cats and dogs, Mr. President...
(mixed voices)
Rusk: ... from the public point of view, and from the effect on Khrushchev you should add some fighters, even if you don't call up... (mixed voices)

Taylor: We have them off the coast looking for cripples, but they haven't been coming over because of the (words unclear)
McNamara: Dean, it's just not worthwhile... (words unclear)
Voice: I just wanted to be sure.
JFK: Now who announces this -- the Defense Department?
McNamara: Yeah, I'll do this (mixed voices & sounds)
(Pause)
(Discussion in low voices, not general, hard to understand. RFK concerned about next steps -- mention of POL -- tanker)
JFK: In addition it's not really his assurance to us, it's his assurance to U Thant and the United Nations.
(mixed voices)
JFK: I think we maybe ought to call Stevenson -- when the Secretary gets back we'll talk to him -- to tell U Thant this ship is coming on have him get (name close to "Zorin") or whatever it is ... After all, the assurance was to U Thant and not to me, that they'd keep them out of there. The U.N., for the record, is clearer.
Taylor: Mr. President, with regard to reconnaissance the Chiefs talked this over at great length. We would say there is no great -- no need for more reconnaissance tomorrow, except for the fact that we know that we should check on whether they're working or not. And secondly we think it would be a mistake to back away (words unclear)
JFK: I agree (mixed voices) ... we also want to find out (words unclear) if they're firing tomorrow. If they're firing tomorrow we'd better announce that. I think -- uh -- Mr. Secretary, we were talking about this ship. He gave U Thant assurances on sending ships, so I think that we ought to, tonight, call Stevenson to inform U Thant that this ship is continuing to approach (words unclear) that we'd like to get some answer from them, whether this is going to be called back or otherwise we -- the confrontation must take place. It needs to be -- we ought to have the record a little better. Do you have any objections to...
McNamara: No, in fact I... (mixed voices)
RFK: Could we have a couple of minutes -- just a minute's discussion, as to whether we should intercept it or not. I don't know whether we think that that's advisable if we're going to -- uh -- face firing -- if they are firing on us. I should think the argument could go (words unclear)
Rusk: Well, I was just making a list here of the things that have happened today. By the way the intercept area business was available last night, I think.
JFK: I just want to call them, Bobby and tell them about the ship. We don't have to say what we're going to do about it, but I think we ought to tell them... (mixed voices)
RFK: Okay.
JFK: Will you find out where it is, Mac, in a technical way, and give them the latitude and longtitude.
Bundy: I was just talking to Harlan Cleveland (mixed voices)

JFK: We don't need to say what we're going to do about it, but we ought to say this is approaching, and we'd like to have you know about it.
(mixed voices)
RFK: Tomorrow morning -- is it possible to decide tomorrow?
McNamara: Yeah, we can wait until about noon tomorrow.
(mixed voices)
Rusk: Mr. President, just to remind us of seven things that have happened today. He, by the way, is telling us the pressure's on Khrushchev (words unclear). One was the statement this morning on the broadcast. Second, was this business on the intercept (word unclear) U Thant. Third was an announcement on enforced surveillance. Fourth was our short message to U Thant (words unclear). Five was our answer to K's letter of October 26. Six, was a call up of air squadrons. Seven will be a warning to U Thant of an approaching ship.
Now, in general, I think that's -- uh -- for one day, that's building up. Tomorrow, we'll need to be sure that the pressures continue to build up.
JFK: Well, we've got two things. First place we've got the POL. Secondly, we've got the announcement about these -- whatever happens -- if we don't take the ship, we announce that the (words unclear) been broken, and from now on, it's POL, all ships, and -- uh -- so on. (words unclear) Nine ships (words unclear) in addition our own ships. So it seems to me we've got two or three things tomorrow, that...
(Pause)
Rusk: Bob, if you make (words unclear) in calling up, how much of the 150,000 is left.
McNamara: The air squadrons are 14,000, out of a total of 150. (voice: 125,000) 14,000 out of 150 - 135 left.
(mixed voices)
Taylor: Shipping -- the importance of shipping, Mr. President. That the next step in my judgment ought to be calling up ships.
JFK: I thought tomorrow we'd do that. (words unclear) It's just a little late tonight, and I think probably tomorrow.
(mixed voices -- on ships -- national guard)
JFK: What we'd better do is now figure out these messages to NATO and the Turks. Has everybody seen Norstad's message?
Bundy: No, sir.
JFK: I'll read it. Dear Mr. President:
I just talked to Finletter, who is arranging for the NAC meeting in the morning. He might be instructed to give details of Khrushchev's communication to you, to state that regardless of the merit or lack of merit of the proposal, the seriouness of the situation requires (sound cuts out). Finletter's presentation should be brief, factual and should be cool and skeptical, without suggesting that you have established a firm and final position. The resulting discussion would, I hope, be useful to you as an indication of European opinion, and might develop some aspects of the problem of importance to you in making your

decision. In any event it should help to avoid a situation in which you can be wrong whatever you do, and your allies can be right and wise regardless of developments. It also of course helps meet the consultation commitment.

No matter how productive and useful a NAC discussion may be it will not, I fear, substantially relieve you of the burden of making a difficult decision. Many questions will arise as this subject is considered. Among these are:

(a) The missiles in Cuba. Are missiles in Cuba on the same basis as those in Turkey? Clearly the answer is No.

(b) Can Turkey be treated as a satellite? Clearly Khrushchev seems now publicly to have placed Cuba in that category.

(c) Although accepting the Khrushchev proposal may bring short-term relief, if such action is taken as a sign of weakness in any case, will it contribute to strengthening our long term position?

(d) Would an acceptance of the proposal indicate that the threat of missiles posed to the U.S. caused the weakening of our NATO protection under Soviet pressure, where MRBMs sited against Europe had strengthened our defense and our resolve?

(e) What would be the effect on Greece and Turkey, both of whom live in constant fear of being left alone?

This is a very incomplete list of the questions which come to mind as one considers this problem. The answer seems to me to add up to a rejection of Khrushchev's proposal, and I believe Finletter should be instructed to indicate this as the general direction of U.S. thinking.

That's General Norstad.

(Pause)

JFK: (Words unclear) a draft?

Rusk: There is one -- we have one on the basis that -- uh --

(pause for 1 minute)

Rusk: Mr. President, I wonder, in a matter of this sort, whether it is necessary for the United States to give its first choice at the time that we first discuss this problem with NAC. We could let them know that we've got to take action in Cuba if this thing continues, and this will create dangers in the NATO area. Remind them that the Soviets have raised this question of Turkey. We'd genuinely like to consult Europe -- the NATO allies. Now there are three possibilities. The one is that we -- that NATO takes the position that they cannot connect the defenses of NATO with the situation -- the security situation in another part of the world. These defenses relate to the Soviet military position regarding NATO, with hundreds of missiles aimed at NATO. Therefore we have to stand by them in NATO and make sure that -- uh -- the Soviet Union realizes that we have to combine with NATO on this issue. The second alternative would be, on straight security grounds, take Bob McNamara's point, here on page three. The third would be to take George Ball's proposal -- uh -- draft here, saying that we accept this but on the full

understanding that -- uh -- we will make alternative arrangements, which are easily made, for the nuclear defense of NATO. But -- and tell them that in this situation, since we understand the grave issues involved, that we would be glad to have the views of NATO -- to take into account before we decide what has to be done here in this Hemisphere, and how we handle this particular problem.
(Pause)
Rusk: And if we were asked for an especial preference, of course the preference is One, that we go ahead with this Cuban business without regard to bargaining with NATO, but that NATO must understand the nature of the risks that are involved to NATO.
JFK: Well, if you're going to really present it to them that way, you wouldn't want to state a position, I don't think, Mr. Secretary, would you, because they'll feel compelled then to agree with that -- it sounds sort of strong and firm and clear, and then they -- uh -- unless we're sure that's the direction we want to steer them. I think we can steer them in that direction. It's officially the easiest position, but I think we ought to be sure that that's what we want to do. (Pause) We have to -- what we want to do -- it seems to me, Mr. Scretary, that even if we want them to end up that way, we don't want to look like that's where we urged them and therefore they have accepted, some reluctantly, some eagerly, the United States opinion, then it goes bad, which it may well, then they say well, we followed you, and you bitched it up. But so far (words unclear) who gets involved -- us, the Russians, and Cuba. Beginning at the offer on Turkey, then they're really in it. I don't think we are -- even indicate -- all we're doing is saying, "This is it. This situation is getting worse, and we're going to have to take some action, and we want you to know, we want you to have an opportunity, and we're consulting with you, definitely, is there any merit in this?" And if we don't -- take it, then we want everybody to understand what we think may be the alternative if we're going to have to move. I think that's probably what this first meeting ought to be, and then we might have another one the next morning. But otherwise (words unclear & mixed voices)
Dillon: ... very clearly that we aren't pushing them either way.
Voice: ... leave out the pentultimate paragraph, the first -- around the top of page three, and the last paragraph (words unclear)
(mixed voices)
Rusk: Some of them may come up with an idea that would unlock this damned thing, something that we haven't thought of. It's just possible.
Voice: Do we just report to them all these actions that are being taken (mixed voices) and not anything further (mixed voices)

JFK: Well now, will the introduction of Turkey, we think that if we take an action which we may have to take, I don't think we ought to say -- which we may well have to take the way it's escalating, if they hit Turkey and they hit Berlin, we want them -- if they want to get off, now's the time to speak up.
RSM: Mr. President, do we believe that we'll be able to settle Cuba more easily with or without the Jupiters in Turkey. I think we ought to decide this point before we open the door to NATO.
RFK: That's what -- can't we wait? Isn't it possible to get through tomorrow at three or four o'clock without even getting into NATO with the Turkey business? And then figuring, I mean if we lose the gamble with -- and I think that -- if once they find, playing around and figuring on Turkey, we're willing to make some deal -- if I were they I'd push on that, and then I'd push on Italy, figuring that well if they're going to go on that they can carry it one step further. But if we are hard on this thing -- the gains that we have - we know that we've got some respite -- that (words unclear) see some way in Moscow -- the way that they made the offer initially. Why don't we just wait another eighteen hours, see if that's been eased at all. We're hard and tough on this. We called up the planes tonight, and we wait. We find out if U Thant is successful, then we find that he's not successful -- the whole thing looks like it's collapsing, and we're going to have to go in there. So then we call them together, and we say what the problem is.
JFK: Have we called the meeting yet?
Voice: Yes we have.
(mixed voices)
Bundy: I think it says in Norstad's message ten o'clock.
(words unclear)
Bundy: Three o'clock our time. No, other way around, morning our time.
(cut off)

[End Meeting Item 42.2, Reference Reel 1, continued on Reference Reel 2]

RFK: I think you could say it tomorrow, if you had the information. State the facts, and say we think that this should be based -- based completely in the Western Hemisphere. This is what we had...
Bundy: We have an obligation to talk with you, and more of an obligation and we'll meet with you again raising this irrelevance, at ten o'clock tomorrow morning.
RFK: Then if the thing blows tomorrow, then we go at ten o'clock the next morning and say that...
(mixed voices)
RFK: Well, I think you've got to figure -- that's another twenty-four hours. You could do it -- Ok. Well -- uh -- one day, I can't believe it's going to make that much difference.
(voices unclear)
RFK: I think -- I think you've got to give them a chance. But I think if we indicate to them tomorrow that we're willing to make a deal on Turkey if they're willing to make a deal, that half of

them are going to be willing to make it, half aren't, -- I think then you'd be in a ...
JFK: Well, but the only thing is have we lost anything (words unclear)
Voice: You shouldn't discuss the Turkey deal.
RFK: No, I think you just keep silent. Tell them what has happened today. Go through the whole thing. This is just to report to them what we've done, and what steps we're taking, and then they're -- that we called up the air, and we're thinking of calling up the ships, -- (words unclear) calling up the ships -- this is what happened -- we sent the U-2 over -- it looks like it got shot down -- we got some of these -- and this is the offer that they've made to us, with the messages that came through Scali and through the other people -- we've accepted this -- the President (words unclear) when they suddenly came in with the Turkey business -- we haven't considered that because we think it should be restricted to the Western Hemisphere -- uh. We made that -- we said that we would accept that. We haven't heard yet. We will report to them when we hear and we suggest that we meet at ten o'clock tomorrow morning, and then the Russians come back and say we're only going to do it if you can get the bases out of Turkey, and then we come in and we talk to them and say, "Now this is what our suggestion is, what do you want to do," and they say, "We want to hold fast," and then on Tuesday we go in.
I think if we indicate tomorrow -- (words unclear)
Thompson: It'll become public.
Voice: become public
JFK: All right does anybody -- uh -- Mr. Secretary, What do you think of that?
Rusk: No, I think that's all right.
JFK: Mac, can you draw the
Bundy: Yes, sir.
JFK: You and Ted draw the instructions based on what Bobby said.
Voice: It would combine these.
(Voices mixed)
Bundy: It simply leaves out, as I understand it, the recommendations section of both messages.
Voice: that's right.
Voice: the thing you have to bear in mind...
(mixed voices)
Voice: You've already said in NATO...
(mixed voices)
Voice: I think we've got to say whatever we say in the capitals, also.
Rusk: Whatever we say there is going to be known.
Voice: Oh, yes.
(mixed voices)
JFK: -- and then he can take the temperature. But we have to instruct Finletter not to try to get them to do (words unclear).
Dillon: If it's a very serious briefing, this could serve as an indirect warning to the Russians.

Voice: Yeah.
(mixed voices)
Bundy: How much -- what noise do we want at the end of it in terms of welcoming discussion? Do we want ...
Rusk: Put the situation to them and welcome their views on it. I tend to hope that they might have some ideas about the alternatives.
JFK: Well, no, what I think -- I don't think that yet. In NATO (words unclear) in order to prepare this groundwork for a disaster to NATO, later in the week, in Berlin or someplace, we ought to be saying to them that the reason we're consulting with them is that the situation is deteriorating, and if we take action, we think there will be reprisals, and they should -- we want them to now get a ....
Bundy: We better say we think there might be ...
JFK: Well I think this is just a draft...
(mixed voices)
RFK: Do you think, Mr. President, that -- uh -- that somebody that's been involved in these discussions and knows as much about the background should -- might be there?
Bundy: Mr. President it's only seven hours to the meeting I don't (mixed voices)
Sorensen: It's essentially Ros's draft, and there's one paragraph dropped. You're not recommending any policy. I wonder, though, whether you want to raise, not a policy question but a military question -- and then to examine how valuable are the Jupiters...
McNamara: I would suggest -- I would suggest you not lead into discussion of this. This is (words unclear) that you don't want discussion tomorrow. They may split up, and you may have chaos.
JFK: But I think you can say that we won't -- that we're going to ask for a meeting on Monday on it.
(mixed voices)
JFK: I think we'd better give them some of this stuff -- for your eyes -- about not bringing up the Jupiters at this point because it'll leak and so on -- uh, Mac, I suppose we ought to say -- uh -- we shouldn't bring up the question of the Jupiters at this point because it may leak and -- uh -- our efforts to get the Russians --
Bundy: I think the message should begin that this is -- it is now decided that your briefing should not be related to the Soviet proposal but to the situation -- I think that's really what's concluded, especially in the light of the fact that tomorrow is the day of signals to the Soviet Union. Is that -- is that right?
RFK: I think it should go into much more detail --
(mixed voices)
Voice: Are we going start-up a communication with Khrushchev on this provocation (words unclear)
JFK: the plane going down -- the plane going down?
(Pause)

Rusk: There's a (words unclear) -- would -- uh -- keep the finger pointed on Cuba on this business of surveillance -- uh -- I gather that those points are covered.
JFK: What are we going to announce in regard to tomorrow's planes?
McNamara: We shouldn't announce anything.
JFK: Not whether we're continuing or
Gilpatric: We've already announced that, that we're going to continue.
McNamara: But we didn't say tomorrow. We said we're going to continue surveillance. We've got enough messages right now, John. I think that he knows about the plane. He's announced it, so I think the (words unclear)
Sorensen: I think in some ways it's a sign of weakness if we keep resorting to messages.
JFK: I think we shouldn't send him one again. I think we ought to just let that one go tonight. The boat's going to be the important thing. Is he going to turn that boat around or...
JFK: We -- uh -- who's notified Stevenson - (words unclear)
Ball: We're trying to -- uh -- Alex has talked to New York and we -- they're going to call back -- whether U Thant goes down or not apparently isn't clear -- quite clear yet.
Rusk: Goes down where?
Voice: To Havana.
JFK: Well, I was thinking about that ship, because we're going to be faced with the problem of that ship tomorrow. Do we have a -- do we announce it or do we just send ...
(mixed voices)
Bundy: ... warning, a ship is approaching the intersector.
Voice: I'm not sure, Alex was talking about...
(Mixed voices and noises)
JFK: ... send a letter to de Gaulle (words unclear) I think we ought to send a letter to de Gaulle, a sort of situation -- just as a...
Voice: It shouldn't go to de Gaulle, when Adenauer is
(mixed voices)
JFK: I'm in constant touch with Macmillan but we haven't been with de Gaulle, so we...
Voice: It could almost be a copy of the message to Finletter.
Gilpatric: Well that's going to the heads of government.
(mixed voices)
Voice: ... send it to all the NATO capitals.
JFK: Our ambassador -- I think he ought to send a letter to de Gaulle -- also Macmillan and Adenauer, but I was thinking more of de Gaulle -- but let's send it to all three, it involves Berlin. More or less giving the resume of what the situation is. I'm thinking that I should send it to de Gaulle. (words unclear).... What about the Turks, now? What are we going to say to Hare?
Rusk: Well we would say to him what we say to NATO.
Voice: He'll get exactly the same...

JFK: I think we ought to have an "eyes only", in which we tell him -- to -- uh -- I mean, at least in the next twenty-four hours we shouldn't even suggest to Hare that -- uh -- that there's a possibility of the -- uh --...
Voice: No, you don't want to talk...
Rusk: You've seen that long telegram giving the four alternatives?
Voice to him?
Rusk: From him.
(mixed voices)
Thompson: He's done a very good job on the Turkish situation.
(voices mixed and low)
JFK: Let's just say, it seems to me that on Hare if we don't want to -- we try to get the Russians off the Turkish trade -- then we probably don't want to do anything with Hare for twenty-four hours till we get some sort of an answer.
Thompson: This is Hare's telegram. I don't know if you saw it or not.
(mixed voices)
JFK: Well, let's see -- uh -- let's give him an explanation of what we're trying to do. We're trying to get it back on the original proposition of last night, and -- because we don't want to get into this trade. If we're unsuccessful, then we -- its possible that we may have to get back on the Jupiter thing. If we do, then we would of course want it to come from the Turks themselves and NATO, rather than just the United States. We're hopeful, however, that that won't come. If it does, his judgment on how should it be handled (words unclear) we're prepared to do the Polaris and others, does he think this thing can be made? We'll be in touch with him in twenty-four hours when we find out if we're successful in putting the Russians back on the original track. (words unclear)
Thompson: All right, we'll get that.
JFK: OK?
Voice: How you want to personally?
(mixed voices)
Dillon: You can send this personally to de Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan, if you want to (voice too low)
JFK: We've sent a message to Macmillan, (words unclear) send one to Adenauer and de Gaulle.
(mixed voices)
JFK: Ok.
(mixed voices)
JFK: Question to George.
Ball: ... The only problem is that as John suggests, when some of these NATO, NAC ambassador report to their own capitals and...
(mixed voices about possible leaks)
RFK: They say they shot down our U-2. They say they shot it down.
(mixed voices)

Taylor: They say they shot down planes.
(mixed voices)
RFK: Then we're going to get shot at tomorrow.
(mixed voices)
McNamara: Mr. President, if we go in at a low level tomorrow, we ought to be prepared, it seems to me, to attack MIGs if they attack our aircraft.
(mixed voices)
McNamara: This time we would make it perfectly clear that if they attack our aircraft, we're going in after some of their MIGs.
(mixed voices)
JFK: ... until Tuesday morning, because we'll have to go back to NATO again Monday, in which we say the situation is getting worse and so on and so forth (words unclear) last chance.
(mixed voices and noise)
McNamara: We take some time tomorrow to talk about it.
(mixed voices and noise)
Voice: What time did we decide on tomorrow morning?
(mixed voices and laughter and more mixed voices)
RFK: How are you doing, Bob?
McNamara: Well, hard to tell. You have any doubts?
RFK: Well, I think we're doing the only thing we can do and well, you know.
(mixed voices)
McNamara: I think the one thing, Bobby, we ought to seriously (words unclear) damned sure the (words unclear) and then we need to have two things ready, a government for Cuba, because we're going to need one (words unclear) and secondly, plans for how to respond to the Soviet Union in Europe, because sure as hell they're going to do something there.
(mixed voices)
Voice: Suppose we make Bobby mayor of Havana.
(mixed voices and cut off)

[End Meeting Item 42.2]

PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS
OCTOBER 16 - OCTOBER 28TH, 1962

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1962

9:25 am — The President arrived in the office.

9:30 - 9:48 am — Commander and Mrs. Walter M. Schirra, Jr.
Walter, III and Suzanne

9:50 - 9:54 am — Mr. Edward McDermott

10:00 - 10:26 am — (Congressman Ross Bass) OFF THE RECORD
(Tennessee)

10:26 - 10:30 am — (Hon. C. Douglas Dillon)
(Hon. Henry Fowler)
(Hon. Myer Feldman)

10:33 - 11:15 am — The President met with the members of the Panel on Mental Retardation in the Fish Room.

11:15 - 11:46 am — Hon. Charles E. Bohlen
U. S. Ambassador to France

11:50 - 12:57 pm — OFF THE RECORD MEETING RE CUBA
(The Vice President)
(Hon. Dean Rusk)
(General Maxwell Taylor)
(Hon. Roswell Gilpatric)
(Hon. Edwin Martin)

1:03 pm — The President departed the office and went to the Mansion.

1:00 pm — LUNCHEON at the White House in honor of His Royal Highness Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi, Crown Prince of the United Kingdom of Libya:
The President
H. R. H. The Crown Prince of the United Kingdom of Libya, Hasan al-Rida al-Sanusi
H. E. Wanis al-Qadhaafi
Minister of Foreign Affairs
H. E. The Ambassador of Libya
Dr. Mohieddine Fekini
H. E. Yunis Bilkhair
Minister of Defense
The Honorable Fathi al-Khoja
Master of Cermonies of the Royal Household

(continued)

1:00 pm

LUNCHEON list continued from previous page:

The Honorable Abdullah Sikta
Director of the Development Council
The Honorable Khaliifa Muusa
Under Secretary of Finance and Director-General of Customs
The Honorable Ahmad al-Hamaali
Federal Director of Press and Publications
Mr. Abu al-Qaasim al-Ghamaary
Private Secretary to His Royal Highness
Colonel Idris Issawi
Deputy Chief of Staff, Libyan Army
Colonel Raasim al-Naaili
Aide-de-Camp to His Royal Highness

The Vice President
Hon. George Ball, Under Secretary of State
Hon. Adlai E. Stevenson
Senator Benjamin A. Smith, II
Hon. J. Wesley Jones
Hon. Angier Biddle Duke
Hon. McGeorge Bundy
Hon. G. Mennen Williams
Hon. Edmond C. Hutchinson
Hon. Eugene R. Black
Hon. George W. Mitchell
Mr. Henry J. Tasca
Mr. Henry C. Alexander
Hon. Lewis Clark
Mr. James C. Donnell, II
Mr. Boyd France
Dr. Jerome H. Holland
Mr. Alfred Jacobsen
Dr. Majiid Khaddouri
Mr. Leonard F. McCollum
Mr. Clark R. Mullenhoff
Mr. Michael Ross
Mr. Robert Roth
Mr. M. A. Wright

3:57 pm — The President returned to the office.

4:04 - 4:10 pm — (Mr. Samson Field) OFF THE RECORD
(Chairman, Board of Directors, The Printing Company of America)
(Mrs. Jim Akin)

4:25 pm — The President departed the White House and motored to the Department of State Auditorium.

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT before the National Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and Radio-TV Public Affairs Broadcasters at the Department of State Auditorium.

4:58 pm — The President returned to the White House.

5:00 - 6:00 pm — H. R. H. Hasan al-Rida Sanusi
Crown Prince of the United Kingdom of Libya
H. E. Wanlis al-Qadhafi, Minister of Foreign Affairs
H. E. Dr. Mohieddine Fekini, Ambassador of Libya
H. E. Yunis Bilkhair, Minister of Defense
Hon. John Wesley Jones, U. S. Ambassador to Libya
HonE. G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Mr. Camille Noffel, interpreter
Mr. William Witman, II
Director, Office of Northern African Affairs

6:30 pm — (11:30 am meeting resumed):
(The Vice President) OFF THE RECORD
Hon. Dean Rusk)
(General Maxwell Taylor)
(Hon. Roswell Gilpatric)
(Hon. Edwin Martin)

7:55 pm — The President went to the Mansion.

(OFF THE RECORD, the President and Mrs. Kennedy had Dinner with the Joseph Alsops)

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1962

9:15 am	The President arrived on the office.
9:35 - 9:55 am	Hon. John McCone Hon. McGeorge Bundy
10:00 - 11:30 am	H. E. Dr. Gerhard Schroeder Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany His Excellency K. Heinrich Knappstein Ambassador of Germany Dr. Simon Personal Aide to the Foreign Minister Dr. Reinkemeyer Chief of Soviet Affairs in the Foreign Office, Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Kusterer, interpreter Hon. Dean Rusk Hon. Walter C. Dowling U. S. Ambassador to Germany Mr. Martin J. Hillenbrand Department of State Mr. Robert C. Creel Director of German Affairs, Department of State Hon. William R. Tyler Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
12:30 pm	The President went to the pool.
12:48 pm	The President departed the White House and motored to St. Matthews Cathedral. Arrived at St. Matthews and attended services in commemoration of NATIONAL DAY OF PRAYER. Departed St. Matthews and motored to the Embassy of Libya.
1:15 - 2:30 pm	LUNCHEON at the Embassy of Libya in honor of the President, given by the Crown Prince of Libya.
2:28 pm	The President returned to the White House.
2:50 pm	Departed the White House and motored to MATS Terminal for flight to New Haven, Connecticut.
3:09 pm	Airborne for New Haven, Connecticut.

4:25 pm — The President and his party arrived at Bridgeport Municipal Airport. The President was greeted by
Governor John Dempsey
Hon. Abraham Ribicoff
(Candidate for U. S. Senate)
Mayor Samuel Tenesco of Bridgeport
Mr. John M. Golden
State Democratic National Committeeman

4:30 - 4:38 pm — ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT at Bridgeport Municipal Airport.

4:40 pm — The Presidential motorcade departed Bridgeport Municipal Airport and proceeded to Waterbury, Conn.

WATERBURY, CONNECTICUT

6:22 pm — The President and his party arrived in Waterbury, Connecticut. The President was greeted by
Mayor Edward D. Bergin

6:25 - 6:35 pm — ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT at Waterbury, Conn.

6:46 pm — Presidential motorcade departed Waterbury. Congressman Robert N. Giaimo rode with the President and Mr. Bernard Grabowski, candidate for Congress at Large.

NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

7:52 pm — The Presidential motorcade arrived in New Haven, Conn. The President was greeted by Mayor Richard C. Lee.

7:53 - 8:02 pm — ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT in New Haven, Conn. (The President was introduced by Governor Dempsey).

8:03 pm — The President and Mayor Richard C. Lee of New Haven motored to the New Haven Airport.

8:22 pm — Arrived at New Haven Airport.

8:33 pm — Airborne for Washington, D. C.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1962

9:28 am — The President arrived in the office.

9:32 - 9:45 am — Presentation of the Harmon Trophies by the President, in the Rose Garden of the White House.

Lt. Colonel William R. Payne, USAF
Jacqueline Cochran
Commander Malcolm D. Ross, USNR
Lt. Commander Prather, USN (deceased)

(The above received the Harmon Trophies)

The following were present for the ceremony:

Hon. Majeeb Halaby
Hon. Joseph S. Imirie
Hon. Fred Korth
Brig. General Godfrey T. McHugh
General William F. McKee
Commander William Nelson
Cpatin John R. Seal
Captain Henry G. Wagner
Hon. James E. Webb
Colonel Edwin E. Aldrin
Mr. and Mrs. Harry Bruno
Mary V. Bronnahan
Colonel and Mrs. Bernt Balchen
Mrs. Chester Barth
Mr. and Mrs. Peter C. Doern, Jr.
Major Alexander P. de Seversky
Dr. Carl A. Frische
Mr. Robert B. Hotz
Mr. and Mrs. Michael W. Iannone
Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Johnston
Thomas Victor Jones
Roger Lewis
Major General J. B. Montgomery
Mrs. William F. McKee
Colonel Paul C. McCandless
Mr. Floyd B. Odlum
Mrs. William R. Payne
Mr. and Mrs. R. L. Polhemus
Gerard L. Phillippe
Mrs. Victor A. Prather, Jr.
Marla Lee Prather
Victor A. Prather, III
Mrs. Victor A. Prather, Sr.
Mr. P. Hodges Combier
Vice Adm. Chas. Rosendah
Mrs. Malcolm D. Ross
Jane and John Ross
Mr. and Mrs. J. R. Ross
Mr. and Mrs. Wm. W. Schramek
Morris Semiatin
Dr. & Mrs. Igor I. Sikorsky
Mr. and Mrs. Patrick J. Sullivan
Col. and Mrs. A. E. Talbert
Maj. & Mrs. R. Wagner
R. H. Windmer
William R. Wilson
Mrs. & Mrs. Otto C. Winzen

10:00 - 10:35 am — CABINET MEETING

Hon. Lyndon Johnson, The Vice President
Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Hon. C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury
Hon. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, The Attorney General
Hon. J. Edward Day, The Postmaster General
Hon. Luther Hodges, Secretary of Commerce
Hon. Anthony Celebrezze, Secretary of HEW
Hon. W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor
Hon. Charles Murphy, Under Secretary of Agriculture
Hon. John A. Carver, Asst. Secretary of the Interior
Hon. T. C. Sorensen, Special Counsel to the President
Hon. David Bell, Director of the Bureau of the Budget
Hon. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President
Hon. Walter Heller, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
Hon. Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President
Hon. T. J. Reardon, Jr. Special Assistant to the President
Hon. James Webb, Administrator, MASA
Hon. Glenn Seaborg, Chairman, AEC
Hon. Robert Weaver, Administrator, HHFA
Hon. Donald Wilson, Deputy Director, USIA
Hon. John Gleason, Administrator, VA
Hon. Najeeb Halaby, Administrator, FAA
Hon. John Horne, Administrator, SBA
Hon. Bernard Boutin, Administrator, GSA
Hon. Aubrey Wagner, Director, TVA

10:50 - 11:10 am — The President went to the South Grounds of the White House.

11:10 - 12:57 pm — OFF THE RECORD MEETING IN CABINET ROOM (Re Cuba)
(Set up by Mr. Bundy - no list available)

1:00 - 1:18 pm

Hon. Eisaku Sato
Former Minister of Finance and Minister of International Trade and Industry of Japan
Hon. Averell Harriman
Mr. Michael Forrestal
H. E. Korchiro Asakai, Ambassador of Japan
Michio Mizaguchi, Third Secretary, Japanese Embassy
Mr. James J. Wickel, interpreter, Department of State

1:33 pm — The President went to the pool, then to the Mansion.

(LUNCH)

3:30 pm	The President returned to the office.
4:30 - 5:00 pm	Hon. Dean Rusk Hon. Llewellyn Thompson
5:00 - 7:18 pm	H. E. Andrei Gromyko Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR H. E. Anatoliy F. Dobrynin Ambassador of the USSR Hon. Dean Rusk Hon. Llewellyn Thompson Hon. Martin J. Hillenbrand H. E. Vladimir S. Semenov Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Mr. Alexander Akalovsky, Department of State onterpreter Mr. Victor M. Sukhodnev, interpreter
8:10 pm	The President departed the office and went to the Mansion.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1962

9:44 am — The President arrived in the office.

10:35 am — The President departed the South Grounds by helicopter and flew to Andrews Air Force Base.

10:49 am — Airborne from Andrews Air Force Base.

CLEVELAND, OHIO

11:40 am — Arrived in Cleveland at the Cleveland-Hopkins Airport. The President was greeted by
Governor Michael V. DiSalle
Senator Frank Lausche
Cohgressman Michael J. Kirwan

11:50 am — The Presidentials motorcade departed the Airport.

12:35 pm — Arrived at the Superior Avenue entrance of the Cleveland-Sheraton Hotel. The President was greeted by
Mr. Allen James Lowe
Manager of the Cleveland Sheraton Hotel

12:40 pm — The President went to the speaker's platform located in the Public Square.

Governor DiSalle introduced the President.

12:45 - 1:00 pm — ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT at Public Square, Cleveland, Chio.

1:05 pm — The President departed the platform and motored to Cleveland Airport.

1:50 pm — Arrived at the Cleveland Hopkins Airport.

The President received an autographed football from the student body of St. Edwards Catholic High School, Lakewood, Ohio.

2:00 pm — Airborne for Springfield, Illinois.

SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS

2:15 pm	The President arrived at Capital Airport, Springfield, Illinois. He was greeted by Governor Otto Kerner Congressman Sidney Yates
2:21 pm	Departed the Airport and motored to Lincoln's Tomb.
2:30 pm	Arrived at Lincoln's Tomb. The President was accompanied inside the tomb by Governor Kerner, Congressman Sidney Yates and Senator Douglas. The President placed a wreath and returned to his car.
2:40 pm	Departed Lincoln's Tomb and motored to the Illinois State Fairgrounds Coliseum.
2:50 pm	Arrived at the Illinois Fairground Coliseum. The President proceeded to the speaker's platform.
3:10 - 3:22 pm	ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT.
3:23 pm	Departed the Illinois Fairground Coliseum and motored to the Capital Airport, Springfield, Illinois.
3:34 pm	Arrived at the Airport.
3:45 pm	Airborne for Chicago, Illinois.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

4:30 pm	The President arrived at the Chicago-O'Hare International Airport. He was greeted by Mayor Richard Daley and local dignitaries
4:40 pm	The President, Mayor Richard Daley, Congressman Sidney Yates and Hon. John Bailey, and Governor Otto Kerner departed the Chicago-OHare International Airport in motorcade.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1962 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

5:30 pm	The President and his party arrived at the Sheraton-Blackstone Hotel.
7:18 pm	The President, Mayor Richard Daley, Congressman Sidney Yates and Hon. John Bailey departed the Sheraton-Blackstone Hotel and motored to McCormick Place Expostion and Convention Hall.
7:25 pm	Arrived at McCormick Place Exposition and Convention Hall.
	The President attended the annual recpption and dinner of the Democratic Party of Cook County, Illinois.
9:35 - 9:55 pm	ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT at the Democratic Party of Cook County, Illinois.
10:00 pm	The President and Mayor Daley went to the Aerie Crown Theatre. The President was introduced by Mayor Daley.
10:09 - 10:14 am	ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT before the precinct cpatains.
10:15 pm	The President and party departed for the Sheraton Blackstone Hotel.
10:25 pm	Arrived at the Sheraton-Blackstone Hotel.
	No further activity recorded this date.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1962

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

10:02 am — The President departed the Sheraton-Blackstone Hotel and motored to the Chicago-O'Hare International Airport.

10:35 am — Arrived at the Airport.

10:50 am — Airborne from Chicago, Illinois.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

1:25 pm — Arrived at Andrews Air Force Base.

Boarded helicopter for the White House.

1:35 pm — Arrived at the White House.

(Although the President had cut his trip short because of a slight cold, he conferred, OFF THE RECORD, with officials on the Cuban crisis).

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1962

9:52 am	The President and Mrs. Kennedy departed the White House and motored to St. Stephen's Church.
9:57 am	Arrived at St. Stephen's Church.
10:00 - 10:45 am	Mass at St. Stephens Church.
10:46 am	Departed the Church and motored to the White House.
10:50 am	Arrived at the White House.

(The President remained at the White House all day, conferring with officials of his staff on the present crisis in Cuba).

MONDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1962

9:15 am — The President arrived in the office.

10:30 - 11:00 am — Hon. George McGhee
Department of State

11:00 - 11:46 am — (Hon. Dean Rusk)
(Hon. George Ball)
(Hon. Martin Hillenbrand)
(Hon. Michael Forrestal)
(Hon. McGeorge Bundy)
OFF THE RECORD
(Political track)

11:47 - 12:30 — The above 11:00 am group plus

(Hon. Paul Nitze)
(Colonel Armstrong)
OFF THE RECORD
(Re Berlin contingency)

12:30 pm — The President went to the Mansion.

(LUNCH)

3:00 pm — The President returned to the office.

3:00 - 4:00 pm — NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

The President
The Vice President
Hon. Robert Kennedy
Hon. John McCone
Hon. Robert McNamara
Hon. Roswell Gilpatric
Hon. Paul H. Nitze
General Maxwell D. Taylor
General Earle G. Wheeler
Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.
General Curtis E. LeMay
General David M. Shoup
Edward A. McDermott
Hon. Dean Rusk
Hon. George W. Ball
Hon. U. Alexis Johnson
Hon. Edwin M. Martin
Hon. Llewellyn E. Thompson
Hon. Henry H. Fowler
Hon. Donald M. Wilson
Hon. McGeorge Bundy
Hon. T. C. Sorensen
General C. V. Clifton
Mr. Bromley Smith

4:03 - 4:45 pm

Hon. A. Milton Obote
Prime Minister of Uganda
Hon. James Simpson
Minister of Economics of Uganda
Hon. Grace Ibingira
Minister of Justice of Uganda
Hon. Apolo Kironde
Uganda's Representative-designate to the United Nations
Mr. John Kakonge
Secretary General, Uganda People's Congress

Hon. G. Mennen Williams
Hon. A. G. Matthews
Hon. Edmond Hutchinson, AID

4:45 - 5:30 pm

CABINET MEETING
The President
The Vice President
Hon. Dean Rusk
Hon. Henry Fowler
Hon. Robert McNamara
Hon. Robert Kennedy
Hon. J. Edward Day
Hon. Stewart Udall
Hon. Edward Gudeman
Hon. W. Willard Wirtz
Hon. Anthony Celebrezze
Hon. Orville Freeman
Hon. T. C. Sorensen
Hon. Jerome Wiesner
Hon. David Bell
Hon. Walter Heller

5:30 - 6:30 pm

BIPARTISAN LEGISLATIVE LEADERS MEETING
The President
The Vice President
Sen. Hubert Humphrey
Sen. Richard B. Russell
Sen. J.W. Fulbright
Sen. Bourke Hickenlooper
Sen. Everett M. Dirksen
Sen. Leverett Saltonstall
Senator Alexander Wiley
Senator George Smathers
Senator Thomas Kuchel
Speaker John McCormack
Cong. Carl Albert
Cong. Charles A. Halleck
Cong. Carl Vinson
Cong. Thomas Morgan
Cong. Leslie C. Arends
Cong. Robert B. Chiperfiel
Cong. Hale Boggs

6:33 pm	The President went to the Mansion.
6:55 pm	Returned to the office.
7:00 - 7:17 pm	ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT to the Nation concerning the developments in Cuba.
7:20 pm	The President went to the Mansion.
7:44 pm	Returned to the office.
8:01 pm	To the Mansion.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1962

9:58 am	The President arrived in the office.
10:00 - 11:03 am	EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING (The President) OFF THE RECORD (The Vice President) (Hon. Dean Rusk) (Hon. Robert McNamara) (Hon. Robert Kennedy) (Hon. John McCone) (Hon. George Ball) (Hon. Roswell Gilpatric) (General Maxwell Taylor) (Hon. Llewellyn Thompson) (Hon. Kenneth O'Donnell) (Hon. McGeorge Bundy) (Hon. Theodore Sorensen)
12:10 - 12:20 pm	H. E. Neville Noel Ashenheim Newly appointed Ambassador of Jamaica (Presented his credentials to the President) Hon. Angier Biddle Duke) Mr. John H. Crimmins Mr. Rockwood Foster
12:58 pm	The President to the pool.
1:20 pm	To the Mansion. (LUNCH)
3:45 pm	Returned to the office.
5:25 pm	To the South Grounds
5:29 pm	To the office.
6:00 - 7:00 pm	(Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council - same group as 10:00 am above)
7:05 pm	The President signed the Proclamation: <u>Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba</u>
8:06 pm	To the Mansion.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1962

9:30 am	The President arrived in the office.	
9:35 - 9:55 am	(Hon. Robert F. Kennedy)	OFF THE RECORD
9:58 - 10:00 am	(Hon. Robert Kennedy) (Hon. Kenneth O'Donnell) (Hon. Pierre Salinger)	OFF THE RECORD
10:00 - 11:03 am	(EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE) (NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL) (Regular Daily Meeting)	OFF THE RECORD
1:03 pm	The President went to the pool.	
1:25 pm	To the Mansion.	
	(LUNCH)	
4:00 pm	Returned to the office.	
4:05 - 4:33 pm	(Mr. Henry Luce) (Mr. Furnberger)	OFF THE RECORD
4:34 - 4:58 pm	H. E. Alberto Franco Nogueira Foreign Minister of Portugal H. E. Pedro Theotonio Pereira Ambassador of Portugal Mr. William Tyler Department of State	
4:58 - 5:05 pm	Senator William J. Fulbright	
5:05 - 5:15 pm	(Hon. Dean Rusk) (Hon. Robert McNamara) (Hon. John McCone) (Hon. Robert Lovett) (Hon. McGeorge Bundy) (Hon. Theodore Sorensen)	OFF THE RECORD

5:15 - 5:55 pm BIPARTISAN LEGISLATIVE LEADERS MEETING

OFF THE RECORD

(The President)
(The Vice President)
(Senator Mike Mansfield)
(Senator Hubert Humphrey)
(Senator J. W. Fulbright)
(Senator Richard B. Russell)
(Senator George Smathers)
(Senator Carl Hayden)
(Senator Everett Dirksen)
(Senator Bourke Hickenlooper)
(Senator Leverett Saltonstall)
(Senator Alexander Wiley)
(Senator Thomas Kuchel)
(Speaker John McCormack)
(Congressman Carl Albert)
(Congressman Hale Boggs)
(Congressman Thomas Morgan)
(Congressman Carl Vinson)
(Congressman Charles Halleck)
(Congressman Leslie Arends)
(Congressman Robert Chiperfield)

6:32 - 6:47 pm The President went to the Situation Room in the White House.

8:05 pm To the Mansion.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1962

9:50 am	The President arrived in the office.
9:58 - 11:10 am	(EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING)
11:40 - 12;28 pm	(Hon. Dean Acheson) OFF THE RECORD
1:17 pm	The President to the pool.
	to the Mansion.
	(LUNCH)
4:00 pm	Returned to the office.
5:00 - 5:46 pm	(EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING)
6:14 - 6:25 pm	The President went to the Situation Room.
7:43 pm	To the pool, then to the Mansion.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1962

9:20 am	The President arrived in the office.
9:59 - 11:20 am	(EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING)
1:00 pm	To the pool.
1:23 pm	To the Mansion.
	(LUNCH)
4:15 pm	Returned to the office.
5:53 - 6:19 pm	H. E. Braj Kumar Nehru Ambassador of India Hon. Phillips Talbot Hon. Carl Kaysen
6:25 - 6:37 pm	The President went to the Situation Room.
7:40 pm	To the pool, then to the Mansion.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1962

9:25 am	The President arrived in the office.
9:27 - 9:32 am	Hon. Kenneth O'Donnell Hon. McGeorge Bundy
9:35 - 9:40 am	H. E. Ellis Emmanuel Innocent Clarke Newly appointed Ambassador of Trinidad and Tobago (Presented his credentials) Hon. Angier Biddle Duke Mr. Rockwood Foster Mr. Kennedy Crockett
10:05 - 11:55 am	(EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING)
11:56 - 12:19 pm	The President met with the Civil Defense Committee of the Governors' Conference: Hon. Nelson Rockefeller, New York Governor Edmund Brown, California Governor Elmer L. Andersen, Minnesota Governor George Dewey Clyde, Utah Governor Albert D. Rosellini, Washington Governor John A. Volpe, Massachusetts Governor Farris Bryant, Florida Governor William W. Barron, West Virginia Governor S. Ernest Vandiver, Georgia General Francis A. Woofley, Civil Defense Director (Representing Governor Davis of Louisiana) General John McGreedy, Civil Defense Director (Representing Governor Notte of R. I.) Hon. Edward McDermott Hon. Steuart Pittman
12:32 - 12:55 pm	(Duke and Duchess of Devonshire) OFF RECORD (Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore)
1:45 pm	The President went to the Mansion.
5:00 pm	(General Lyman L. Lemnitzer) OFF THE RECORD

6 GLEN ORA, MIDDLEBURG, VA.

6:40 pm The President, Caroline Kennedy, Lemoyne Billings, Miss Shaw, Captain Shepard, and Maria Shriver departed Glen Ora and flew by helicopter to the White House.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

7:00 pm Arrived at the White House.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1962

9:54 am	The President, Hon. David Powers, and Lemoyne Billings departed the White House and motored to St. Stephen's Church.
9:57 am	Arrived at St. Stephen's Church.
10:00 - 10:45 am	Attended Mass at St. Stephen's Church.
10:46 am	Departed the Church and motored to the White House.
10:50 am	Arrived at the White House.
11:00 - 12:15 pm	NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING:

Members

The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State, Hon. Dean Rusk
Hon. Robert McNamara
Hon. C. Douglas Dillon
Hon. Robert Kennedy
Hon. John McCone
Hon. U. Alexis Johnson
Hon. Roswell Gilpatric
General Maxwell Taylor
Hon. Llewellyn Thompson
Hon. McGeorge Bundy
Hon. Theodore Sorensen

Also attending

Hon. George Ball
Hon. Don Wilson, USIA
Hon. Kenneth O'Donnell
Hon. Pierre Salinger
Hon. Bromley Smith

1:39 pm	The President, Captain Shepard and Lemoyne Billings departed the White House and flew to Glen Ora, Va.

GLEN ORA, MIDDLEBURG, VA.

2:00 pm	Arrived at Glen Ora.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE, OCTOBER 22, 1962

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

RADIO-TV ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION
FROM THE WHITE HOUSE
OCTOBER 22, 1962

(AS ACTUALLY DELIVERED)

Good evening, my fellow citizens:

This government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.

Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9:00 a.m., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail.

The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include Medium Range Ballistic Missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D. C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the Southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate range ballistic missiles -- capable of traveling more than twice as far -- and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far North as Hudson's Bay, Canada, and as far South as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base -- by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction -- constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and Hemisphere, the Joint Resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms build-up in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation.

MORE

The size of this undertaking makes clear that it has been planned for some months. Yet only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles and the existence of defensive anti-aircraft missiles, the Soviet Government publicly stated on September 11 that, and I quote, "The armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes," and, and I quote the Soviet Government, "There is no need for the Soviet Government to shift its weapons for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba," and that, and I quote the government, "The Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." That statement was false.

Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive build-up was already in my hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said his government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba, and I quote, "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba," that, and I quote him, "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive," and that "if it were otherwise," Mr. Gromyko went on, "the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance." That statement also was false.

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.

For many years, both the Soviet Union and the United States, recognizing this fact, have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which insured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation, under a cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history, unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II, demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the USSR or in submarines.

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In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger -- although it should be noted the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat.

But this secret, swift and extraordinary build-up of Communist missiles -- in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and Hemispheric policy -- this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil -- is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.

The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere.

Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation, which leads a worldwide alliance. We have been determined not to be diverted from our central concerns by mere irritants and fanatics. But now further action is required -- and it is underway; and these actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth -- but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the Resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following <u>initial</u> steps be taken immediately:

1) First: To halt this offensive build-up, a strict quarantine <u>on all</u> offensive military equpmment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.

2) <u>Second</u>: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military build-up. The Foreign Ministers of the OAS, in their communique of October 6, rejected secrecy on such matters in this Hemisphere. Should these offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the Hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that in the interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing this threat will be recognized.

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3) Third: It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

4) Fourth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a standby alert basis.

5) Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Organization of American States, to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to invoke Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. The United Nations Charter allows for regional security arrangements -- and the nations of this Hemisphere decided long ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies around the world have also been alerted.

6) Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of UN observers, before the quarantine can be lifted.

7) Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction -- by returning to his government's own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba -- by refraining from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis -- and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions.

This Nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum -- in the OAS, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful -- without limiting our freedom of action. We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms and military bases in a fair and effective disarmament treaty. We are prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides -- including the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba, free to determine its own destiny. We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union -- for we are a peaceful people who desire to live in peace with all other peoples.

But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why this latest Soviet threat -- or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our actions this week -- must and will be met with determination. Any hostile move anywhere in the

world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed -- including in particular the brave people of West Berlin -- will be met by whatever action is needed.

Finally, I want to say a few words to the captive people of Cuba, to whom this speech is being directly carried by special radio facilities. I speak to you as a friend, as one who knows of your deep attachment to your fatherland, as one who shares your aspirations for liberty and justice for all. And I have watched and the American people have watched with deep sorrow how your nationalist revolution was betrayed -- and how your fatherland fell under foreign domination. Now your leaders are no longer Cuban leaders inspired by Cuban ideals. They are puppets and agents of an international conspiracy which has turned Cuba against your friends and neighbors in the Americas -- and turned it into the first Latin American country to become a target for nuclear war -- the first Latin American country to have these weapons on its soil.

These new weapons are not in your interest. They contribute nothing to your peace and well being. They can only undermine it. But this country has no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you. We know that your lives and land are being used as pawns by those who deny you freedom.

Many times in the past, the Cuban people have risen to throw out tyrants who destroyed their liberty. And I have no doubt that most Cubans today look forward to the time when they will be truly free -- free from foreign domination, free to choose their own leaders, free to select their own system, free to own their own land, free to speak, and write, and worship without fear or degradation. And then shall Cuba be welcomed back to the society of free nations and to the associations of this Hemisphere.

My fellow citizens: Let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead -- months in which both our patience and our will will be tested -- months in which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing.

The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are -- but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high -- but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission.

Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right -- not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this Hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

Thank you and good night.

END

READING COPY

Good evening, my fellow citizens:

This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere. Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9 a.m.,

I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in full detail.

The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include Medium Range Ballistic Missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C.,

the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the Southeastern part of the United States, in Central America or in the Caribbean area.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles -- capable of travelling more than twice as far -- and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson's Bay, Canada and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons,

are now being uncrated and assembled on Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base -- by the presence of these large, long-range and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction -- constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this nation and Hemisphere, the Joint Resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13.

This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms build-up in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation.

The size of this undertaking makes clear that it had been planned some months ago. Yet only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles and the existence of defensive anti-aircraft missiles,

the Soviet Government publicly stated on September 11 that "the armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes", that "there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons . . . for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba", and that "the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." That statement was false.

Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive build-up was already in my hand,

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said his Government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba", that "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive", and that "if it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance." That statement also was false.

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute a maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to the peace.

For many years, both the Soviet Union and the United States -- recognizing this fact -- have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which ensured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history -- unlike that of the Soviets since World War II -- demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people.

We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere.

Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation, which leads a world-wide alliance. We have been determined not to be diverted from our central concerns by mere irritants and fanatics. But now further action is required -- and it is underway; and these actions may only be the beginning.

We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of world-wide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth -- but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and that of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the Resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:

1) First: to halt this offensive build-up, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba, from whatever nation or port, will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.

2) Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military build-up. The Foreign Ministers of the OAS in their communique of October 6 rejected secrecy on such matters in this Hemisphere. Should these offensive military PREPARATIONS continue, thus increasing the threat to the Hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the armed forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that, in the interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at these sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing this threat will be recognized.

3) Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

4) Fourth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel there and ordered additional military units to stand by on an alert basis.

5) Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Organization of American States,

to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to invoke Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. The United Nations Charter allows for regional security arrangements -- and the nations of this hemisphere decided long ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies around the world have also been alerted.

6) Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace.

Our Resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of UN observers, before the quarantine can be lifted.

7) Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction --

by returning to his government's own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba -- by refraining from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis -- and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions.

This nation is prepared to present its case against this Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum -- in the OAS, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful -- without limiting our freedom of action.

We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms and military bases in a fair and effective disarmament treaty. We are prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides -- including the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba, free to determine its own destiny. We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union -- for we are a peaceful people who desire to live in peace with all other peoples.

But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these problems in an atmosphere of intimidation.

That is why this latest Soviet threat -- or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our actions this week -- must and will be met with determination. Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed -- including in particular the brave people of West Berlin -- will be met by whatever action is needed.

Finally, I want to say a few words to the captive people of Cuba, to whom this speech is being directly carried by special radio facilities. I speak to you as a friend, as one who knows of your deep attachment to your fatherland,

as one who shares your aspirations for liberty and justice for all. And I have watched with deep sorrow how your nationalist revolution was betrayed -- and how your fatherland fell under foreign domination. Now your leaders are no longer Cuban leaders inspired by Cuban ideals. Theyare puppets and agents of an international conspiracy which has turned Cuba against your friends and neighbors in the Americas -- and turned it into the first Latin American country to become a target for nuclear war -- the first Latin American country to have these weapons on its soil.

These new weapons are not in your interest. They contribute nothing to your peace and well-being. They can only undermine it. But this country has no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you. We know your lives and land are being used as pawns by those who deny you freedom.

Many times in the past, the Cuban people have risen to throw out tyrants who destroyed their liberty. And I have no doubt that most Cubans today look forward to the time when they will be truly free -- free from foreign domination, free to choose their own leaders,

free to select their own system, free to own their own land, free to speak and write and worship without fear or degradation. And then shall Cuba be welcomed back to the society of free nations and to the associations of this Hemisphere.

* * *

My fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead -- months in which both our will and our patience will be tested --

months in which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of our danger. But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing.

The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are -- but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high -- but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose is the path of surrender or submission.

Our goal is not the victory of might but the vindication of right -- not peace at the expense of freedom,

but both peace and freedom, here in this Hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

* * *

TCS - 3rd Draft
10/21/62

Good evening, my fellow citizens:

This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive nuclear missile sites is now in preparation on that unhappy island. Until less than a week ago, no reliable information of this nature had been received -- but, having now completed its evaluation and our determination upon a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in full detail.

Four and possibly five of these sites, containing 4 launchers each, are Medium Range Ballistic Missile sites, with two missiles to be loaded on each launcher. Each of these 32 missiles would be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1000 nautical miles. Each of these 32 missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the Southeastern part of the United States, in Central America or in the Caribbean area.

Two additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for sixteen Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles -- capable of travelling more than twice as far and thus capable of striking almost any city in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson's Bay, Canada and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, medium range jet bombers, capable of

carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated on Cuba, while appropriate air bases are being prepared.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base -- by the presence of these large, long-range and clearly offensive weapons of sudden destruction -- constitutes an open threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in naked and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this nation and Hemisphere, the Joint Resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms build-up in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that Soviet missiles would never be stationed on the territory of any other nation.

The size of this undertaking makes clear that it had been planned some months ago. Yet only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles and defensive anti-aircraft missiles, the Soviet Government publicly stated that "the armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes", that "there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons . . . for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba", and that "the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." That statement was

patently false, ~~and misleading.~~

Only last Thursday, as this rapid offensive build-up continued, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said the Soviet Government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba", that "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive", and that "if it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would have never become involved in rendering such assistance." That statement also was dishonest ~~and dishonorable.~~

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute an "armed attack" under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in the nature of their threat may well require an act of self-defense.

For many years, both the Soviet Union and the United States -- recognizing this fact -- have deployed nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which ensured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own weapons systems have never been secretly transferred to the territory

of any other nation; and our history -- unlike that of the Soviets since World War II -- demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the USSR or in submarines. In that sense, missiles in Cuba ~~simply~~ add to an already clear and present danger -- although, it should be noted, the nations of Latin America have never previously been included as communist nuclear targets.

But this secret, swift and extraordinary build-up of communist missiles in an area well-known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere -- in violation of Soviet assurances, in suddenly stationing strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil, in defiance of American and Hemispheric policy -- is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be believed again by either friend or foe.

The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere. I am so informing Soviet Chairman Khrushchev and

President Dorticos of Cuba by separate messages already dispatched.

Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation. We had no wish to be diverted from our central efforts by mere irritants and fanatics. But further action is now required and underway; and these actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of world-wide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our hands -- but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and that of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the Resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:

1) First: to halt this offensive build-up, there is to be initiated a blockade on all military equipment under shipment to Cuba. Such a blockade can clearly be authorized both by the requirements of U. S. self-defense and by the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States, acting under Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty and this year's Punta del Este Resolution. All ships bound for Cuba, from whatever nation or port, will, if found to contain cargoes of weapons, be turned back. Such a blockade will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. In short, it will not only prevent completion

of the current offensive build-up on Cuba. It will also require the Soviet Union to choose between fighting the U. S. Navy in American waters or abandoning its build-up on Cuba. And it will require Cuba to choose between pursuing the interests of her own people or subjecting them to great dangers in the interests of a distant power.

2) Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military build-up. The Foreign Ministers of the OAS in their communique of October 6 rejected secrecy on such matters in this Hemisphere. Should offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the Hemisphere, appropriate action will be undertaken at a time and in a manner of our own determination. I have directed the armed forces to prepare for such eventualities, ~~including the targeting of these bases by our strategic forces~~; and I trust that both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at these sites will recognize ~~in time~~ our inability to tolerate this threat.

3) Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

4) Fourth: We shall urge the UN and the OAS to demand removal of these offensive weapons, and the prompt dispatch of an international inspection team to make certain that this is done.

5) Fifth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced

our base at Guantanamo, evacuated the dependents of our personnel there and ordered additional military units to stand by on an alert basis.

6) Sixth: Our allies in both NATO and the OAS have been alerted; the call for the OAS meeting to which I referred has already gone out; our case against this serious threat to peace will be presented, as required by the Charter, to which we subscribe, to an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council; and we shall, in addition, convene immediately a meeting of countries in the Caribbean area to work out cooperative means of halting the clandestine movement of subversive agents and materials between Cuba and Latin America.

7) Seventh: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join with me and others in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and transform the history of man. By his action last week the world has moved a step closer to the brink of that dark and awful abyss of destruction. It is time for both sides to step back from that brink -- to refrain from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis -- and to resume the search for peaceful and permanent solutions.

This nation is prepared to present its case against this threat to peace and our own proposals for a peaceful world at any time, in any forum, to any figure -- in the OAS, in the United Nations, and to Chairman Khrushchev

in person. We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms and overseas bases in a fair and effective disarmament treaty. We are prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides -- including the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba, free to determine its own destiny. We have only recently supported the announcement by the Iranian Government that it would not permit the establishment of foreign missile bases upon its territory. We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union; for we are a peaceful people who desire to live in peace with all other peoples.

But we cannot settle these problems under threats -- negotiation yes, intimidation never. That is why this latest Soviet threat -- or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our quarantine -- must and will be met with determination. And that is why, should any talks develop, our forces all over the world will be alert -- and the blockade will remain. Any Soviet show of force anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed -- including the brave people of West Berlin -- will be met by whatever action is needed; and we are ready, if tensions are increased over Berlin, to send additional ground and air forces to Europe.

8) Finally, I have directed the United States Information Agency to use all available resources in making clear our position to the captive

people of Cuba. My words tonight are being carried directly to them -- and I want to tell them this. Do not permit yourselves to become involved in the grim confrontation of nuclear weapons. Do not become the first Latin American country to have these weapons on your soil. Do not become the first Latin American country to be a necessary target for massive destruction. These weapons cannot contribute to the security of Cuba; they can only undermine it. They can contribute nothing to your peace and well being.

This nation has no quarrel with the Cuban people, only sympathy and hope. We know you did not consent to the transformation of your island into a target for nuclear war. We know your lives and land are being used as pawns by those who deny you freedom. We have no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you.

Our objective, on the contrary, is to give back to the Cuban people the dream of their own revolution -- the dream of "liberty and justice for all" which Fidel Castro repudiated when he sold you out to the Soviets. Many times in the past, the Cuban people have risen to throw out tyrants -- foreign and domestic -- who destroyed their liberty. And I have no doubt that the vast majority of Cubans today looks forward to the time when they will once again be free -- free to choose their own leaders, free to select their own system, free to own their own land, to speak and write and worship without fear or degradation. And when foreign domination is

ended, and the use of Cuba as a base of subversion and aggression has ceased, we shall gladly welcome her back to the society of free nations and to the associations of this Hemisphere. For the basic objective of the United States in the world today is peace and freedom -- and that includes the peace and freedom of the Cuban people.

* * *

My fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead -- months in which both our will and our patience will be tested by those who would have us do more and those who would have us do less. But the path we have chosen for the present is consistent with our character and courage as a nation, and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high -- but Americans have always paid it. One path we shall never choose -- the path of surrender or submission.

Our goal is not the victory of might but the vindication of right -- not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this Hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 22, 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 196

TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT Establishment of an Executive Committee of the National Security Council

I hereby establish, for the purpose of effective conduct of the operations of the Executive Branch in the current crisis, an Executive Committee of the National Security Council. This committee will meet, until further notice, daily at 10:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. I shall act as Chairman of this committee, and its additional regular members will be as follows: the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Ambassador-at-Large, the Special Counsel, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The first meeting of this committee will be held at the regular hour on Tuesday, October 23rd, at which point further arrangements with respect to its management and operation will be decided.

cc:
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Ambassador-at-Large
The Special Counsel
The Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
bc:
Mr. O'Donnell
Mr. Salinger

CC: Mrs. Lincoln
Mr. Bundy (3)
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files